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I,

BITRODUGTION

It is alleged under Count I of the Indlctraentj

that the defendant Johann Ludwig SGIf'/SRIN von KROSIGK
participated in the initiation of invasions of other

countries and wars of aggression in violation of

international laws and treatiesi including but not
limited to planning preparationj Initiation and waging
of wars of aggression, and wars in violation of
r

international treaties, agreements and assurances.

The acts recognized as Crimes against Peace are set
forth in Paragraph 1(a) of Article II of Control
Council Law No, 10.

SGHWLRIN von NROSIGK is charged under Count II

with, during a period of years preceding 6 May 1945,
participation as a leader, organizer, instigator,
and accomplice in the formulation and execution of
a common plan and conspiracy to commit, and which

involved the commission of Crimes against peace,

(including the acts constituting War Grimes and
Crimes against Humanity, which-were committed as an
integral part of suoh Crimes against Peace) as defined

by Paragraph 1(a) of Control Cpuncil Law No. 10, and
is individually responsible for his own acts and for

all acts committed by any persons in the execution of

such common plan and conspiracy,

The proof adduced

relative to Counts I, V, and VI forms a part of the
said common pl?n and conspiracy and suoh proof is
incorporated in Count I^ for substantiation of the
allegations in Count II.
The defendant Is also charged in Counts V and VI

with War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity as defined
"

1

-

1
by

1(b) and (c) of Jb^ticlo II of Control

Council Law No,. 10»-

The criteria of oriminnlity nre sot forth in

paragraph 2 of Article II of Control Council Law
No» 10> which roads in part as follows?

"2.- Any person without regard to nationality
or the capacity in which he acted, is
deemed to have committed

a

crime as de

fined in Paragraph 1 of this article,

if

he was (a) a principal or (b) was on
accessory to the commission of any such
crime or ordered or abetted the

same

or

(c) tooh a consenting part therein or (d)
Was connected with plans or enterprises

involving its commission or (e) was a
meaiber of any organization or group, connected
with the com.nission of any such crime or

(f) with reference to paragraph 1 (a) if
he held a high political, civil or millta.ry

(including General Staff) position in Ger
many or in one of its Allies, co-belligerents

or satellites or held high position in the
financial, industrial, or economic life
of any such countri^,"

ft I

5?
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II.

COUNT I

CRII.SS AC-AINST P3ACE

Introduction

Defendant von KROSIGK is charged under both
Count I and Count II of the Indictment (as well as
Counts V and VI).

The theory upon which von KR03IQ;K can be held
under Count II — the conspiracy count — is a
matter which concerns a large number of the

defendants. In this respect reference is made to
further briefs dealing with the common plan and
conspiracy.

Here, the proof will be directed toward Count I participation

"...in the initiation of invasions of other
countries and wars of aggression in vio
lation of international laws and treaties,

including but not limited to planning,
preparation, initiation and waging of

wars of aggression, and wars in violation
of international treaties, agreements
and assurances."

This Is the equivalent of Count II of the IIir»
/

There is an adequate basis for convicting yon

K.ROSIGK on Count I by analogizing him to Funk. In

fact, his guilt is perhaps more clearly established
than that of Funk, In some respects, because of
the long period of time during which he gave his

services to the Nazi regime; he enoon^DassGs much of

the period which, in the IMT case, was described
as attributable to Schaoht, as well as the period

when Funk was Plenipotentiary General for War
Economy,.

To Glabornto this a little more: As to Schacfcit,.

the X„T summed up the issue In the following

sentence (Vol.I, p.310):
"The case against Schacht therefore depends
on the inference that

Schacht did in fact

know of the Nazi aggressive plans."

That inference^ the IMT said,, (p. 310}

"has not been established beyond a
reasonable douot.-'"

The basis for that remaining reasonable doubt is
explained in the earlier discussion of the case
against Schacht,- It was not that Schacht could not

have known of the .aggressive objective of the re

armament progr.am; quite the contrary, the IMT
specifically recognized that anyone with a know

ledge of German finances was in a particularly
good position to realize that the armament policy

had aggression as its object. The mT} said (p. 309):
"On the other hand, Schacht, with his in
timate knowledge of German finance, was
in a peculiarly good position to under
stand the true significance of Hitler's
frantic rearmament, and to realize that
the economio policy adopted was consistent
only with war .as its object.?^
The basis, then,, was not la.ck of knowledge,

but

lack of participation in the economio program after
Its aggressive purpose became evident. The lUT

apparently accepted Sch.acht's own explanation of

his conduct (p.309):
"Schacht has contended that he participated
in the rearmament program only because he
wanted to build up a strong and Independent
Germany which would carry out a foreign v
policy which would command respect on an
equal basis with other Suropean countries;
that whan he discovered that

the Nazis

were rearming for aggressive purposes, he
attempted to slow down the speed of re
armament;

* 4

i

^4-

Kf. -.p-.
'x<-

rViiiiiliiifi%firroi1'

' C'.V . .

As to that contention, the IMT said (p., 309):
"Schacht, ae early as 1936, "began to ad
vocate 3, liraitiSlon of the rearmament

program for financial reasons. Had the
policies advocated by him been put into
effect, Germany would not have been

prepared for a general Surope-an war. In
sistence on his policies led to his.
eventual dismissal from all positions
of economic significance in Germany#"

In the light of this reasoning, there can be no
question but that Schacht would have been found

guilty under Count II of the IHT case (Count I, this

case) had he continued to cooperate in the economic
program, rather than adopting a policy of opposition

which eventuajly "brought about his dismiBsal- If
there wei^e any doubt about it, the judgment as to

Funk dispels it. The first sentence of the judgment

finding Funk guilty states (Vol.1, p.304):
"Funk became active in the economic field

after the Nazi plans to wage aggressive
war had been clearly defined,"

Then, after outlining hie activity, the IIJT con
cluded (p.305):
"Funk was not one.of the leading figures
in originating the Nazi plans for aggressive
^

war. His activity in the economic sphere
was under the supervision of Goering as
Plenipotentiary General of the 4-year plan.
He did, however, participate in the economic
preparation for certain of the aggressive

wars, notably those against Poland and the
Soviet Union, but his guilt can "be ade
quately dealt with under Count Two of the
indictment."

Preliminarily, however, the formal positions
held by von KROSIGK should be summarized.
S#

von KROSIGK's PoeitSons and Career

Count Johann Ludwig SCHWERIW von KR05IGK spent

his entire government career in the Reich riinlstry
-5"

ill-

of Financej

as follows!

1920 -

Government

Councollor*

1922 -

Promoted to Senior Government Councellor.

1924 -

Ministerial Councclllor.

1925 -

General Referent, for the Reichs Budget

in charge of supervising the budget of
the Gorman Rcich»

1 Janu.ary 1929 - Promoted to Ministeriai jJlrector
and head of the Budget Division,

2 Julj 1932 - Appointed Reich Minister of Finance
in Papon Cahinet,

30 January 1933 - Reappointed to same post by
Hitler and remained so to the end.

1 May 1945 - Appointed by Doenltz as Foreign Mini
ster and in charge of the Civil Cabinet
with authority to fill the other positions^

(Rr-23856 .and 351-PS, Sxh. 430, Bk. 70-a, p. 1).
The source for the 1945 appointment, is an affi

davit of Doenitz (HG-4393, Sxh. lOlO, Bk,- 70-a, p. 7)
which states:

"I have offered SGKWSHIN-KROSIGK on

1 May 1945 the position of Foreign
Minister and he has accepted.

Fur

ther, I have offered him charge of
the Civil Cabinet and he h.as also

accepted.

In. this capacity I ga,ve

him the task to f i l l the other cabi

net positions*.
I know that he has
not filled the position of Minister

of the Interior, however, he assigned
Stuck,art to take care of still cur

rent business within this department,
I have seen Stuckart repeatedly there
after and know therefore that he be

longed to the staff of SCHW3RINKROSIGK."

Under direct examination, von KROSIGK stated he
was educated for two years at Oxford where he majored

in socialism and public finance..

(.Tr,p. 22697),.

He

fought in World War I pnd became a first lieutenant
of the reserve,. (Tr,p,. 22700).,..
-6-

As to the Llinistry of Finances, to which he 'be

longed from spring 19S0 to May 1945,. he testified on
its position and activities, distinguishing "betv/oen
the period "before and after Hitler took over the

government,.. He raaint?.ined that this ministry^ also

under the Weimar republic, was a. purely professional
one,and had nothing to do with political questions.
CTr.pp.-. 22866-22868).

As opposed to this, and as indicative of what

some of this time-consuming '^'ork was, we have evi

dence of the secret pu'blications of the High Command

of the German Navy in 1937,. entitled ^The Fight of

the,Navy against Versailles, 1919-1935".

(0-156,

3xh..1171, Bk. 70-b, p. 92}.. The editor. Captain
Schuossler (Navy), states that:
"The object and aim of this memorandum
is to draw a technically reliable
picture based on documentr^ry records
and the evidence of those ^"ho took

part of the fight of the Navy against
the unbearable regulations"of the
Peace Treaty of yersr.lHes.

"It also stresses more clearly the ser
vices of those men, who——without being
known in wider circles—applied them
selves with oxtraordinarv zea.1 and re-

eponsibility to the task" of the "fight
against the Peace Trc^.ty; thereby,
stimulated by the highest feeling of
duty, they risked, particul^-rly in the
early days of their fight, thomsc-lvos
and tneir positions unrestrainedly."

Later, the text of the book (at p. 727 of the original)
statedr

"The liouidntion of the Lehmam enter
prises, which had "branched out far

and wide, took several years and could
only be Carried out in a way which put
enough emphasis on the military idea

because the perEonallties, entrusted
with this task, were full of the high

est .understanding for the tasks of the
-7-

defense of the country.

Their parts

pl-ayod in this task the Mlnisterla.1
Councillors Weiss and Graff
von KROSIGK.

SCKWSEIN

When von KROSIGK became liinietor of Finance in

1933, he was not a member of the NSDAP.

He "became

a member when he was awarded the Golden Party Badge_

by Hitler on 31 January 1937 (2964-PS, Sxh. 805, Ek,
70-a, p» 5), the fourth annivers.ary of the appoint
ment of Hitler.

Seizur£ and
£oils£l_idation £i'_Power

(a),

^he ^G_lzur_e o.i£H£W£r.
As already indicated, von KROSIGK was appointed

by Hitler on 30 January 1933, and attended^ the first
meeting of Hitler^s Cabinet.

(351-PS, Sxho 430, Hs:.

70-a, p. 3).

The II.!T stated (Vol. I, p. 178):
^The Hitler Cabinet was anxious to pass

an *Enabling Act' that would give them,
full legislative powers, including the
power to deviate from the constitution.
They wore without the necessary majority
in the Reichstag to "bo able to do this
constitutionally-.
They therefore mp.do
use of the decree suspending the guar
antees of freedom

and took into so-

called protective custody a large num

ber of Communist deputies and p.irty of
ficials.,
Having done this, Hitler in
troduced the 'Enabling Act into the

Reichstag,, and after he had made it
clear that if it was not passed, further
forceful measures would be t-^ken, the

act was pa.ssed on the 24th liarch 1933*-*'^

The defendant von KROSIGK participated fully in

the planning for this seizure of power..

Ho attended

a meeting of the Llinisters on 15 Harch 1933, presided

over by Hitler,, and called to discuss the Enabling
-8-

AcU

.(2962-PS4 Kxh. 1149, Bis:, 70-a, p, 8),

no doubt what was Intended,

There was

Frick, Minister of the In

terior, stated th-'^t he had in mind an Sn-abling Act under
yjhich "every provision of the German constitution could
be side-tracked."

(p. 11)., He said he had in mind some

thing like the folloyring (p. 11)5
"The Reich administration should "be en
abled to take such measures as i t deems

necessary in view of the needs of the

people and State.
visions of
be waived.

In doing so the ]pro-

the Reich constitution can

Von KROSIGK contributed his ideas to the dlecussiono

-He

suggested, for example, a special commission, consisting
of representatives of his own Ministry, of the fjlinistry

of the Interior, and of the Prussla.n Ministry of Finance,
to make a list of the measures which should be.first

enacted as poon as the Knabling Act was passed.

approved (p, 13).

Hitler

At the meeting of the Ministers on

SO March 1933, just preceding the passage of the En

abling Act, and presided over by.Hitler, von KROSIGK
was also present.

(2963-PS, Exh, 1150, Bk. 70-a, p. 15).

The Enabling Act was signed by von Hindenburg, Hitler,
Frick, von Neurath, and von KROSIGK.

(2001-PS, Exh. -

1151, Bk, 70-a, p. 20).
During the first weeks of Hitler^s rule the German

Parliament was still in existence.

In order not to en

danger the vote on the Enabling Act, the Communist Party
had to be dissolved. A pretext for enforcing its disfsolution was on hand when the parliament was set on fire

on 27 February 1933.

It is commonly known now that the

arson was engineered by the Nazie, however.. Hitler im

mediately held the "Communists responsible for it and

dissolved their Party^
— 9

On the nl^ht of 27 February 1933 von KROSIGK was
with French ambassador Francois-Poncot when news of the
fire was receivedo

Franccis-Poncet adds in his memoirs

"Bewilderment appears on all faces^

However, KROSIGK - whether he is or
is not yet a Nazi

fit of joy:

cries in a strango

'Thank God'®"

(Tr.p. 23858)®

The defendant KROSIG-K, under cross-oxamination,
denied having made the remark,

".in that form",

but ad

mitted that he may possibly have said:

"If anything has to burn at a,ll, then
i t Is not the worst thing for the
Reichstag to burn, heoause more valu
able objects might have been set fire

to."

(Tr.p. 23858),

Even in this version KROSIGK reflected .his joy. that fhe

remnants of constitutional government were abolished.

Dictatorship could take its course,

(b)o

T^h£ ^ons£l^dat^on o_f__p£W£r_2_
Following the seizure of power,

the Nazis "pro

ceeded to extend its hold in every phase of German

life."

(IMT, p. 178).

Von KROSIGK was active in this

procedure in several directives.

Serv_ic£,
The IMT stated (Vol. I, p. 178);
"The Government then proceeded to secure,
control of the

Civil Service.

This was

achieved by a process of centralization,

and by a careful sifting of the whole
Civil Service administra.tion.
By a law
of the 7th April it was provided that
officials 'who were of non-Aryan descent'
should be retired; and i t was also decreed
that 'officials who because of their pre

vious, political activity do not offer
security that they will exert themselves
for the national state without reservation

shall be discharged'.

The law of the 11th

April 1933 provided for the discharge of
•'all

Civil Servants who belong to the Com

munist Party
-10-

»-,

Von KROSIGK was very active in this whole program.

The law of 7 April 1933, referred to by the lUT, was
signed by only three persons —

KROSIGK.

Hitler, Frick a.nd von

C1397-PS, . 3xh. 1152, Bk. 70-a, Pr 24)..

The

selection is not accidental; although Frick, as Mini
ster of Interior, was most closely connected with the

Civil Service, the financial'aspects required von

KROSIGK^e complete cooperation.
A

Most of the law, vrhich

is in 18 Articles, concerned salaries, pensions, re
tirements, seniority, etc.

Needless to say, the finan

cial provisions were very much to the disadvantage of
the displaced Civil servants*-

The first regulation issued under the law of April

7 (referred to by the IMT as the "law of the 11th April
1933") was also signed only by Frick and von KROSIGK.

(2012-PS, Exh. 1153, Bk. 70-a, p, 25). Here, despite
the fact that no new financial changes were made, we
find von KROSIGK as one of two signatories.
There were other laws and regulations, also signed

by von KROSIGK, to the same effect.

On 30 June 1933,

von KROsiG-k, with Hitler and Frick, signed .another law
more drastically removing those of non-Aryan descent,
V

and cutting of pension rights of Communists.
Exh. 1154, Bk. 70-a, p-^ 27)-,

(1400-PS,

On 20 July 1933 Hitler and von KROSIGK also signed
an additional law (von KROSIGK signing for the Minister

of the Interior) (1398-PS, Exh. 1156, Bk. 70-a, p. 28)
which amended the law of 7 April 1933 by specifying, in
F'^ragraph 2 a, that:
"Officials who have belonged to the Com

munist party or to Communistic siuxil-lary
or collateral organizations, or otherwise

have been active in furthering the aims
of Communism, are t^ be disohnrged.""
-11-

Von KROSICxK's aotivitles in this .respect did

not step with the early measures.

He, Hitler, and

Frlch signed the German Public Officials Law of

27 January 1937 which, certainly worked the complete

subjugation of all State officials (2340-PS, 3xh, •
1156,• Bk. 70-A,'p,. 29).-

Article I (3) provides:

"The state demands of the official
absolute obedience., .

Article 4 (1) prescribes the following oath:
"I S'^'earf

I ^Hi be loyal and

obedient to the Fuehrer of the

German Reich and people, Adolf
Hitler, obey the law and conscien
tiously perform my official duties,
so help me God."

Article 25 (1) made persons who were married
♦

ineliglDle for official positions unless the'spouse

was of German or -^elated blood, and Article 25 (2)
forbade marriages by officials to anyone except a

person of German or mixed blood.

The law limited

employment of civil service personnel to German
citizens (Art.

'

belief that the employee was no longer politically
reliable (Art.

X

26) and permitted dismissal upon the

57).

On 30 April 1938, von KRDSIGK

alone signed a further regulation imposing additional
restraints on the right of civil servants to marry

V

persons not of Germsji or racially related blood
(iJG-4758, Fxh, 1157, Bk. 70-A, p. 32).

The transla

tion of the document does not itself sho"^ that it

was signed by von KROSIGK,' however, he admitted It
under cross examination (Tr; d;- 23874).

There is also evidence that von KROSIGK carried

his expertise in the Civil Service field well into
the war period, and into the immediate preparation

for war*' At the second meeting of the reorganized
-12-

•Reich

Defense Council (see infra) on 23 June 1939

(3787-PS, Sxh. 553, Bh. 70-B., p, 23), Frich, as
General Plenipotentiary for Administration,

criti

cized the overlapping and waste of manpower in govern

ment administration, with Civil Service,

Wehrmacht,

Party, and Permanent Organizations paralleling each
other.

He recommended a

small

Commission to make

definitive proposals, which was done (p, 35).

The

Reich Minister of finance, together with Frick, Funk
and a few others, were made members of this Commission,

under the presidency of Stuckart (p. 36).

Goering

(p. 36)
"requested that the Commission's
proposals be accepted.
It was' an
Important part of the preparation
for war."

2)

Control of citizenship and confiscation of
property of persons deprived of citizenship

A further blow against the Jews,

an a.ccretion

of some financial support to the Reich, and an in
terrorem

removal of another potential set of opponents

of the Nazi regime, was the law of 14 July 1933, signed

by Hitler, Frick, von Neurath and von KROSIGK (NG-4759,
Bxh, 1158,. Bk,. 70-A, p. 33)..
<A»

This law authorized the

denaturallzation of undaslraoles ^nd the revocation

of citizenship of German nationals residing abroad

who were unfaithful to the Jlelch,

^t also rauthorized

•the confiscation of property of persons ^"ho were

•deprived of citizenship.

Paragraph 3 provided:

"The Reich Ii/Linlater of the Interior

in agreement with the Reich Ministers

for Foreign Affairs and Finance may
issue legal and administrative decrees
to execute this law. "
-13-

ryr--

3) Consoll<3.ation of power In Hitler-

The law of 1 August 1934 consolidating in Hitler
the office of Reich Chancellor and Reich President

was signed "by von KROSIGK together with all the other

members of the Cabinet (2003-PS, 3xh,. 1159, Bk. 70-A,
p. 36)-

4) Destruction of the Trade Unions.

The IlilT said (p. 179);
"In their determination to

remove a l l

sources of opposition, the HSDAP leaders
turned their attention to the

tro.de

unions, the churches, and the Jews, In
April 1933 Hitler ordered the late
defendant Ley.

who was then staff

director of the political organization
of the KSDAP,

'to take over the trade

unions.'.

At the

.

.

conclusion of the

action the official NSDAP press ser

vice reported tha.t the National Social

ist Factory Cells Orgnjiization had
^eliminated the old leadership of Free
Trade Unions'

and taken over the

leadership themselves.
Similarly, on
the 3d Hay 1933, the NSDA? press ser
vice announced that the Christian

trade unions 'have unconditionally
subord.iaated'. themselves to the leader

ship of Adolf Hitler..'

In place of

the trade unions the Nazi Government

set up a Deutsche Arbelts Front (DAF),
controlled by the NSDAP, and which,
in practice, all workers in Germany
were compelled to join."
The defendant von KROSIGK had his part in this

activity.

Sven before Ley's "coordinated activity"

against the unions, von KROSIGK, among others, had
signed a law on 4 April 1933, severely limiting the

powers of the Factory Representative Councils, which
had served as sort of grievance committees for German

laborers, particularly as regards dismissals (1770-PS,
Exh. 1160, Bk. 70-A, p» 37).

The new law permitted

cancellation of memberships in the Councils of those

who had been "appointed contrary to the spirit Of
State and economy," and removed the right of the
-14-

Councils to oppose the dismissal of a worker "if. the
dismissed is suspected of an unfriendly attitude to
ward the State."

Ag.ain, on 19 May 1933j von KROSIGK signed a law

eliminating the right of collective bargaining, and
substituting therefore regulations by ''Trustees of

Laoor."

Section 4 provided "The trustees of labor are

bound by the directives and decrees of the Eeich Govern

ment, "

(405-.PS, 2xh,. 1161, Bk, 70--A, p, 39)^

He also

signed the law of 20 January 1934 inaugurating the

"Fuehrerprinzip" in labor relations (1861-PS, 3xh,1162,
Bk, 70-3, p. 40).

Paragraph 2 provided;

"(1) The le.ader of the plant makes the
decisions for the employees .and laborers
in .all matters conoerning the enterprise,
so f.ar as they are regulated by this law."
5) Persecution of Jews and the Churches.

The material in this phase of the Consolidation

of Power is contained under the section pertaining to

Count V, and need not be repeated here, except to say

that it reveals a full participation by von KROSIGK,
In general, on this topic, we should not forget
that the above refers only to the laws vhlch von KROSIGK

signed.

He was, however, a member of the Cabinet, and

undoubtedly knew of and is chargeable with all of the

laws and decrees passed by the Cabinet during the period
of Consolidation of Power up to 1937, even though he

did not personally affix his signature.

He had signed

the Enabling Act {2001-PS, 3xh, 1151, Bk. 70-A, p. 20),
which gave the Cabinet law-making power, and can
scarcely be heard to say that he was not responsible

for the laws passed by the Cabinet under that grant,
-15-
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The decision of the BaT .refusing to hold the Caoinet

to he a criminal organization declaredj as one of
its reasons for that conclusion (p. 104).;
"Because i t is not sho^i'n that after

1957 it ever really acted as a group
or organization, "

On this basis, it may fairly be said that von

ICROSIGK took a consenting, if not active, part in
every decree by which the Cabinet solidified the

Nazi*s control beyond the po^^er of anything but a
war to break.

The documents which are these laws

and decrees,, extracts from the Reichsgesetsiblatt for
the most part, are subject to Judicial notice even
though not in evidence.

iven on the basis of the laws which he signed,
however, it is already plain that von KROSIGK is not

a mere tax-gatherer or a paymaster.

He participated

in policy questions well outside that narrow- field

in civil service, in manpower problems, in trade

union and labor control, in Jewish pe">^secution, and
in attacks on the churches. In short, as his position
as a Cabinet iiinister would naturally imply, he was a
significant figure in the Nazi program of seizure
and consolidation of power.

4.

A^-_"^2^J^50SIGK_in
£3?eparation for ^res^ive War

(a) The Rearmament Program in its Rarly Stages.
The HjIT stated (p. 184};
"In October, 1933, Germany withdrew from
the International Disarmament Conference
and the League of Nations.
In 1935 the

Nazi government decided to take the
first open steps to free itself from

its olDligations undet- the treaty of

Versatile , •• . Six days later^ on
the 16th iilarch 1935, a la^ "^as passed
bearing the signatures, among others,
of the defendants Goering, Hess,
Franky Frick,- Sohacht and von Weurath,
instituting compulsory military ser
vice and fixing the establishment of

the German Army at a peacetime
strength of 500,000 men,"
The defendant von KROSIGK was involved in ooth

steps.

This he does not deny,

Ke stated under

direct examination:

"In the financing of rearmament I par
ticipated from complete inner convic
tion that an unarmed stace on a

con

tinent which was completely armed was
a threat to peace, a vacuum always

drawing things into it.,"

(Tr.p. 22936),

This explanatioh, however, Is utterly unjustified;

the neighbor states of the European continent were
not "armed" - that's the reason why Hitler's ability

to invade them without encountering resistance is
sufficient evidence to the contrary.

In 1933 the

Helchswehr, though small in size, was a highly
trained army certainly in a position to

off

any attack, if it could be established thct Ger^

ninny's neighbors fostered aggressive intentions.
KHOSIGK was present at the conference of Mini

sters on 13 and 14 October 1933 at which Hitler

I'

announced Germany's withdrawal from the Disarmament

Conference and the League of Nations.

(2907-PS,

Il63j Bk. 70-a, p. 44; that von KROSIGK was

there ig ghown at p.. 51). And he, too, was one of
<:he signers of the law of 16 March 1935 relntro-

duolng oompulsory military service.
Sxh, 1164, Bk, 70-a, p, 52),

(1654-PS,

^IS-

r iI

• •

I >

The defendant von KRQSIGK had also, from the
"beginning taken an active part, at the highest
level,

In the beginning of the rearmament program#

On April 4, 1933, the Cabinet had created a Reichs

Defense Council (Reichsverteidigungsrat - RVR)#
Its composition was announced by Keitel in the
minutes of the 2nd session of the Working Committee

of the Delegates for Reich Defense held on 22 liay

1933.

(EG-177, Exh. 543, Bk. 70-a, pp. 61, 62).

Among its members (9 in all) was von KROSIGK, as
Minister of Finance..

At this second session,

Keitel, who was made President, announc.ed (p. 62):
"The Reich Defense Council, which
until now had been prepared for
war emergency, will go into im
mediate action."

Keitel was also asked, "What about the finan
cial aspects of this work?".

His answer Indicated

that the Minister of Finance was to have a very
significant and over-all function (p. 64)I
"The organization of a war economy
always requires plenty of money and
time... Proposals and inouiries of
the various Reich ministries must be

made the subjects of sessions of the

Reich Defense Council (Cabinet) by
the working committee.
It is to be
decided there, which tasks have
priorities over others and for which

purposes means have to be available.
Nevertheless,, the financing of the
various proposals remains a matter
of the ministry concerned.
The
direct influence of the Reich Chan

cellor on these tasks represents,

however, a great progress compared
with past times. The various mini
stries have to submit yearly budget

proposals, which are to be approved
separately."
The document also indicates that the Finance

Ministry was not only concerned with financial
-18-
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aspects, but cooperated directly in other war
measures.

Under Item 6 of the agenda,

"Storage

of \Veapons", Keitel announced (p. 66):
"(b) The Finance Mnistry has set

up a *re-enforced border control
service'.

The value of this or

ganization lies in the distribu
tion of personnel among the cus
toms sectors—equal to border

protective sectors. Exchange of
personnel rosters between the cus-

'

I

toms, etc., authorities and the
Wehrkreise is in effect already.

^

re-enforced border control ser

The peace-tijne maneuvers of the

vice are of great importance."

*

Nor was there-any doubt left as to the neces

sity for extreme secrecy.

Keitel announced (p. 64):

"No document must be lost,

since

otherwise the enemy propaganda
^

would make use of i t .

Matters

communicated orally cannot be

proven, they can be denied by
us in Geneva. "

t

The representative of the Finance Ministry (Wapenhensch) added his idea (p. 65):
"If letters pertaining to Reich
Defense can

be written in such

a way that in case of loss their
contents cannot be recognized as

*

mobilization measures by enemy
news services, express matters

must be dispatched by mail."

.f

•

•

In discussing the evidence against Schaoht,

the IMT stated (p. 134):
"After that date (30 January 1933)

he played an important role in the
vigorous rearmament program which
was adopted, using the possibilities
of the Reichsbank to the fullest ex
tent in the rearmament effort... He

devised a system under which 5-year

notes, known as M.3.F.O. bills, guar
anteed by the Reichsbank and backed
in effect, by nothing more than its ,
position as a bank of issue, were
Used to obtain large sums for re
armament from the short-term money
market."
-19-

..

,

^

-.

In 1933, the law which governed relations
betwaen the Reich Treasury and the Reichsbanlc wa.s

the law of 30 August 1924,
Bk, 70-b, p. 80).

(N&-4760, 3xh, 1168,.

Under that law the Reichsbank

was authorized to lend to the Reich amounts not

in excess of lOO million HJ, for a period not in
excess of 3 months, and at the close of each

fiscal year the Reich had to be clear of obliga
♦

tion to the Reichsbank,

t

That, for rearmament, was practically useless..
Hence a way had to be devised to obtain loans out
side the law, and Mefo was the answer,.

In a nut

shell, since the Reichsbank could not lend directly
to the Reich, it was arranged to create a private
company — Metalurglsche Forschungs G.m,b.H.

and let the Reichsbank lend to it.

The armamer.

suppliers drew for their deliveries drafts on ht

Mefo accepted the drafts; the suppliers then gave
them to their own banks which endorsed them and

sold them to the Reichsbank,

The Reichsbank could

take them without ado, because they carried the

signatures of three private firms. The drafts ran
for five years, (Tr.pp,. 23865-23868),
It is apparent from this description that the

system was no good unless the Reich stood behind

it in some way, since the Reichsbank was getting
nothing whatever for its funds; thp proceeds were
going into guns, tanks, ships, etc. The Reichs"^^^nk, knowing that the Mefo was a commercial en

terprise eetaDlished ad hoc and without any means
of its own, demanded a strict guarantee from the
Reich to the effect that it would honor the drafts
-20-

at maturity.

This guarantee was given by the Reich..

Irv this way, enormous amounts of short-term

money were made available for the armament program.
The Mefo bills finally amounted to "about 12 Ml-

lions'i, - (Tr.pp. 16734 and 22939).

In von KROSIGiC*s

letter to Hitler, dated 1 September 1938 (EC-419, .
Sxh. 1165, Bk". "-70-5, p. 67), ' von KROSIGK eummariaed

financial aspects up to them.

He states, In part

(p. 67): .
"1.

Since the assumption of power,

the definite policy has been fol
lowed to finance the large and once
occurring expenditures for the first
labor procurement and for the rearma
ment by the means of loans.

'Vhen this

was not possible through the normal
use of the money and investment mar

ket, that is from the annual savings

Increase in Germany, the financing
was arranged through the discounting

of bills of exchange (trade and MEFO

(Metalurgic Research, Inc.) . bills of
exchange) at the Reichsba,nk which
means the printing of money... When

at the turn of 1957-1938, the state
of full production was reached, the
system of MEFO bills of exchange,

which at that time amounted to 12
milliards RM, was abandoned,"

There can be no question that von KROSIGK was

fully advised and deeply involved in the Mefo system,•
and must at least share the responsibility for it, .
Strenuous efforts were made to keep the Mefo

system a secret in the Ministry of Finance.' •It.did

not appear in the budget, • (Mayer, Tr,p. "16734). ' It
was, in fact, the heart of the secret armament budget

of the Reich.
said;

To this the Befense witness, Mayer,

"Certainly, yes."

(Tr.p,^16788).

In the

Ministry of Finance we have a document, NG-.5339 (Exh,
3907, Bk, 212) -- a top secret letter or memorandum

from Ministerial Counsellor Bayrhoffer of the Ministry
-21-

of Finance to the Reich Minister for War and Com^

mander in Chief of the, Wehrmacht dated 13 April 1937
which sto.tesi

"I hereby confirm that within my
sphere only a'small circle of of

ficials is being assigned to work
on ma:tters connected with Mefo, so
that the secrecy of the matter Is
secure,'"
Mefo is highly signlficn.nt for von KHOSIGK in
«

I

two ways?

1.

It shows that insofar as Inflation was con

cerned, von KROSIGK had a position even more signi
ficant than Schacht—and inflation would have wrecked

the rearmament program beyond question.

Inflation

can perhaps be simplified into two major factors—

the amount of paper - flat - money in existence as
compared with the amount of goods produced; and the

confidence of the people in the money printed.

As

to the latter, von KROSIGK, by the strenuous efforts

to keep the amount of Mefo transactions secret, held
one control—public confidence, which would have been

affected by the knowledge that by 1937. the Reich had

12 billions of short-term debt.
examination of KROSIGK).

(Tr.p, 23866, cross-

One can reply that Schacht

shared this responsibility with yon KROSIGK, but
Schacht, at least, had denied it^

In the session

of 1 May 1946 of the IMT :(Vbl^ .XII, p. 474) Schacht
saids

"But I should like to add also that
all the Mefo bills, which we we taken

. up by the Relchsbank, were listed in
the bill account of the Heichsb.ank.

Furthermore,

I should like to say

that the keeping secret of state ex

po ndlture s--and arm-ament expenditures
were State expenditures—was not a
matter for the president of the Relchs

bank but an affair concerning the Reich
Minister of Finance.
If the Reich
-22^

Minister of Finance did not publish
the guarantees Fhioh he had accepted
for the Mefo bills, then that was his
affair and not mine.

I. am not re

sponsible for that.
The responsi
bility for that lies with the Reich
Minister of

Finance."

The other side of the inflationary picture is
the amount of currency in circulation..

Mefo—the

discounting of bills of exchange—was the signifiCrant

part of it.

As von KROSIGK put i t in his 1 September

1938 letter to Hitler (20-419, Sxh.- 1165,- Bk.-70-b,,
p. 67), when normal financing couldn't be arranged,
it was. done by Mefo—-'"which means the printing of
money".

And here again, von KROSIGK, who had to.

guarantee the Mefo bills, had a supervisory role.

Hence, on this first point—that as regards in

flation controls in the face of a huge rearmament
program—von KROSIGK can be, on these records,, as

signed a greater participation than Schacht, and
Schacht's acquitt.al is thus not dete.rmihative. .
2.

More important, however, is the end of the

Mefo program, in really setting Schacht on one side
and von KROSIGK on the other, .The program ended in
1938 or 1939 when Funk came in«
It has already been pointed out that Schacht es

caped conviction because the IMT was at least partially

convinced by his story that he began to put on finan

cial brakes as soon as he saw the aggressive designs
cf Hitler,

in his testimony before the IMT (Vol, XII,

P- 48S), Schacht described the brakes he had at his

•ilBposal,

The first was the power to limit credits—

"the Reichsbank was the supreme authority of the State
far as the granting of the credits was concerned, "
-23-

The

second:

"The second si-fegu'ird—limit was con
tained in the agreement which the

Minister of Finance, the Government,
and of course Hitler had made—the

Mefo bills, of which those credits
consisted, were to oe paid b-ack when

they expired.

They were repayable

after 5 years, and I have already
said that if the repayments had "been
made, funds for rearmajnent would
naturally have had to decrease.

Therein lay the second possibility
of limiting the-rearmament."

-«

«

As Schacht spelled out in some detail, the "brake
he thought he had dldn*t work.

His explanation is in

his testimony before the IMT (Vol. XIII, pp. 16-20).
He

said:

Well, you, stated

yesterday th^t you started to sabotage
the government in 1936 and 1937.

"^cl^^h^:

Yes, because I did not want

excessrve armament;"

"Mr_5_ Ju£t_ic_e Jobk^son;

Now, after this

AnscHluss, tHe Mefo bills which had been
. issued began to come due, did they not.
In 1938 and 1939?

"Schacht:

No, the maturity date of the

Tirs^ Mefo bill must have been at the
earliest in the Spring of 1939.
They
had all been issued for 5 years and I
assume that

the first Mefo

bills were

issued in the Spring of 1934, so that
the f i r s t

Mefo b i l l s

became due

in the

Spring of 1939.

J^ow,

qu"estion and tHe answer*-'
I -am wrong*

this is the

Correct me if

'QU£s^lon:.. Well, did you in the Heichsbank utlTlze funds which were available?

Let me put it this way: As these mefo
bills became due, what did you do about
them?:.

*Answer::

I asked the Minister of Plncance

whetHer he could repay them,, because after

5 years he had to repay them, some in 1938

or 1939, I think.

The first mefo bills

would have become due for repayment an4

of course he said, "I cannot"^'
-24-
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"You had that

conversation withtho

Finance Minister while you were still
President of

the Reichsbank?

."Sc^^^hti Mr, Justice, I said that
throughout our financial de.olings we
"becarae somewhat worried as

to whether

we would get our Dills paid back or
not,
I have already explained to the
Tribunal that in the

second half of

1938 the Finance Minister got into
difficulties and he came to me in

order again to borrow money.

upon I said to him,

*
^

There

'Listen, in what

kind of a situation are you anyway

for you will soon, have to repay the

first mefo bills to us.

Are you not

prepared for that7'_. And now it
turned out, that was in the fall of

1938, that' the Reich Finance had done
>

nothing whatever to fulfill his obli
gation to meet payment of the mefo
bills-; and that, of course, in the
fall of 1938, made for exceedingly
str«ained relations with the Reich

Finance Minister, that is, between
the Reichsbank and the Reich Finance

^

Minister.

Jackson:

Now, taxes did

not yield any suTfTcient revenue to
discharge those bills, did they?
"Schacht-: Yes, I explained already
yesterday that the risk which was
taken in the mefo bills, "'hich I have
admitted from the very beginning, was
not really a risk if a reasonable fi-

nanclnl policy were followed; that is,
if from 1938 on, further armament had
not continued and additional foolish

expenditures not been made, but if in
stead, the money accruing from taxes
and bonds had been used for meeting

the payment of the mefo bills.

Just^o^ £'"^£^£011:

All I am asking

you at"the present moment, Dr. Schacht,
is whether these bills could not have

been paid out of the revenue from taxes.

"^chacht:

Surely,

Yes.
They could have?

"Scha_cht: Qf course, but that was the
surprising thing, they !vere not repaid;
the money was used to continue rearnw
Ing..."

Justice Jackson:
Your subscriptions
to tHe FourtH Helc"E Loan of 1938 had pro

duced unsatisfactory results, had they

.

y
•

^

"Schacht: They were hardly pleasing,
The capital marhet was not good»
And you ha.ve re

ported on The Toan that there had been
a shortage in the public subscription?
And the, result had been unsatisfactory?
"Schacht; • Yes.

"Mr. Justice Ja£k^on:
did you not
ma^e tTTis answer to the interrogator's
question:

*Sh£sjtion:
e

«

But I am asking you whether

during tHat period from 1 April 1938
to January 1939 you did not continue
to finance

armoments?

•'Answer;
Sir, otherwise these mefo bills
Ha^ To^be refunded by the Reich, which
they could not be, because the Reich had
no money to do it; and' I could not pro
cure any money for refunding because that
would have had to come from taxes or loans,

So I had to continue to carry these ncfo
bills and that, of course, I did.'

"Did you give that answer?
"Schacht;

Yes, that was ouite in order—

¥indTy1.et me speak, would you not—because
the Finance Minister did not make his funds

available for the repay"i®nt of the mefo
bills, but instead gave them for armr-jnents.
If he had used these funds to pay the mefo
bills, everything would have been all right,

"Mr. Justic_e Jack_son:
meTo

And you carried the

bTlYs wHich let him use current rev

enues to continue the plans of rerarmament
after 1938, did you not?

"Soha_chT; Mr. Justice, this was the sltuatXon." A large part of the mefo bills was
already on the financial and capital mrorket. Now, when that mcarket was too heavily

"burdened by the government, then the people
brought in the mefo bills to the Reichsbank,
for the Reichsbank had, promised to accept

them. That, precisely, was the great ob
struction to my policy.
The Reich Finance
Minister financed the armament instScad of

honoring the mafo bills as he had promised..

Jack£ori:

Now, it was under

Those cirGum'stance¥ tho.t you took a posi
tion which would result in your retirement
from the Reichsbank?

•'3chach_t:

Yes,"

To put the matter in terms of von KROSIG-K, when

Schacht was trying to slow down rearmament, von KROSIGK
—26—

had already taken measures iwhich made it Impossible,

Schacht "fas not only in opposition to Goering in the
economic field,

but was also in opposition to von

KROSIGK in the financial field.

Von KHOSIGK, too,

must have known that

Dills were

if

the mefo

to 'be

paid—12 billion of them—that rearmament would slow

down, because the money was not there for both repay
ment and continued rearmament.

fact,

He chose, despite that

to allocate the money to further armament, rather

than meet the mefo obligation.

At the very best, he

cast his lot with the aggressors, rather than with
Schacht,

There will be considerable more evidence, below,

that von KROSIGK went along after the huge armament,
outlays had convinced Schacht that Hitler meant war.

This mefo material, however, is Important in that it
dramatizes his opposition to Schacht,

We also have a document (NG-4143, 3xh. 0-56, Bk,
212) which further illustrates the role of the Finance

Ministry in the early secret rearmament.

The top docu

ment, marked secret, dated 12 July 1933 from the Reich
Air Ministry to the Reich Finance Minister—attention
Josef Mayer, states:

"It has become necessary to put into action
immediately 'Kasse

(Account L), the

creation of which was provided for in the
mutual decree of 10 June 1933.

'Kasse L*

hrad to make all payments for the armament
budget and must repay, to the various treas-

uries the advance payments ma.de heretofore

^or such expenditures.

"Since it is to oe avoided that letters sent
5y my Ministry to other offices reveal the
close connection between the Reich Air Min

istry and 'Kasso L', I must reauest thn.t

you inform the Reich Hauptkasse (Reich Main

Treasury) in each case of the amounts which
-27-

have "been made available to *Kasse. L',

I 'should like you to Inf orra me by imy
of brief reports of such transfers,"
In the subsequent pages, the Minister of Avla.tion informs
the Minister of Finance of the requirements of money for

the coming month.

The amounts, for the period covered,

ar,e:

2S June to 26 July 1933

500,000 RM

August 1933

5,620,000

n

September 1933

5,320,000

Tt

October 1933

5,758,000

ij

November 1933

7,711,000

(1

December 1933

7,677,000

n

January 1934

9,022,000

n

'February 1934

7,426,000

tt

March 1934

7,755,000

n

April 1934

4,000,000

ti

#

The total is close to 64,000,000 RH,

In vie?^ of the 12

billion of mefo over the years from 1934 to 1938, this

is not much,

but it indicates that von KROSXGK ras In

on the rearmament almost from the seizure of power,

and

it also illustrates again the secrecy with which it was
surrounded,

NGw-4142, 3xh, CU57 explains that "Kasse L"

was the secret rearmament budget for the Air Force,.

Mayer so admitted this,.

(Tr,,p. 16777),

The document

has the agreement setting up the "Kasse L", signed by

Olscher, a Finance Ministry BUbo.rdinate of KROSIOK,.

Mayer also identified a document (NGw4021, 3xh, C55) which showed that von KROSIGK had approved the pur
chase of an airfield in early 1935 by the Minister of

Aviation in such a way as to camouflage that it was

being required for military purposes,
16769-16771),

(See Tr,pp,

^0-4224, Sxh. C-58 shows the participation
-r28*^

of the Finance mnistry in Aviation Kontor G.m.b.H.,,
a ooinpany set u]p to camouflage aviation rearmament

in 1933 - 1934.

(See Tr.pp. 16776-16779, 16783).

The above-mentioned decree of 10 June 1933, by
which *Kasse L' was established, is contained in
document NG^4142, 0-57, Bk. 212.

The decree is

signed by Blomberg (Reichswehr Ministry), Hilch

(Ministry for Aviation) and Olscher who signed 'by
order' of the Ministry of Finance,

It starts!

"Effective 1 April 1933, a sneclal
Independent Cash Office will be es

tablished with the Ministry of Avi
ation for expenditures covering

secret (underlined in the original)

purposes of the Ministry of Aviation.
"The Cash Office will be known as
'Cash Office L'. "

In his accompanying letter of 15 Juno 1933 with which

the Minister of Aviration sent copy of this decree to
the Finance Minister, the former states!
"I Intend to give notice of the sun
required for the Case Office L

(Kasse L) in such n way that I

shall indicate the totral demand

of my ministry for the Individual

periods when submitting the monthly

monetary requirements."

Exh. C-57, Bk. 212).

(NG-4142'"j

An important device for camouflaging rearmament,
sspecially in the field of the Air Forces, was the
secret acquisition of corporations which ownOd in

stallations suitable for military purposes.

This

acquisition had to be.ofifhatedt through the defendant
von KROSIGK.

A letter of the Minister of Aviation

to the Minister of Finance, dated 6 December 1935,
clearly illustrates these transactions*

The letter

states: (ng-4021, Exh.C-55, Bk.212)
"Approximately 18 months ago, I ob
tained all the buslneea shares of
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the Braunschweigische Flughafergesell-'
schaft m.b,H.
• • — — — •—-V—

—

V

•«» V

(Brunswick Airport Corn*),

* —«

^

^

4

t

J.

••

w

w

^

I

with your knowledge and consent. At
that time, I required the Brunswick in
stallations for military purposes, and
I was interested in maintaining the
civilian appearance of the Brunswick
enterprise,•,

"Now, however, that the motive for cam

ouflage has disappeared and that, as
far as possible, a clarification of the

property status, especially with regard

to the land register, is to take place,
I am no longer interested in the con

tinued existence of the Braunschueigische
Plughafen m.b.H, and I intend to liqui

4

date the firm,"

»

The Minister of Aviation, therefore, suggested that
the Corporation is to sell all its installations to

him "as I sholl continue to need them for military
purposes".

He, furthermore, estim-^ted the purchase

price at 800,000 RM but proposed to fix It later on,
and requested the Finance Minister to agree to his

suggestion.

The Minister of Finance promptly agreed

by letter of 9 December 1935-.

(NGw-4021, Fxh, C-55,

Bk. 212).

Later on the Ministry of Aviation decided to

transfer its industrial aviation property to the

Luftfahrtkontor G.m.b.H. (Aviation Bureau Corp.),
a corporation, the shares of which belonged to the

Reich.

A detailed plan was submitted to the Mini

ster of Finance;;, and the corresponding letter of
5 July 1938 also reveals the original task of that
.corporation and the reason for the aforementioned
transfer:

'

"Its task was to undertake the trustee
ship and administration of Reich assets

in the Reich treasury (Aviation) in the
capacity of a cover-company.

The cam

ouflaging has been dropped, the expan
sion of the aviation Industry has, so
•fco

speak, reached the and of the first

stage in its development,"

i:xh, 0-58, Bk. 212).
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The letter outlines the future tosh of the

corporation and stresses that an increase in capi
tal to approximately -70 million RM would "be impor-

ative.

Needless to say, the dei'endant von KROSIGK

was the competent authority on this matter, and he
took it up personally as his notes in gre^pencil
Indicate.

The importance of the Luftfahrtkontor G-.m. "b.H*
<

^

is also evidenced by another letter from the Mini
stry of Aviation to the Minister of Finance-., dated

2 January 1939.

(NGw4239, 3xh. 0-59, Bk, 212).

At

tached to this letter is a secret memorandixm, ini

tialed in green pencil by von KROSIGK, ^^-hloh sots

^

forth the position and the development of the
Luftfahrtkontor»

The memorandum mentions "the new

armament programs ordered late in 1938 and in spring

1939" (first sentence on p. 5 of the Snglieh trans-

latlon)r

this new armament program makes it clear

why there was a terrific Jump in the budgetary ex
penditures of the ^ehrmacht from 1937 to 1938,
namely from 7 billion RM to about 17 billion RM and

^

disproves the e:^lanation given by von KHpSICK under
direct examination.

(.Tr..pp. 22943-22944).

We can end this period with the report of the
counsellor of the Reich Finance Ministry to the

Sixth Session of the Working Committee of the Dele
gates for Reich Defense.
p. 68),

(FC-404, Fxh. 544, BK. 70-a,

He reported on the pre-parednese for ^ sudden

niobllization as foilowe (p. 69)1
"In case of a suddenly occurring con
flict, financing of mobilization can
t)e Carried out in the shortest time

(24 hours).

According to the opinion

of the department reviewers of the
-31-

Reichs'bank,

the inventories of the

Reichsbanh. of piece money (Stueck
Geld) (paper money and coins) are
sufficient,"
Various fiscal and financial measures ^*hich would have

the effect of strengthening and maintaining plants es
sential for Wrar—tax'exemptions,

accelerated amortlza^

tion of new machinery, etc»~were also revealed and
discussed.

The Finance Ministry was clearly in the

throes of preparation for wajr.

(b),

Lajber rearmajnent program.
The IMT said, in its decision on Funk (p. 304):
"Funk became active in the economic

field after the Nazi plans to wage
aggressive war ha.d been clearly de
fined. "

As to von KROSIGK, we need modify th^t sentence .in

only one respect, so that it would read:

Von KROSIGK

£ontinued ^o_b^ active in the economic field after the
Nazi plans to wage aggressive war had been clearly de
fined,

The IMT begins its recitals on Funk with the

Gooring speech of 14 October 1938, at which a "gigan
tic increase in armaments" was announced.

For von

KROSIGK, we have to go back a little further to pick
up the threads, and show how, by the end of 1938, the
Ministry of Finance was completely allied with and an
integral part of the whole rearmament program.
We can conveniently begin the discussion with the

secret defense law of 21 May 1935.

Bk, 70-a, p, 72),

(2261-PS, Sxh. 545,

Of this law the DAT stated (p, 184) s

"It is clear from this law that by
May of 1935 Hitler and his govern
ment had arrived at the stage in

the carrying out of their policies
where it was necessary for them to
have in existence the requisite

machinery for the administration
and government of Germany in the
event of this policy leadir^ to
war, "
-32-
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This

was. in two main pafts:

mobilization.

state of defense, and

It gave to Hitler the power to declare

a state of defense, in which event all powers devolve
upon him, to be exercised by the Minister of War,
Article 3 provides tha.ts
•^The Keichministers are to observe
the direction of the Reichminister

of Wai%

They remain the hi^^hest

Reich authorities within their
rea3in of activity,^

Article 4 gave Hitler power to order mobilization.

Article 6 gave Hitler power to appoint a "plenipo.
tentiary-general for w^r economy to direct the entire
war economy,"

Article 6 (3) provides, in part:

"Furthermore the financing of the
war effort, (in the province of the
Reichs Finance Ministr;^ and the

Reichsbank) will be carried on under
his responsibility,"

Soh.a.cht was at about the same time, 31 Ma.y 1935, named
the plenipotentiary-Cr.eneral,
On 26 June 1935 the law was discussed at the lOth

meeting of the Working Committee of the Reich Defense

Committee. (FC-405, Ixh. 546, Bk, 70-a, p. 77). Gen
eral Major von Reiohenau presided. He explained the
Reich Defense Law and the Hatlonal Service Law.

Then

Oberst Jodl spoke on "Participation in Mobilization

Preparations."

He said (p. 80):

"The existence of mobilization prepar
ations is not to be admitted, however,
to persons not directly concerned

(Unbetelllgten)^ The individual mobi
lization measures are still subject to
the directives issued concerning secrecy.
Insofar as they cannot be camouflaged,
ihey are to be explained on the basis

of peacetime necessities."

The complete perfidy of the Nazi foreign policy was
boldly set forth.

Jodl said (p. 80);

"The dGmilitarr-

Ized zone requires special treatment," He pointed out
-33-

that Hitler had stated that the Versailles Treaty

and the Locarno Pact were being observed, and that

the Retch Government had replied to an aide__m£m£ire
from the French that no mobilization was going on .

in the demilitarized^zone,\snd then:saidt
Since political entanglements
abroad must "be avoided at -present
under all circumstances, only those
preparatory measures, that are ur
gently necessary may be carried out
in the demilitarized zone.
The ex

istence of such preparations or the

intention of them must be kept in

strio-tist secrecy,, in "the zone it
self as well as in the rest of the

Reich.^

Yet 10 aspects of mobilization, including economic
mobilization,, were projected.

On 7 Harch 1936, in

defiance of the Tre-aty of Versailles, the. demili
tarized zone was entered by German troops.
Judgment, p.., 185).
It will be remembered that it was In 1936 that

Schacht, according to the lUT, began to .advocate a'
limitation on armaiaents, and, as the HjIT said, be
cause of his intimate knowledge of German finance,
was in a good position to realize that Hitler's

"frantic rearm.ament" was "consistent only with waras its object" (p.. 136).-. The documents certainly
fully bear out the Intimate knowledge which von
KROSIGK had of all matters.of finance and economics

in the preparation for war.

They also show that von

KROSIGK'-S attitude conformed thoroughly to the will
of Hitler to rearm as quickly as possible. •
The HIT stated (p. 182)r •
"It was necessary to lay a secure
financial foundation for the

building of arra.aments, and In
April 1936, .the defendant Goerlng
was appointed coordinator for raw
materials and foreign exchange,

,

-34-.
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and empowered to supervise all
state and party activities in
these fields.
In this capacity
he "brought together the War Min
ister,. the Minister of Sconomics,.
the Reich Finance Minister,, the
president of the Reichsbank, and
the P.russian Finance Minister to

discuss problems connected with
war mobilization, and on the 27th
of May 1936, in addressing these
men Goering opposed any financial
limit of war production and added
that ^all measures are_ to be con
sidered from the standpoint of an

assured waging of war*."
Our documents el.a'borate these facts..

The raw

material problem had engaged von KROSIGK*s attention
as far back as May, 1935,.- when he was a member of
the Committee on Raw Materials under Goering*e

chairmanship,.

The minutes of the meeting of 26 May

1935,, attended by, among others,, von KROSIGK,

dis

cuss at length the necessity for securing raw mate

rials such as oil, , rubber and iron ore in the event

of "Jir-case" (code reference to, a t^vo—front war).

(NI-5380,. Fxh. 945, Bk.. llS-a')..

We find von KROSIGK

again engaged,on the raw material and fo'<^eign funds
program, on 6 December 1935, when the Reich Defense

Council had its 11th meeting, at which there worej
of course, representatives of the Finance Ministry
present.

(3.C-406,. Sxh., 547, Bk. 70-b,. p.. 1)..

minutes state (p.. 4):.
"Thereafter General Keltel discusses

two Important fields:,

raw material

and money,.

"Complying with the Fuehrer's desire,,
the extension of our armed forces is

knowingly Just before all other state
necessities by the economical leader
ship,.

It Is the task of all members

of the Reich Defense Council to Use

for it concentratedly and economically

the people's property therefore pro

vided, in the frame of the overall

situation,, and only request such funds

and raw m-a-terlale that will servo ab
solute and sole for Reichs defense.,"
-35-

The

Then., after Goering's appointment., "-e have a
memo "by Baron von Neurath of a meeting of the Foreign

Sxchango Committee on 12 M:ay 1936.
1170-, Bic. 70-"b, p. 88).

.(NG^1217.-, Sxh,

Goering there stated:

"...that according to an order re
ceived hy him., the question of raw
materials and the foreign exchange
question must "be dealt with from

the point of view of German armraments.
Therefore, in eich case it
would have to "be examined what the
requirements of the Armed Forces
were.
All other reculrements would

have to recede "before them.
The Questions are

"1.

to

be dealt with

By a board on r^hlch the Heich

Minister ^f^^r, the President of
the Reichsbank, the Minister Kerrl,
KROSIGK, Darre and Popitz are per
manently represented,"

There can "be no question, even apart from the HCT

Judgment itself, that von KHOSIGK was thoroughly and
intira<ately advised of the measures taken under Goeiv-

Ing's leadership to bring raw materials and foreign
exchange completely under the domination of the re
armament program, and, considered in the light of

the Goering announcement of 27 May 1936, referred to
by the IMT, there must even in von KROSIGK's mind have
been a gnawing suspicion that Hitler contemplated a
violent solution of hie political-diplomatic problems.
We

can also add

for the year 1936,

a

l i t t l e additional coloration

On 12

1936 there was a meeting

of the Council of Ministers attended "by Gooring,

Schacht, Bloraberg, Popltz and KROSIGK,
Exh, 971 2, Bk. 70-c, p, lo).
full,

(1301-PS,

Its minutes are fairly

and reveal what must have "been a fairly acri

monious discussion between Schacht and Goering on the

financing of the armament program,

Schacht pointed

out at the outset that 11 "billion marks outside the

regular budget had been raised for rearmament; that
-36-
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the danger of inflation is imninent; that he will
never be party inflation; and that if a road is taken

which contains this danger, ho would like to drop out
now,_ ep as not to disturb the new course later (pp.

II-IS).,

It is not possible to say with certainty

from these minutes alone that von KROSIGK was on

Goering's side; that can be deduced with the required
certainty from the fact that von KHOSIGK stayed on,

and Schacht did not..

The document is significant,

however,_ in showing that von KHOSIGK participated in
the top-level discussions at which that policy of more
and more armament was revealed and insisted upon despite
Sch.acht's objection.
At the next meeting of these some men as a Council

of Ministers, on 27 May 1936 {1301-PS,. Exh.. 971 S, 3k,

'^0-c, p. 20), Goering, in discussing the matter of raw
materials, mrade the remark quoted by the XMT in the
quotation abovel

''All measures a^^e to be taken from

the standpoint of an assured waging of war,." (p, 21),.
Von KROSIGK took a part in the discussion, although,
most of the talking was done by Goering and Schacht, ,
•t

Meanwhile, on 14 May 1936, therj had been another

meeting—the 12th—of the Reich Defense Council, ...at

which the Finance Ministr:^ was again represented, . (3C'^7, Dxh, ^548, . Bk. 70-b, .p, ..6), The opening remarks
by Field Marshal von Blomberg illustrate both the

"frantic re-armament" and the Importance, ..in that
activity,, of the financial aspects of it, . He opened
the meeting (p. 6)—
"v^,^with fundamental 'explanations
about the necessity of the prepar
ation for a

total mobilization em^

phasizlng the measures most urgent

at this time (among these mobiliz.'v.

tlon Calenders,, legal bnsle, pre«parations in the remilitarized zone),.. ..
-37-

He further points out the task
of the Reich -authorities

to fi

nance the measures for the pre
paration for the Reich Defense

from their budge t»"-

In addition,. Lieutenant General Koitel, the Chairm.an,.
explained that "in today's nnd future meetings of the

Reich Defense Council,, a survey of the general sitiuation of all fields affecting the Reich defense ™dll
be given,.

The description of the situation will not

appear in the minutes of the meetings.-"

In other

words,, von KROSIGK had' a pipe-line to the whole

picture of preparation for war—a picture which w,ag
to be given in such detail that it was not to be
trusted even to "Top Secret" minutes.-

The same document (1301-PS,. Exh. 971, Bk.. 118B,
p. 265) contains, in addition, an unsigned top secret
letter from the War Minister to Goering, with an at

tached certificate that copies had been personrally
handed to von KROSIGK and Schacht.

The letter in

dicates that rearm,ament was going to continue at an
even faster pace, and gives some idea of the magni
tude of the preparations-

The letter indicates the

need for 3..8 billions in^exc_es_s of the 1936 budget
in order to meet the additional expenses for re

militarizing and fortifying the Rhlneland, "the
setting up of fall of the 36 divisions already by

1 October 1936", "The speeding up of motorization,,
particularly the establishment of 4 fully motorized

Infantry divisions",- increasing ammunition reserves,,
and the like (p.. 26).-

As regards the air force,, the

letter statesJ-

"According to an order of the
Fuehrer,, the setting up of all
air-force units has to be com

pleted on 1 April 1937,- There
fore considerable expenditures
-38-
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have to "be made in 1936 whicH at
the time the "budget for 1936 was
made, was planned for l^tar years
only,"

The letter wQund up with the statement that the pre

liminary- work in the 1937 budget Indicated that the
total request for the nrmed forces (Including the
/

air force) would be 13-7 billion RI£.

Considering

that the actual expenditures for 1936 for the same
three services wer^ about 5,8 billions (N&-4062,'

Exh. 1166, Bke ,70-b, p, 79) even a stupid man—which

von KROSIGK was no"^.—must have begun to see that a
solution "by force of aggressive war was in contem• plation.

There is also attached to this ss^ne document

(1301PBS) a comprehensive memorandum on "Financing
of the. Armament".

It is not signed, and not ad

dressed to anyone, and its date can only be guessed
at from its contents, bpt it is not'later than mid^- '

1936,

The opening sentence expresses the then pre

vailing point of view (Bk, 70-c, p. 1):
"The following explanations take as
their premise the fact that the ex
ecution ^of the armajnent program is
by its speed and extent the mission
of German policy, that everything

•

"

else must therefore be subordinated

to this purpose, unless the neglect
of other q^aestions would endanger
the main goal,"

Nor^should it be forgotten that in the framework

of the re-armament progrtam tremendous amounts wer^
spent by other ministries which had no dir'ect con-

section with the Wehrmacht.

It will, for instance,

later on be proved that in 1938 the Ministry of.Food
Agriculture spent 559,000j00d RIJI for establishing
^ grain reserve, the amassing of which belonged to
-39-
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preparation of w-i:r«

Tlie greatest part qf the money

needed for establishing his grain reserve was

^

by credits of German banks and the Ministry of Fi
nance cooperated

guaranteeing the credits, • which

also will be evidenced later oUo

He?:'e it, nny be

mentioned that German Mortgage Banks likewise were
used to finance expenditures for re-armament.

In

the fall of 1936, 19 of these institutes were

authorized to issue debentures totalling 72,000,000
RM fbr^bulldlng projects of the Wehrmacht, and this

financial action required the consent of" the Ministry,
of Finance.

Needless to say, .the consent was -granted.

(Na-4077, Sxh. 3909, Bk. 212).'

,

In the latter part of 1936 we find von KROSIGK

fully informed of, and deeply involved in, the p'celiminary sq.cret discussions which led to the announce-

ment of the,4-year plan toward the end of that year.
On 4 September 1936 there was a meeting of the Mint

Isterlal Council (Ministerrat) presided over by
\

. Goering and attended by von KROSIGK.

Again, Goering

Repeated his remark on the "assured waging of ¥far".

The minutes this time state (KC-416, Rxh. 940, Bk.
118-a, p. 46) S
"If war should break out tomorrow
we would be .forced to take measures

from vrhich .we might possibly shy
away at the present moment.
They
are, therefore,.to- be t^ken."

"All raeasuhes are 'to bo taken just
as if we were actually in the stage
of imminent danger of war."

Perhaps even more important, however, is the fact
that at this meeting a memorandum from Hitler to the
-I

War Minister w/as read.

(The memo Itself is NI-4955,

Sxh. 939, Bk. 118-a, p. 25)." Goering introduced it
) ,

^40-

I' . /
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lUth the rsaark (p, 47): "It starts frenn the basic
thought that the showdown -ith Russia is inevitable,

The memorandun: itself, .diich is quite Jong, has a

flavor which can, be appreciated from the following!
"The extent and pace of military
e^ololtation
of our strength oaLot
be too large or too rapid." (p. 30) '
"The definite solution lies In an
extension of our diving spdce, that
c.nd food basis or our nation.

1 [p

It

i

political leader-

fu^L=°^f°
question at some
lUEure time."M(p, 33)

In conclusion. Hitler states (p. 45):
"I herewith set the following tasks:
a) The German army must be ready for
combat "dthln fou.**? years.

b) The Gorman ec.onom.y must be
.mobilized for war withii; four

Later, the Four Year Plan was announced by
Hitler at the I936 Nurnberg Party D.y. There is a
separate b.rief on the Pour-Year PI,an, in connection
#

the Economic llinlatries Case, and for the deJ

tails reference.should be made to that. Here it
Is sufficient to show that von KROSIGK was one of
its important figures under Goering. The first de-

sfv'
ip'f

vS.

Goerlng on the execution of the plan,

•i^ted 22 October 1936 (Wa-1221, 3xh.460, Doc.Bk.

•

,
••,.,

29-b) states in Section II that
the

anls?h''
of whhh

temoers^i

additl^^

Jt'l

decisions I contemplate

®CoiBmlttee
of
mrflsters),

f°Li°»in8 persons will be

Ministerdealing
of Finance,
In
on several sections
with pa.rtlcular

Pobleme, the Mlni8tr.y of Finance le given a
-41-
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speojfls task. In V, for oxa,api^, dealing with
"PrgdnoSion of Q-erman raw LSatepjals and PlastlGs,"
the decree states;

BtMotfon
av-sstions
of the reconwill be handled in
P?n^n ana,
? the Reich Ministry
ilinistrv
Finance
of of
economics."

f;

The same language appears in several other sections.

*

Theri. oein be no doubt that vofi KROSIG-K was
active and fully advised on the progress of the

plan under Goerlng's leadership. The original

Four year Plan "Bible" of May, 1937 (30-280, Pros.
ixh.961, Doc.Bk.ll8-b, p. 202) shows in its

distribution directives that von KHOSIGK got two •
copies. The same is true of the report on the

results of .pour :ipar plan for 1937, together viith
the total planning for the four years, dated 3I

December 1937 (NI.6769, Pros.Exh. 963, Poc.Bk.118 b);
two copies went to von KROSIGK (p.214). And when,

in February 1938, Goering issued a decree reorganizing
the ...inistry of kconomlcs and consolidating the
our Year Plan into it, under Punk, von KROSISK

rataincd his high position (WID-13629, Pros.£xh.752,
•3k.li8_b, p. 119). The decree provided for a-

General Council to insure adequate colLabor-atlon, >
Stated;

•

Imporl/ant
cases " the Small
Council of Ministers
will meet.

Defendant von KROSIGK was one of the seven membtsrs
that Small Council.

The flavor of the Four Year Plan, as Goering
Ived. it, rnai^- be gathered from 'a report of his
-42h<

speech in "The Execution of the Four Year Plan"

on 17 December 1936, in the big assembly hall of the

"Preussenhaus" (NI-051j Pros.Exh,964, Doc. Bk. 118-b,

p.218).

have no proof that von KROSIGK was there;

the only indication of the audience is an affidavit <

by the defendant KOERKSR (NI-5995, Pros.Exh,965,
Doc. nk, 118—b, p. 223) in which he sees that Hitler

also spoke, and "all of the leading personalities

of the totality of German industry and economy,
altogether about 100 persons, were present for this
address," It is i:jrobably a reasonable rassumption,
on this basis, that von KROSIGK was there, and
certainly that he heard rabout it, Goering stated
(p.219);

"Then I always hear objections, such as:
What is to happen to my investment, once
the rearmament is finished Gentlemen; In
asmuch as we would have to increase our

capacity in order to be prepared for any
eventuality, it cannot happen. Whatever

happens our caprdty will be far too

small. The struggle which we are apprbaching demands a colossal measure of productive

ability. Ho end of the rearmament can be

in eight. The only deciding point in this

case is: victory or destruction. If we

win, then the economy win be sufficiently

compensated. Profits cannot be considered

here according to bookkeepers' accounts,

but only according to the necessities of
policy^ Calculations must not be made ns to

the cost. I ciemajid that you do all to prove
that Part of the national wealth is en-

trusted to you. It is certainly immaterial
"^iCther in every case new investments can

e written off. We are now playing for the
Highest stake. What would pay better than
the orders for rearmament^?"

It is worth while noting agnln the dissimilarity
1sen Von KROSKJK and Schaoht, This was the time

when Schaoht began definitely to lose out. The Iia
Gald (pp. 307-308);
.43-

"11

"Goer-ing advoc^.ted a .jroatly e5q">andod program
for the production of synthetic ra-:^ materials

^^hlch was opposed by Schacht on the ground
that the resulting financial strain might
involve Inflation."

As we have seen, von KHOSIGK, who was also on the
council which had to do with raw materials and

foreign exchange, went along with the program.
ki

The IMT said (p.307).J
"The influence of Schacht suffered further

when in October 16, 1936, Goering was
appointed Plenipotentiary for tho 4-year

plan with tho task of putting *tho entire
economy in a

state of readiness for war'

within four years. Schacht had opposed the

announcement of this plan and the'appoint

ment of Goering to head it, and it is clear

J

that Hitler's acclon represented a decision
that Schacht's economic policies were too
conservative for the drastic rearmaniint

policy which Hitler wanted to put into
effect,"

There is no evidence that von KROSIGK opposed the plan,
or Goering's appointment. He went along, fully. Schacht
went on leave of absence from the Ministry of Economics
in Septemoer, 1937, and,resigned ns Minister of

Econoralcs and. as Plenipotentiary for ^^ar Economy in

November, 1937" (IMT, p. 307),. Von KROSIGK stayed on,
cooperating at the highest level.
Moreover,

the documentation for the years 1936

and 1937 set out above, illuminates the remark of the

II'IT (p. 307) that Schacht,
"with his Intimate knowledge of Germnn finance,
was in a particularly good position to under
stand the true significance of Hitler's
frantic rearmament, and to realize that the
economic policy a.dopted was consistent" pnly
with war as its object."

No one, no matter how gullible, or how blinded by
patriotism or by devotion to Hitler or
-.44^

anything

else, oould iv^.ve wo-^ked long with Goening in the
Four Year Plan, or attended the meetings of the Reich
Defense Council, or listened to the Hitler memorandum
on the basis. fQr

Four Year Plan without the

realiz.atlon of which the IMT speaks. Certainly when
one was in a position so high

a cabinet minister

that he participated in all of these activities, the

denial of knowledge and realization is patently absurd.

Even were it possiole that one could be so stupid,
so vain, or so blind as to fail to recognize vvhat was
happening in 1936 and 1937, the events of 1938 would

set all doubts at rest. By the middle of the. year, the
rearmament program had \again been stepped up. Goering,

on 18 June, 1938 sent a circular letter on the expanded
plan (it is quoted in NCk.5328, p. 27, Exh.3909, Doc.Bk.
212).

In the memorandum Goering sta.ted;
"The new directives given by the Fuehrer for
the development of the Defense of the Reich
requires.a strict concentration and the

combined efforts of all our means . . . .

The task assigned to us is so big that it

can only be accorapllshed if all other plans

in the fields concerned of the Wohrmacht,

economy and administration are absolutely
subordinated to this superior task."

"The new situation becomes clearly obvious
through the f.act that the i.ron quota (for
non-^Vehrinacht purposes) of the Four Years'
Plan c-^ji not be mnintaaned at its former

level flk..thoaigh,_l-t._-was already rather too
email than too large. According to the new
tasks set by the Fuehrer there will alec

have to be some changes in the Four Years'

Plan; the requirements for the Defense of

the Reich will be given first preference,

and materials will be utilized to the last.

?•hkvv.A-.. ' •

This circular letter w=e In turn forwarded by von
liROSI&K on 5 July 1938 to all liinlsters, togoth,er

with a letter of his, own (Doc; NG-5328, Pros. Exh. 3908,
Doc.Bk.212), In the letter, vop KROSIGK himself

emphasized the magnitude of the stepping up of the
progranij and his full support of it:
The execution of the newly ordered measures

for the Defensb of the Reich which was not

calculated in the Reich budget for 1958 are
making additional requirements on the fin^^incinl
power of the Reich to such an extent that"

the funds cannot be raised unless in carry—

ing through the Reich Dudfi;et for 1938 all
Reich departments are guided by the basic

idea of the ci.rcular lette.r and definitely

postpone all tasks which are not "bsolutelv

. necessary in order to place all funds thus''
becoming available at the disposal of the
Defense of the Reich."

He demanded, therefore, a rewiev of all. projectg; the. postponement of any which were riot Defense"-of the Reich proJectsp. and-'the^reporting-:of all fuhdd:. so saved by 15Augusl;, together yjlth all sums that can be saved in
other ways.

The last letter in Doc.NGu.5328, 3xh.3908, Doc.Bk.

212, is a further memo by von ICROSIGK to all ministries
dated l September 1938. He states:
"The development of the Defense of the Reich
ordered oy the Fuehrer necessita.tes measures
of ah extraordinary character. My letter of

5 July 1938 . , ,

which stated the prere

quisites for the solution of the financial
questions,
/I

has not .fiot with the expected

understanding of the various departments.

For this reason decisive measures will hp.ve

to be taiven in order to guarantee priority
to the Reich defense."

Von KROSIGK then states that "In agreement with the

J^lnlster President General Field Marshal Goering" . . .

^*1 herewith cancel — effecti.ve immediately - all
funds for building projects . . . not yet started."
He added, finally, that he would grant no funds in
-46-
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in excess of the Dud;_;et, so that no requests should
he made for

such .amounts.

When .the reorganization of the Reich Defense
Council occurred in Septomoer, 1938, von KHOSIGK re

tained his position as one of its members.

(The now

defense law of 4 September 1938 is 2194^PS, £xh.549,
Doc.Bk,70-b, p.9), This law gave Hitler the power to
declare a state of defense and mobilization (Par,1)

or a state of war (Par.8). The Reich Defenvse Council

was described in Par.lOj as follows:
"The task of the Reich Defense Council consists

in peacetime in the'decision on all measures

for the prepo.ration of the Reich defense and the
getting together of all forces and means of
the nation according to the direction of the
leader and Reich chancellor."

The head of it w.as Hitler; his permanent deputy
Goerlng. Von KROSIGK was one of 14 permanent members.

There was also created a Plenipotentiary for Reich
Administration (GBV), who "is responsible for directing
the flnahcing of the Reich defense within the realm of
the Reich Finance Mnistry and the Rolchsbank, " (Par.

4 (2) ). On the other hand, this did not by any me.ans
:r».

supplant von KROSIGK; Par.6 provided that
"The Reich liinieters and

chief Reich officers

carry out the task within their spheres on their
own
responsibility, regn.'^less of the
special competence of chief of the OKW, of
the GBV, and of the GBW, according to
paragraphs 3, 4 and 5, "

Before the first meeting of the newly reorganized

Reich Defense Council, Goering made a speech. The IMT

said (pp.182-183):
"On the 14th October 1938, .at rJiothor conference,
Goering announced that Hitler had instructed

him to organize a gigantic armament program.
-47-
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which would make insignificant: all previous
achlevementB, He said that he had been or
dered to "build as rapidly as possible an

air force five times as large as originally
planned, to increase the speed of the re
armament of the navy and army, and to con

centrate on offensive weapons, principally
haavy artillery and heavy tanks. He then
laid down a specific program designed to
accomplish these ends."

In discussing Crimes against Peace with respect to
Funk, the IMT said (p,304):
•^Punk became active in the economic field
after the Nrazi plans to wage aggressive

war had been clearly defined. One of his
representatives attended a. conference on
October 14, 1938, at which Goering announced

a gigantic increase in armaments and instructed
the jlinistry of Sconouilcs to increase exports
to obtain the necessary exchange."

This is, therefore an important conference, since it
appears to the IMT to have "clearly defined" the

Nazi's aggressive plans. The minutes of the meeting
are In 1301-PS, i:xh.971 Hi, Doc. B. 70-0, p. 36). They

do not, however, reveal who was present, except that
two State Councillors, Schmeer and Neumann, spoke
before Goering summarily ended the meeting. However,

from the fact that tvro State Councillors were there,
one can properly assume that all ministries— at least

all that were Important in the war effort, were present,

'^hie is la^enforoed by the oxsenlng remarks of Goering
(p*36):
"General Field Marshal Goe'ning opened the
session by decla.rlng that he intended to

give directives about the ^vork for the
next months."

Moreover, finances was one of the major problems
(p.36):
"He is faced with unheard of difficulties.

The treasury is empty, the industrial capacity
is crammed with orders for many years. In
spite of these difficulties ho is going to

change the situation under all circumstances."
-48-

Moreover, Goerlng was no doubt spealilng of plans

which had already been discussed at the highest, levels,
and in which von KROSIGK must have participated.

Furthennore, as is seen below, he spoke of thei^ again
at the first meeting of the Reich Defense Council in

November 1938. Certainly, like Punk, von ICROSIGK knew
what he was doing when he continued action in late

1938. What Goering said on 14 October, and what he

no doubt said elsewhere, was certainly plain enough

I••

-!;'J

(p. 36):

"He received the order from the Fuehrer to

increase the armament to an abnormal extent,
the air force having first priority. Within

the shortest time the air force is to bo

increased five fold, also the navy should
get armed more rapidly and the army should
procure large amounts of offensive weapons
nt a faster rate, particularly heavy artillery
pieces and heavy tanks."

Moreover, bearing in mind that the .Munich settlement

Had been on 29 September and that on 26 September Hitler
Had said in a public speech that after the Sudetenland
e u'ill be no more territorial problems for Germany

in Europe" and that he would then no longer be inter
ested in the Czech state and "that as far as I am
concerned I win guarantee it" (IMT, p.197), the

following statement by Goering must have made the

future aggressive intention clear (p.38):
"The Sudetenland has to be exploited with all
tne means. General Field Marshal Goering

counts upon a complete industrial assimiSlovakia. Czech and Slovakia

ouxa become German dominions. Everything

fn^^
^^ust be taken out . . . . Searches
0-,
and ore have to be conducted in
vakia, notably by State Secretary Keppler,"

e Nazi aggressive aims had been mildly veiled
Id© f o 3?

* "they now stood forth stark and clear.
-49-
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In the middle of the next month,
1938,

on 19 November

the reorganized Reich Defense Council had its

first meeting (poc, 35f?5-PS, Exh,l06, Doc. Bk, 70-b,p. 16).
This meeting,

too "consisted solely of a three hour

lecture 'by the Field Marshal" (p,16).'The minutes,

signed by the defendant Woermann,. recite (p, 16):
I

"All Reich Ministers and State Secretaries,
with few exceptions, were present,"

r

Again Goering repeated many of the sane points made in
his 14 October speech.
"The assigmaent is to raise the level of arma
ment from a

current index of 100 to one of

300,(p. 17)

"The first task, is to safeguard the "basic
food supply, the second task is to increase
armament production, the third,, equally
Important, a substantial increase of ex
ports as a source of foreign exchange."
(P. 17)

Under the heading "Finance" G oering stated (p. 18):
"Vary critical situation of the Reich

Sxchequer. Relief initially through
the "billion imposed onx Jewry, and through
profits accruing to the Reich in the
organiZvation of Jewish enterprises."
On these documents alone, x^?e can assert that von
KROSIGK knew of the plan to smash Czechoslovakia,

and

lent his willing aid to finance the necessary prepara

tions.

However, we also have further proof.

On 1

September 1938 von ICRGSIGK wrote Hitler (FC-419, Exh.

1165, Bk, 70-B, p. 67).

In it he explains the financial

situation;the measures he has taken to meet the rearma

ment program, and the steps he has 1aken to meet the

"basic change" in 1938 caused by the retaking of Austria,
the Western fortifications and the "increased tempo of
^^mrmient, "

He ends the letter with a statement that

(P» 70);
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"...

the day will not be far off

when the final death thrust can he
dealt to the Czechs."

Von KROSIGK may argue that the letter counsels
• caution, as i t does,

like Schapht,

and that i t makes von KROSIGK

Thp dlfferehce is that von KROSIGK*s

worries are not, as Sohacht' s were found to he, ahout

whether there would he an aggressive war, hut.one
solely as to when the aggression should occur.

He

thought, and argued, that Germany's head start on

the Western Democracies was not yet great enough.
Ho said (p. 70): "Most. Important is: 'time works

in our favor'' , ,
waiting, "

We therefore can only gain hy

But heyond a doubt, as early as 1 Septem

ber — before Goering's speech — von KROSIGK was
aware that the first object of all the frantic
rearmaiaent was "the final death thrust" to the Czechs.

Finally, if further proof be needed, von
kroslgk received two "Most Storet" memoranda from

Koital, on 28 and 30 September 1938, concerning the
plans for the military occupation of the Sudeten-

land, with specific directions on the handling of
Various a.spects of the occupation — the Henleln

Free Corps, Postal Ministry, financial measures, etc.

(388-PS, Kxh, 43, Bk. 70 B, pp. 72, 74),
There is one further aspect of von KROSIGK's

activities in 1938 which is worthy of mention.

In

his letter to Hitler of 1 September 1938, supra,
von KROSIGK mentioned the measures he had taken to

flnajice the expanded armament program in 1938.

As

a means, again, of putting him in a category differ

ent than Schacht, we oa.n with Schacht's testimony

before the IMT (Vol. 12, p» 484):
-51-

"Dr. Dix:

You were not responsible

"for The same reason.

!tSchii.cht: No, of course I am not
responsible for that.
"Dr. Dix:

Anh presumably the same

applied with respect to the point

made 'by the Prosecution that you

allegedly drafted a new finance

program in 1938?

"Scha£ht:
s

On the contrary, I re-

fu'sed To do anything else for the
financing of rearmament; the finance

program was drafted hy a state secre
tary in the Reich Finance Ministry,
and it loohed like it,"

By the samie tohen, we can put von KHOSIGK side "by side
with Funk.

The BIT said, in discussing Funk *s crimes

against peace (p. 305):
"On October 14, 1939, after the war

had begun, he made a speech in which
he stated that the economic and fi

^

nancial departments of Germany vrorking under the 4-year plan had been
engaged in the secret economic pre
paration for over a year."

This would put the beginning of Funk^s and von KROSIGK*s
•r.

war preparation back to about mid—1938, when the new
armament plan was announced, the ReichDefense
Council was reorganized, and when the new financing

^

plan was drawn up.

In every aspect, von KROSIGK was

in up to his neck.

When we come to the year 1939, we find vonKROSIGk,

and the Ministry of Finance, playing an even more im

portant part in the war preparations; the Relchsbank
which until then had been an important, and an inde

pendent instrumentality of war financing, became in.
1939 completely subservient to the Finance Minister.
The outline of the story is in the IMT judg
ment (p. 308):
-52-
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"At the end of 1938, in an attempt
to regain control of fiscal policy
through the Reichsbank, Schacht re
fused an urgent request of the
Reichsminister of Finance for a

special credit to pay the, salaries
of civil servants which were not

covered by existing funds^
On
January 2, 1939, Schacht held a
conference with Hitler at which

he urged him to reduce expenditures
for armamentse On January 7, 1939,
Schacht submitted to Hitler a re
port signed by the directors of the

Reichsbank which urged a drastic
curtailment of armament expendi
tures and a balanced budget as

the only method of preventing in
flation., On January 19, Hitler
dismissed Schaoht as president of
the Reichsbank,"

ftink, in his testimony before the IMT, elaborates

the story^ ^nd at the same time explains the vastly,
more important role to be taken by von KROSIGK (Vol.
^3:11, pp, 103-104) ^ ,
Sauter:

.^.Witness,

I believe

it was in'^January 1939 when, you also
became President of the Reichsbank
as successor to Dr.

Schacht,

How

did that appointment come about?
I had just returned from a

Journey about the middle of January

i939.

I was called to the Fuehrer

and found him in a state of great
agitation.

He told me that the

Reich Minister of Finance had in
formed him that Schacht had refused
the necessary financial credits and
that consequently the Reich was in
financial straits. The Fuehrer told
me, in great excitement, that Schacht

was sabotaging his policies, thcat he
would not tolerate the Reichsbank

interference with his policies any
longer and the gentlemen in the
Reichsbank Directorate were utter
to?
believed that he would
Chi?? P
government and no
•• ?

in the world could

policy dependent on
non-co-operation

Of the issuing bank.

"The Fuehrer further declared that
himself, on the sug-

f,. stlons and demands of the Reich
Finance would fix all

Kank
r to the Reich.
given He
by had
the given
Reichs-

hammers instructions to formulate
-53-

a decree^ together '.with the Reich
Minister of Finance, by which the
status of the Reichsbank, as es
tablished by the provisions of the

Treaty of Versailles, would be
cha^nged, and whereby the terms for
the granting of credits to the Reich
would be determined by himself alone
in the future. "

'Funk£

Thus I took over this office

not with the knowledge that Germany
was now entering an inflation period
but, on the contrary, I knew well
that through maintenance of a suit
able governmental policy the cur
rency could be protected, and i t

was protected.

However,

the basic

difference between Schacht^s posi
tion and my iDosition lay ir^ the

fact that during Schacht Vs time
the

Reichsbank

could detemine

the

granting of credits to the Reich,
whereas this authority was taken
from me, and the responsibility

for domestic finances,

therefore,

was turned over.to the Minister
of Finance or of course to the

Fuehrer himselfo"

The law, later enacted, which put the Reichsbank
in a position fully subordinate to the Finance Mini

stry, was passed on 15 June 1939.
1168, Bk, 70-b, p. 82).

(3513-PS, Exh,

It was signed by, among

others, Hitler and von KROSIGK.

Section III provided:

"The German Reichsbank is directed

and administered according to the
directives and under the supervision
of the Fuehrer..^"

Section XVI removed the power that the Reichsbank had
%

had to withhold credit from the Reich:
"The German Reichsbank may grant to

the Reich working credits, the .amount
of which will be.determined by the
Fuehrer... "

Von KROSIGK, subject only to. Hitler, bec.ame the sole
financial power in the Reich.
We

return, now, to the BIT judgment against Funk

in connection with crimes against peace.

One of the

two meetings cited by the B'^T in that connection is
-54-
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the meeting of May 30, 1939 (p. 35).

The IMT said;

"On Moir 30, 1939, the Under Secre.tary of the Ministry of Sconomics
attended a meeting at which de
tailed plans \vere made for the
financing of the war, •'

Similarly, the Under Secretary of the Ministry of
Finance, Reinhardt, also attended the mooting, (3562PS, jiiXh, loll, Bk, 70-c, po 73) t,

The minutes state

(po "73):

"To he shown to the Minister for his Infor-

mation".

The text of the minutes.makes it obvious

why the IMT cited it as Important.

/

A partial trans

lation of page 1 of the minutes states (p. 74)
"Then a report w.ae made of the con
tents
uenus of
or -cne
the 'Notes
'jNotes on the Question
Qi;

of Internal Financing of the War
o
Ti/To^r of
n f this year,
^ v* T»TV-i-i
off 9Q May
in
which the
given to me by the Helchs
Minister of Fln-ance are also disoussedo"

Von KROSIG-k had been active already in making flnanclal plans for the prosecution of the war.

What.kind

of a war? The minutes give a definite answer (p. 75)1
First, as concerns the scope of the
total x>roduction, it is clear that

the economic power of the protectorate

and of other territories, possibly to
he acquired, must of course be com-

the conduct of the war,

l\;purposes
li how-of

over, Just as clear that these terrl-

tories cannot obtain any compensation
economy of Greater Germany
for the products which they will have
during the

because this

niust. be used fully for the war

and for supplying the civilian home

population:
to

it Ss therefo.r 0

superfluous

such compensation
the debt of the domestic
German war
question as to what
products and other

commodities in the Protpctomte and
in the territories to be acouired,
can be utilized for us
thus can'
e excluded from this investigation,

insofar as it should happen that,
.^ Pclltlcal reasons, deliveries

expectancy of compensation

1-^2

demanded of the 'occupied*
- u ® . to that extent we will
able to pay with debt certificates
of* the Reich, "
-55-
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"mring the w^r the army can

out of the economy of Greater^Ger
many, substantially only'a^rith ^e-

liverigs to the extent of tii-?t^ ""

portion of production which ifi
peacetime is attributed to thQ

puolic expenditures—minus Bhe
minimum requirements of \the' civi
lian governmental agenfeies. In
additional reouice
ments of the Army
the economic
power of the Protectorate and of

Jhe territories to be accuired
"
during the Campaign, must' be usid. "

"Tho war" is now the topic. And we will search in,
vain fo,r even a suuaostlon that it Is a "defensive" war.

Von KROSI-GK Is plainly participating, on the highest
level. In the plan to acquire territory ^ior Germany
by force of arms. . Czechoslovakia had boen taken over;
Poland was next. Hitler'r, decision had .-aready, boon '
made, and announced at ameeting of 23 M!.y 1939. (IMT,
PP. 198-204). That voh KROSIGK was n ke.v figure in

the planning is shown by the letter of t-anamlftal
from the .Chief Plenipotentiary for the S.onomy! It
stated (p. 73j.
ploaeo find minutes of a

wnp financing. 30AsMaysoon
1939as concerning
war
the uew
of the Reich Ministry'of
shall
handed to mo" I
y?
take tothis
of again
referring
the opportunity
matter,"

In June, I939, the reorganized Reich Defense Council

held Its second meeting. (3787-PS, Exh. 553, Bk. 70-b,
%

P* 20). It was attended by von KROSIGK, together with

siich figures as Frlck, {ilmmler, jcoitel apt Raoder, and
was presided over by Gocrlng (pp. 23-24). The slgnlance of membership in the reorganized (Smncll Is

P fled by Goorlng's statement opening the meeting
(p. 26):
General Field

DrcnmST"

Gmphaslzed, In a

according to the

|bohrer's wiahee, the Reich De-

^ 0 Counoli was the determining
-56^
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"

body in tho Ht.-ich for all questions
of preparation for war.
It is to

discuss only the most important

questions of Reich defense.. They
will oe worRed out hy the Reich
Defense Committee."

The tenor of the meeting was, without question, one of

getting ready for a war that. was. £oing_ io_happ.2n, not
one that merely mig_ht happen,

Goering announced the

"directives to govern the.distribution and employment
of labor in wartime". (p. 26), Details were given
f

on essential war industries, specia.lizod workers,

training of women to replace men, etc.

assigned;'

Tasks, were

one of tho significant ones was (p. 29):

"The General Plenipotentiary for Eco
nomy is given the task of settling

what work is to be given to.prisoners
of war, to those in prison, concentra
tion c.araps and penitentiary. "

/

"Von KROSIGK^s old-time experience with public admini
stration and civil service got him a special assignment.
Frick pointed out that a saving of labor could and

should "be made in public administration.

A small

commission was recommended, and approved, of which
von KROSIGK was a member, under the chairmanship of

Stuckart,

Goering remarked (p^ 36):

"The President requested that the'com
mission's proposals bo suhmlttede It
was an Important section of the prew •

;'V fT

paration for war."

Meanwhile, as shown by another source, vpn KROSIGK

had been active in the financial preparations.

In the

interrogations of Funk prior to the MT trial (354'i-PS,

Vol, VI, pp^ 217 et:^s£q^, "Nazi Conspiracy and Agg.ros-.

Blon")

(pp.'218-S19);
\

So that Just to clarify it, when

you say Hitler, as you say, In the

middle of August, Hitler told you if
ue couldn^t succeed by negotiation

with the Poles in effect that he

would have to att-ack them; is that
correct?
-57-

I

r

ki '.1

•

"A.
I wouldn't put It precisely
liita •th-'-t, but in my CT.Be he must
hTve expected the possibility of n
WTa "

But when the Fuehrer told you
thut wm ^"rs likely to come you

volunteered the suggestion that

you ought to got up a plan for. the
control of wages and prices; Is
that right?

...

"AThat is correct, yes.-s.« That
washout the middle of August,
which was

the

last time

i

saw

him before the actual outbreak
of

the war«.

"Q,, So that you were a man who
al''"ays felt that you could not

successfully prosecute a war
without internal control of the

economy by way of price-and wage
regulations?

"A,
Yes, certainly.
If a war was
to break out, price and wage con
trols were necessary, and these

things would have to bo fixed to

prevent the Reichsbank from having

"^0 meet oonsidG.rablo expenditure
right away»
These war measures
had been prepared by the Mnister
of Finance separ-ately from me al

ready.

He was proposing a simply

colossal taxation for th-^.t event,

which appeared quite unnecessary

to IBS, and I said If he intro

duced it everybody would go bank
rupt.

"Q.

How long before that were

these tax plans made ^before the

contingencies of war<

"A.

That was all around about the

same time.

"Q.

And that was part of the pro-

gr'*^!!! that you were coordinating
for Hitler?

"A Yes, that was part of it; that
w*=is included In the points. Jind
subgonuently frora that the Minister
of Firinnoe had made similar prepar

ation, which in my opinion went
much too far.

"Q,.

So thot in effect you ware urg

ing upon the
ing
the J^tienrer
Fuehrer aa total
ouojij.

pre...j
onfH von were i n
pcr-ation
for war, and
you wore in
effect preparing for the war itself
within your own.sphere?
-^58-
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"A. Yes; and the fact that I was
against such far—reaching measures

as proposed by the Minister of
Finance can 'be e^cplained from my
convicti:)n that I did not think
that there would 'be .a world war,
hut that I WO.E thinking simply

of a war against Poland, because
if one was of the opinion that a
world war was about to break out

the xj.reprarntion would have been
o^uite diff erent^ •. "
These facts wore corroborated in a limited mcanner

"by KROSIGK under cross examination.

^Vhen asked whether

Funk complained to him regarding extensive taxatioh
plans and their effect, KROSIGK stated;

"Yes, that may very easily be the
case,"

(Tr.p. 25868).

KROSIGK went further and affirmed the fact that Funk,

opposed such plans before, as well as during the war.
(Tr.p, 23872);'.

Significant to note is the admission

"by KROSIGK that the war taxation scheme was drawn
up "by KROSIGK I s State Secretary in the Spring of

1939.

(Tr.p. ^3872).

Finally KROSIGK concluded

that:

"Funk gave me as his reason for
the war law drafts, after the
out'break of the war,

that he

was counting on a short war."
(Tr.p. 25873)o
Nor should it be overlooked that von KROSIGK did

a stupendous job.

Without in the slightest degree

minimizing the importance of the "'ork of many other
parts of the Hitler government, one can still assort
that funds are the sinews of war, and of preparation

for war.

Money had to be available, and it was up

to von KROSIGK, as the Minister of Finance, to supply
that money, "by taxes, long-term loans, s^ort-term
loans, proceeds of confiscation, and the like.

He

participated, as the documents show, in all of the
-59-

high—level conferences except those which were purely
milltriry; and not only was he made acquainted with

all the secret plane— 'b\it he played a major part in
carrying them out.
" >«r

When funds were needed, they were there.

We have
Vi

no evidence to Indicate that Hitler's preparations for
'^SS^sssive war suffered in the slightest from the need

of Reichmarhso

Foreign exchange was a problem, always,

and it was the occasion for many conferences; but

foreign exchange was to a considerable extent, a
function of diplomacy and German manpower, not Gennan
finance. In von KROSIGK-s particular field, the
internal financing of the war, the striking thing
about the documents is that they reveal no particular
concern of the war mongers at where the money vrauld

come froffio
supply it.

i

Von KROSIGK could be depended upon to
And the quantities he supplied were

enormous—not so much in the absolute sense as in

Comparison with prior years.

The figures"for the

Armed forces for the years 1934 to 1939 are.in
evidence, (NG-4052, Sxh. 1166, Bk, 70-b, p. 79).
1934

1^310,500,000 m

1935

1^735,700,000

1936

3,596,400,000

1937

5,014, 700,000

1938

11, 211,300,000

1939

20,500,000,000

(including
Luftwaffe)

^or the Luftwaffe, in addition to the above:
1934

642,300,000 m

1935

1,035,700,000

1936

2, 224,700,000

1937

3,257,700,000

1938

6,025,900,000
Included in armed forces

1939
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There Is also in evidence an analysis of the

Reich budget accounts for the same six years (except
that 1939 gives expenditures only up to August 26,
1939, the first day of mohilization.

Note that the

Reich fiscal year is April 1 to April 1,)

N9-4984j

Introduced 11 March 1948, Tr,p. 2990; this is an

analysis of the Budget Accounts (large volumes)
which are in evidence as Sxli. 1459a«1459g, Bk, 70-b),

The figures are not quite the same, but they are not
different enough to be significant.

The difference

is apparently due to the fact that the budget figures
include the unexpended balances of the past year#

(tr.pp. 22940-22942)o

This la.tter document, however,

illustrates a further difficulty imposed on von

KHOSIG-K, which he also had to overcome, and did over
come,

The Wehrmacht, and the Navy, from 1934 on, did

not give the Ministry of Finance a detailed plan of
expenditures for the budget; a cabinet resolution of

April 1934 relieved the Wehrmacht of this responsir

bility.

(Testimony of Mayer, 18 August 1948, Tr.p.

16717),

All that had to do was to furnish a "global

sum".

The witness Mayer testified that von KROSIGK

tried to push this down, if he thought it was more
money than he could raise (Tr.p, 16720), though he

didn*t have a very strong position because, first,
Hitler wouldn*t stand for cutting down the Wehrmacht,

c.nd, second, because having no knowledge of the details
of the proposed expenditures he. couldn't get much of
^ basis for argument,

(Tr.pp. 16718-16719).

It

should be added that Mayer admitted, on croes-examina-

tlon, that the Finance Minister knew, at a later time,
How the money had been spent by the Wehrmacht; sooner
later, perhaps in a yeari the details of expenditure
-61-
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were reported in the Budget Accounts.

(Tr.p. 16765).

He also admitted that the Finance Minister hnewj

each month, how much cash each department was using,
from their monthly requests for cash to be made

available to them.

(Tr.p. 16774).

Von KROSIGK endeavors to profit by the before
mentioned cabinet resolution of April 1934 by virtue

of which the Finance Ministry, from th'^t time, had to
furnish the Wehrmacht and Navy with a yearly global

sum without being in a position any longer to establish
a detailed budget.

However, von KROSIGK must by no

means conceal his responsibility for the re-armament
behind this cabinet decision and its consequences.

He remained, notwithstanding, the leading man as re

gards financing the armament program.

This is most

clearly evidenced by his "Directives for the future
financing of the arm.ament program" elaborated by

.'•wi

himself -and sent to Schacht and Keitel on 10 March

1938.

In these directives he stresses the experiences

of the past year have proved that the armament program
for 1938 C'^n be carried through most likely at 11
billion Roichsm-ark i f some of the raoaeures not ab

. •••va
i'

solutely necessary for an effective completion of

the program are stopped and price control is increased.

And he goes on to s-ay (paragraph 6):
"In employing all cash -and other reserves
of its regular budget for financing the
armament program, ?he Reich Ministry
for Finance will make all efforts to

guarantee the financing by means of
these funds taken from the budget by

curtailing as much as possible.all
other expenses and by engoglng other
reserves that can be used (e.g. surplus

of unemployment Insurance, surplus from

real taxes).

(NG—5553, 3xh. 3913, Bk. 212).

How, then, can the Minister of Finance, who takes care
of employing "all casH and reserves" for the armament
-62-
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progr^ and who curtails all other expenses in the

interest of that program, deny that he played the
leading role in financing the armament?

Further documents prove beyond any reasonable

doubt his decisive part in financing the re-armament
program, and in m.aking a.vailable the funds for the
three parts of the Wehrmacht.

Under the date of 4

March 1958, Mlnisteria.l Director Bayrhoffer of the

Finance Ministry drew up a memorandum which starts?
"In.a.conference with General Keitel

and President Schacht,

the Minister

(i-e. SCHWSHIN-KHOSIGK) placed at
the disposal of the Wehrmacht the
sum of 11,500,000,000
"
Then Bayrhoffer set forth how and under which accounts

the sura should be booked in the budget, and how the
amount would be raised.

(NG-5552, Fxh. 3910, Bk, 212).

On 5 M.arch 1938 the OKH informed the OKW of the

introduction of a new credit procedure in view of the

fact that no more MeFo bills would be given out after
31 March 1938, and plainly stated;
"From 1 April 1938 onwards' the funds
alloted for Wehrmacht expenses will •
be made available only by the Reich

Minister of Finance,"
3911, 3k, 212).

(NGw.5549, 3xh.

All this shows that SCHVVSRIN*-KROSIGK' s allocation of

funds for the Wehriiiacht was by no means what he now pre
tends to have been,

A man who hold conferences with

Keitel and Schacht on the financing of the Wehrmacht,

v-fho placed billions and billions at its disposal -md
who had the exclusive responsibility for making avail
able these funds cannot contend that he had no influence

on the Wehrmacht budget and the re-armament program.
In other words, he not only furnished the global
Bum but he had to fix the global sum in negotiating
-63-
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with the Wehrmr.cht,

Under direct examination von

hP;OSIG-K stated:

"Budi^ot negotiations in the usual sense of
the v.-ord did not take place. Before the
beginning of the fiscal year Minister von
Bloraberg 'and later iCeitel negotiated with
me and the president of the Reichsbank,
that is to say, with Schacht, until
January 1939, a.nd from then on until the
outbreak of the war with Funk.

The amount

of the round sum to be apj:>roved for the
following year was negotiated on. Regarding
the size of this amount there was regular

ly a struggle lasting for hours which
usually ended with a compromise." (Tr.p.
22938)

AI3. of this merely serves to emphasize the
ability with which von KHOSIC-K performed the task
allotted to him in the prei')aration for war, because,
as NG-4984 shows, he was alwag'"s in a position of having
to raise more than the "global sum" which he had
managed to negotiate as the limit of the financial

resources of the Reich. In 1934, for example, the
estlmo,ted expenditures for Array and Navy vjere

approximately 1,000,000,000 Hi. They actually ^ent,
about 1,440,000,000 RM or almost half again as much.

In 1937, to take another example, the budgcc

estimate for the two departments was about 3,000,000,000
RM. They actually spent about 5,360,000,000 RM, or
almost twice as much; almost 2,500,000,000 Hi had to
be rsAsed that von KHOSIG-K had not counted on

raising, Svery year, for the Army, and almost every
year, for the Navy, it was the same.. Still, thanks

to von KR03IGK, the money was raised. The same holds

true with regard to the Armed Units of the SS, com
prising the SS Verfuegungstruppe, the SS Junker

Schools, the SS Dead Head Units, the Concentration
Camps etc. The money needed was allocated and fur-64-
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nished oy the ^linistar of .Finance, It

left to the

S3 to mahe use of it for whatever purpose they deemed

proper. After having estahlished the particulars of
their budgetj the Amed Forces of the S3 sent it. to
the Ministry of Finance as shown by N&-4456, Sxh,C-62j
Doc,Bk.212, p.2. Special attention is called to page 9
showing the individual Concentration Camps of that
/

year, page 5 shovring the expenditures for the SS

Dead Head Units and p.13 showing the total expenditures
for all Units. It is no wonder that he held his post

both pre-war and during the war, and was to have been
an important officer in the Doenitz cabinet.

The defendant von KROSIG-K estimates that the total

expenditures for the rearmament until the outoreak of

the war amounted to 60 billion Wi (Tr,p.22946), which
would be equal to 56;o of the total budget of all

minlatrioB (Tr.p. 23043). Hitler himself in a speech
on the first day of the war stated the expenditures

for rearmament to "be 90 billion Bll (Tr. p. 22947). There
is suDstantlal proof- to assume that Hitler was correct

in this respect, the tremendous amount spent by other
ministries, for instance the Ministry for Sconomlcs

and the Hlnietry for Food and Agriculture, for x>urposes of the so-called civil rea?^mamc-nt must be con

sidered. These amounts, of course, are not contained
in the budgets of the Wehrmacht and are not included
; %

in the sura suomitted by von KROSIGK. The expenditures

for establishing the grain reserve, during 1938 and in
the beginning of 1939, are also at issue. Von KROSIGK
admitted under cross examination that these exjDenditures
were not included in his figure of 60 billion Rm.
-65-
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One other fact should also be mentioned. In 1945

Reinhardt,, the Under Secretary of the Finance Ministry,
had issued instructions that in the event there ij?as

any danger of the secret files of the Finance Ministry
falling Into enemy hands, all secret directives should
be destroyed "by fire. The witnesses Mayer and Reinharat cor
roborated the fact that, the instruction was given;:arid said

they acted on ittTr.p.16764)KR0Sr(:^^also_adiutiedthls(Tn,p.25892).
Thus we don^t hnow of all of von KROSIG-K^s activities
in the detail that we might. We know enough, as

described above, to show his guilt. We know, too, from
the Relnhardt Instruction, that he had a guilty know

ledge; destruction of documents is a fact ^"hich the
court can properly consider as evidence of guilt.
Apart from the story on aggressive war planning
in the financial field, we have a few documents which
serve to illustrate that von KROSIGK was participating

generally in all sorts of government, political and

diplomatic activities;

no doubt the destroyed files

would show a great many more. For example, on 18

Febraury 1939, the mobilisation book for the civil
administration was. sent to him (1639—A—PS, ixh. 554,

Uoc.Bk.70-b, p/42). The book set forth a comprehensive
mobilization schedule for civil administration in the

event of war, and covers mobilization without j^ublic
announcement, as well as with public announcement
a fact the aggressive significance of which could
scarcely have been overlooked by von KROSIOK.
We have in evidence illustrations of his participation,

by way of approval of programs, in the several activities
-66'}•

of other departments in preparing for i^^ar. In 1937,
for exanple, he ai^proved a draft of a lai?' authorizing

him to give guarantees of 12,000,000 RM for the develop,
ment of German sheep raising and wool production

{N&-429, Sxh 439, Bk, 70-c, p.69), The reasons for
the law were stated (p,71):

"For reasons of public and especially military
economy, however, an addition.al and more

rapid increase in the numoer of sheep and

in the production of wool is reouired,"

We have in evidence a series of letters.between

von KHOsiaiC and the liinister of Food and Agriculture

and Various banks during 1938 and 1939 CNCl-4345, Sxh.
1173, Doc,Bk,70-c,p,77), In brief, the correspondence
shows that von KROSIGK, throush the several guarantees
given oy him to many private banlcs, made possible the
P r hase and stoclcplllng of grain for a war reserve
up to the quantity of six million tons.

Never before did the Reloh have grain stocks of

a similar size. On 30 June 1937 the grain reserve
a unted to half a million tons, two years later same day - to 5,5 million tons. During the next

wei,k6 the grain In possession of the Reich even Ind to 6,5 million tons, and, an additional reserve

Of one million tons was In the hands of tradesmen and

mills. (xIID-14478, Sxh, 1245, Doc.Bk.l02). "That Is the
largest amount we had ever had", testified the witness
von Knorre. (Rr-18331)

So Higantic vras this grain reserve that 18 new
and about 350 new storege hc.lle had to be con-67"
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structed (NII>-.1447e, Exh.l245, Doc. Bk.l02)_, and that
even gymnasiums were used for storage as the silos

and warehouses were not sufficient, (R-18330-18331),
Witness von Knome- tried to explain the tremendous

grain reserve, piled up until the outbreak of the war,
by the record harvest of 1938, Hoi"ever, under, crossexamination he had to admit that Germany, despite the
bumper crop, purchased more than 3 million tons of

grain from abroad during that year. (iU18327), see
also MID-14478, i;xh.l245, Doc. Bk. 102). These huge stocks
wore purcho.sed by mems of loans given by German

banks and guaranteed by the lllnlstry of Fln-ance.

Correspondingly, the guarantees went uri from 96.4

million PM In I936 to approximate 950 million RM by
June 1939. {NXrL.14778, Exh, 1245, Doc, Bk. 102).
Apart from these guarantees given by the Flnojice

ministry an additional amount of 559 million RM was
spent by the Jilnistry of Pood and Agriculture "For

measures on the field of grain and legume economy"

during the fiscal year 1938/1939, {NID_15554, Exh.
C-76, Doc,Bk.212) - whereas the same Ministry spent for
the same purpose only two million RM In 1936 and about

4 million RM in 1937. (R-18338) Needless to say, the
-.dditional 559 million RM used for grain purchases In

1938-1939 were allocated by the Finance Ministry. There
dan be no doubt that a £eaoeful_sovernmant would not

I'uve amassed a grain reserve of 6i million tons, plus
an additional million tone In the hands of dealers, etc..

There can be no doubt that, during a year of bumper crop,
Paaoefui government would not have purchased more than
-68-

3 million tons of ^rain from abroad - all the more so

since that government was in constant lack of foreign
exchange. The tremendous grain•reserve

had one purpose

and one purpose alonej namely, to get prepared for an
Imminent war.

This preparation was fully in line with Goering's

g

statement during the cabinet meeting of 4 September 1936

where he stated,-in the presence of Schwerin-KROSXGK, that

^

all mea,sures are to be taken just as though Germany was
on the brink of war. (EC-416. Sxh.940 S, Doc. Bk.70-B).
It was also in line with KROSIGK's standpoint that a
future war will bo fought not only with military moans,
but that it would be an economic war of greatest scope*

(ECl-419, Exh. 1165, Doc. Bk. 70-B). The ineatiablo Goering
^

had even ordered that ithe grain reserve was to be increased

to 8 million tons. (R-18329) However, this was, apparent
ly considered foolish by ICHOSIGK who deemed 6 or 7

million tons sufficient. In a letter to Darre, dated
'

31 March 1939, (p.83) von KROSIGK taltes issue with the

^

magnitude and expense of the progr-am If it goes over

^

six million tons, and states that he must refuse to go
beyond that quantity for the following year. Note^ however, that this is not a Schacht operation; this is

not in opposition to preparation for war. This is a
matter of judgjaent on how the preparations for war can

beet be made. The letter states (p.84):
opinion also from the point of view of
economy the means of the Reich
uia bo put to more practical use."

A conference with Goering was suggested to resolve the
dispute (p.84); no doubt in many oases the issue of how

I

•

JU

best to spend the available funds for war was an issue
between von KHOSIGK and the rest of the government. He

had to know what was going on. It is worth noting,

too,

that in the critical years 1938 to 1939, the grain re

serve increased (from 7 September 1938 to 7 August 1939)
from 327 million RM to 900 million HM, a huge increase
of aver half a billion RI^ (pp,78,87; the comparison is not cf
the guarantees,

but of the amounts clo-imed under the

guarantees.)

We also have aa^ther letter from von KROSIGK to

Ribbentrop, which illustrates that ho also £)articioated

in the field of diplomacy and foreign relations (0e-f. Doc. 528,
Exh.188, Def.Suppl.Bk,II),

The letter is dated

August 23, 1939; von KROSIG-K had gone to Rome to see

how :;lussolinl and Ciano felt about the Soviet Pact-.

The letter opens with "cordial and sincere congratula
tions" on the pact itself. It rei->orts on Giano*s doubts
that the Axis is yet ready for war, and that the war
can be confined to Poland. The attitude of von KROSIG-K
is also expressed;
"Upon my objection that the Fuehrer is of a
different opinion and would not believe in .a
war with England and France, Dount Ciano re
plied that he knew that but was afraid that

the Fuehrer would be v/rong this time. Upon
my re_^.ly that it is utterly intolerable" for
a great x^eople to watch idly any longer the
systematic tre-atmont of Germo.ns by Poles,
that therefore, a solution of the Polish
question would be inevitable and that the

whole German, people agree on this, Count

Ciano rejolied that much depended on the mood

of the Axis . . .

.«

The letter noted that von KROSIGK*s audience with LIusso-'

lini would take place the next morning.
Again, it is indicated that activities of von KROSIGK
-70-

extendGd beyond the taxgntherc-r field. Diplomaoy and

agriculture are merely indicia that his knowledge of
and his participation in the plans for war covered
the whole range of Hazi activity.

^
♦

Another series of documents dealing with one aspect
of the aggression against the low countries (NG^
5347, Exhibit 3892, introduced in cross-examination
of Lammers) from the Wehrmacht side of the picture

A

reveals that Ministerial Councillor von rietz, of
the Reich Finance Ministry, had come in to see a

Wehrmacht Operations Officer on 17 January 1940. Von
Dietz said that the Finance Ministry had been asked

^

by the Foreign Exchange Investigation Office (under
the 4-year plan) to assist in setting up Foreign Ex
change Investigating Squads, "destined for territories

»

outside the Reich borders which were to be occupied.

In this connection Holland, Belgium and Rmanla had
been mentioned." The memo "by the Wehrmacht man
continued:
1

"Ministerial Councillor von Pletz emphasized
that

the Reich Finance Minister was in no

i'

way informed about such intentions and pre-

iv

parations. But owing to previous experiences,
the estaDllshment of the investigation

^

squads had led to the conclusion that the
occupatir;n of countries outside the Reich

•

borders was now imminent."

The memo ends by saying that the Reich Finance Itlnistry
was requested by OKW not to take any further steps in

•this matter for the time being.
•r

I

Then follows a series of memos on how this

happened, the inference being that it had come about
through the Four Year Plan.
-71-

After the war had brohen out, von KROSIG-K

showed the same energy in carrying on the, war that

-

he had shown in planning and preparing it^ He tried

to mobilize all forces for thp final victory
not only in his own particular field, but in the

whole of the Nazi economy. For ex.^inple, in a letter

dated 1 January 1942, he suggested to Goering a
drastic overhauling of the war economy CNGw4682,
Sxh, 1184, Doc.Bh.70-c, p. 133). He said, for example':
h . „ one of the most important tasks in
the coming year will be to enforce in the
emtire sphere of war economy what the

mllitary call 'Schwerounktoildung* (forming
of essential center of gravity^"

"Schwerpunktbildung" is also necessary in the treat

ment of public opinion, to strengthen the will to
victory. Ho adds that he has "The unsh.okable con

viction that we must win and can win, if we con
centrate all our forces upon victory only."

Furthermore, he not only continued supplying
money to the Waffen SS but exempted them from sub

mitting monthly applications for money as for as
ordinary expenditures were concerned. Special

applications were to be submitted only for expen
ditures such as the liquidation of the Warsaw

ghetto etc. (Na-5516, Fxh, C-60, Doc, 3k. 212). The
amount expended for the Taffen SS during the
year of 1943 amounted to 1,686,950,— RM, exceed

ing the budget by about 266 million RM (Na-5518,
Exh. C-61, Doc. Bk. 212)

Von iCRosiGK held Hitler's full confidence, too,
after the 2o July 1944 plot — indeed, he had an
important part in the proceedings against the con-72-
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spirators, relating to the,confiscation of their

property (NGr-4095, 3xh, 1187, Doc. Bk, 70-0, p.l4S),
A letter to Himmler from SS Obergruppenfuehrer Orel-

>

felt relates a conversation with von KR03IGK 7h' that

"topic# The SS had apparently decided that a Fuehrer

decree of confiscation was necessary, and one of the

-

•

memos indicates that von KHOSIGK^s consent was

necessary (p.147; letter of 3 October 1944). The
letter to Eimmler of 4 December 1944, however, stated

(pol42):
"The undersigned had a detailed discussion with
the Finance liinister Count Schwerin von

Krceigk on 7 Noveinber 1944. During this con
versation a basic agreement has been reached
on the following suojects:

(a) It is neither necessary nor psychologi
cally expedient to regulate the realization
of property of the criminals of 20 July I944,

by a Fuehrer decree."

'

Nor did von KROSIGK's faith fail even when the war

was clearly lost,

and further resistance was useless,

We have several letters from him to Goebbels dated
•

in Feoru.ary, March, and April, 1945, in which he
urges various steps — more anti-Bolshevik propaganda,
greater use of the -Hitler Youth, conscription of

refugees, even •'^^ounded men, for war work, changes

in diplomacy to break up the allinnce between England
and Russia, and the like (MG-4677, Sxh.llBO, Doc,

Bk.70-C, p.125; Na-4583,. Doc.Ht,70-C, Sxh# 1185,p, 137;
NG-.4678, Fxh,1181,Doc.Bk.70-,C, p,l27; NG-4679, Sxh.
1182, Doc.Bk,70-C, p.130; NG-4680, Sxh#1183, Doc,.
Bk,7p-,C, p. 132; NG-.4681, Sxh.1188, Doc. Bk, 70-C, p. 149).
The letters show that, just as in the 1930's, von
^^OSIGK never wavered in hie enthusiasm and labors

for the Nazi cause# They -are not needed for the
-73-
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purp-.-sej but they cert^.tnly add another oleuient of
proof that the attempted parallel to Schacht Is
impossible. Indeed, von KHOSIG-K even functioned
s

K

as Foreio;n Ivlinister under' his appointment by
i

Doenitz; we have a coded telegram to the German
Ambassador in Tokyo instructing him ho^ji^ to answer

•r

'
'

•Togo^s

>

complaint that the peace 'negotiations with

the Allies were

breach 'jf the Tri-partite pact.

(MGv-4685, 5xh.ll86,

3k. 70-Cy p. 139).

Further evidence adduced in Counts V and. VI

constituting ^,Var Crimes and Crimes against .Humanity
which were committed as an integral part of Crimes'

against Peace as hereby incorporated by reference
and will be discussed in later portions of this
brief.
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III.

1.

COUNT V

Persecution of. Jews

It is charged- under Count V of the Indictment

thf.t the defendc?.nt von KROSIGK participated in

persecutions on political, racial and religious

grounds.

His guilt under this count has "been over

whelmingly i^roven.

As will later be shown,, thi^

defendant signed the infamous decree of July 1943
under which the Jews vrere deprived of all judicial

process and left at. the mercy of Himmler's police.

-k
i

The "Final Solution" ha.d arrived.

The IMT branded this persecution as "a record
of consistent and systematic inhumrnity on the

/" V

greatest scale" (p. 247), and, after summarizing the
anti-Jewish policy formulated in the Party Progrpjii,

continued (p. 248-249);
" With the seizure of power, the perse
cution of the Jews wp.s intensified.

i,

. '1

A

series of discrimins.tory la.v/s was
pa.ssed, which limited the offices and

professions permitted to Jcv/s;' and
restrictions were placed on their

family life and their rights of citizen
ship.

By the autumn of 1958, the

Nazi policy tov/ards the Jev7S had

:

reached the stcage vjhovc it was dir
ected towards the comploto exclusion
of Jews from German life, pogroms
were organized,.which included the,

burning and demolishing of synagogues,
' VP

the looting of Jewish businesses, and
the arrest of prominent Jewish business
men.
A colloctive fine of 1 billion

>.4'

marhs was iraposGd on the Jews, the
seizure of Jewish assots was a.uthorized,
'and the ffiovoment of Jowg was restrioted-

.r.ii

by regulations to certain specified
districts and hours.

The creation of

sv

ghettos was carried out on an extensive
scale, and by an order of the Security

police Jews wore compelled to wear p,

/a,

yellow star to be worn on the breast
and back.

"
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These measures ?ga.inst the Jc'^^s were enacted
during a meeting presided over by G-oering on
13 November 1938 with several high officials as
particlpsjits, among then von KROSIGK.

The minutes
» T

of this meeting are contained in Doc. 1816-PS,

(Exh. 1441, Bk, 59, p. 9).

At this meeting Heydrich

reported that 101 synagogues were destroyed by fire,
76 synagogues demolished and 7500 stores destroyed
during the pogrom on 10 November 1938 (p. 15) and
estimated the total damage at 35 million

(p, 19).

As consequence of all thi^, Goering, in agreement
with all participants-of the meeting of 13 November
1938, decided that the Insurance companies "have to

make pa.yraeht for the damago the Jews ha.vc suffered,
but not to the Jews but to the Minister of ^'inrance"

{p. 18), and imposed a "Fine of Atonement" in the
amount of 1 billion marlts on the Jews (p. 39-40).
Furthermore, the "Aryanization" of Jewish stores
and commercial enterprises, the exclusion of Jewish
children from schools, the restriction of Jev/s to

certain districts of cities, the forcible emigration,

the wearing of a yellow star, etc., were Introduced.
The defendant von KHOSIGK testified under

direct examination (Tr. p. 23386) with regand to the

m
• '.Hul

pogrom;

' l'- <•

"At the time when this occurred,

rnd

ever since, I have always considered
aMi;-:'-

this to be a disgrace on the character
of the German people."
•

Moreover, ho testified that he had remained in
'Hitler* s Ca,binet, "to raise the voice of reason and
Justice" (Tr, p. 22933).
Those statements must be compared with

attitude during the meeting in question,

his

the corres

ponding part of his cross examinp.tlon reveals;
-76W ••
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"Q,» . , . Wowj m.?.y I ask you, pStcr

experiencing the injustice sjid in
human actions inflicted on the Jews,

as told at that meeting, did you then
voice your res.son and right at the

meeting v/hi-ch was held by G-oering'?
••

•

A. No,, not at that meeting.

Q. And you
)u didn't object to any '

decision made during that
the.t meeting?
moei

A. Noj not at that meeting," (Tr,p,33905)
He did not only refrain from making any objec

tion, he even stressed the urgency of the measures

agreed upon,

Vvhen Minister. Fischbocck suggested

tha,t those measures should bo carried out "during
the next week", von KROSIG-IC sta.tcd:
"They have to be take.n during the next

4:

w--.'

fi" "

"week" at 1:he "InT^st
E^.14^1,
Bk. 59, p. 49; .• nd Tr,p. 25903-35904)

,

In pursuance of G-oering's decree concerning

'.'.. '

the "Fine of Atonement" von ICROSIG-K issued

an

ordinance dated 21 Hovoraber 1938, levying an assess

ment of 30^ of the property of Jews, to bo paid in
four installments, in order to collect thg

(1411-PS, Exh. 2103, Bk. 57-B, p. 100).

fine,

This

ordinance is signed by the defendant von KH05IG-K
only.

On 19 October 1939 he issued a further decree

increasing the assessment to 25^ (NID—13855, Exh.
2104, Bk. 57^8, p. 103), and on 10 December 1958

he signed detailed Instructions as to how to exact
the paymoht, especially with regard to securities,
mortgage bonds, real est.ato and the like to be
taken from the Jov/s if they V7ere not in a position

to hand over sufficient ajrnounts in cash.
^ Exh. 2424, Bk- 75)
-77-
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In other words, the defendf-nt von KROSIG-K

V7as In complete charge of enacting all" legal and
administrative measures for carrying out the collec

tion of the "fine."

In reality it \va.s nothing mere

than forceful confiscation.

A former officia.1 of the Ministry of

Fina.nce,

Amtsra.t Parpatt, has described in his affidavit

(NCt-4625, Exh. 2428, BE. 75) the way in which the
Ministry of Finance, the only competent authority
In these matters, realized the securities received
by the Reich by various methods.

Parpatt v/ho

handled such matters pointed out that the utilisa
tion of securities hejided over by or confiscated

from Jews wa.s the tasE of the llinistry of finance.
For this pumose it made use oi the Prussian State

Bank (Seehandlung) and the Reich Main Pay Office
(Reichshauptkasse ). It is of no avail, to set
forth here hov; the realization of the securities

took place in particular. In any case, it always
remained under the supervision of the Ministry of
Finance.

\

Von KRCSIOK has not denied that ho was

- in charge of realizing all securities fallen to the
Reich whether they wore confiscated or captured:

•'>

"a. Now, v'ltness, is It correct that
all securities which c?jne into the

.:v

he-nds of the Reich for various reasons

were administered and utilized
Finance Ministry from the end of 1900
on?

A. All securities you say, yes

Q,. And didn't all the higher agencies
which concerned thomselvee Tii'l v-o-iort

flscatcd and captured securities ^spo^t
to the finance Ministry

securities were delivered to tnem?

A. Securities?
-78-
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Q,
\.

Securities, yes

A. Yes, that v^as the order in effect."
(Tr. p.- 23907-23908)

1.1- \

Referring to the Reich Hain Pay Office, the
defendant von KROSIGK stressed under direct exsjnina-

tion, "that it was not a pay office" of the Reich

•Ministry

of ^inance but much rather it was the joint

Main Pay Office of all the departments". (Tr. p.
•23135-23136).

This shall not be disputed, however,

it must be emphasized that the Main Pay Office is
mentioned in the Trial Brief

on von KROSIGK only

Insofar as that office acted on his directives.

KROSIG-.K admitted:

•

Von

"

"The Reich Main Pay Office was sub
ordinated to the Reich Ministry of

^'inanco in respect to personnel and
in respect to disciplinary iiioasures.
The.Reich Finance Minister vras also

h

R ....V
.V,
y.

responsible for orderly books in
questions of fundamental importance,
or in questions of doubts it wa-s up
to the Reich Minister of Finajicc to
rule." (Tr. p. 23135)

He,

furthermore, admitted that also with regard

to the other ministries in some way "the entire assets

were under the control of the Reich Fmaiioo Ministry"
(Tr. p. 23138)
. V,
•!<:

.

We will revert to this matter of confisoation

rjld utilization in connection with the 11th Decree

to the Reich Citizenship law.

First of all, the

background of von KROSIGK's ant.i-Jexvlsh activities
must be discussed.

In 1937, relative to the firing of Jev?ish

employees in governmontal agencies, von KROSIGK issued
an order, dated 19 Juno 1937, to all supreme Reich
authorities and Reich governors stating:
-79-
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"After agreement vjXth the Reich and
J'russlan Minister of the Interior I

ask you that the question of the scope
of dismissal from public service of

employees in public administrative
offices c?,nd enterprises -

in a.ccordrnce

with Article lAOC-O - who are Jews or
of Jewish descent and whose termine,-

tion of contract is contractually

prohibited either permamently or for
a period of more than one yenr or
made dependent upon dmportant reasons,

•^ 'li

_th_e de_ci_sion_of ~_th_o J-ijciis_sa3. or
retaining .of publi_q offi_qial_s on

active_s_ervi_oej_" (NG—1S77, Rxh. 3914,
Bk.

212)

His participation in the anti-Jewish policy of
Hitler and the Ministry of Interior was conclusive.
The decree concerning the Fine of Atonement of

12 November 1938 was followed by a series of additional
anti-Jewish decrees,promulgated, for the most part,

by the Ministry of Interior,

They are dealt with in

the Trial Brief on the defendant Stuckart.

Von

KROSIGK had knovrledge of them and knew the ruthless

trend of legislation enacted against the Jews.
The Importance of the concentration camps as

•means for oppressing and torturing Jews is commonly
known.

The Iffl states with regard to the concentra

tion camps (p. 234);

"They wore first established in Germsny at the moment of the seizure of
power by the Nazi Government. Their
original purpose vjas to imprison ¥7ithout trial all those persons who were

opposed to the Government, or who

were in a,ny way obnoxious to Gorman

authority.

V/ith the aid of a secret

police force, this practice was

widely extended, a.nd in course of

time concentration crmps beo-me places

of organized and systematic murder,

where millions of people were des
troyed. "
-ao-

•f:

•

•'

I

Von KROSIG-K v-ie.s concerned in mripy respects yjXth
the concentration camps.

He has not denied that he

knew the number of those osonps up to the outbrerJt

of war. (Tr. p. 23350).

According to the "Budget of
t

the Armed Units of the SS and of the Concentration

Camps for the fiscal yesr* 1939" (NG—4456, Exh. C-62,
Bk. 212) there v/ere six concentration camps (p. 9 of doc.)
with an average of thirty thousand inmates a.t the^t

time (p. 101) in each camp.

^

As to the money needed for the maintenance of
it

the Concentration Crmps and Death Head Unite,/belonged
to a budget provision of the Minister of Interior

(Tr. p. 24114), but was allocated by the Mlni^stor of
Finance.

When the break-dovm budget v;as cstp.blished

KROSIG-K received knoH'ledgo of it.

Of it, KHOSIG-K

said under cross exavmination:

.•/;!

"Q. And you were aware of the SS
expenditures for the maintenance of
concentration camps?

A. fes."

(Tr* p. 23897)

His knowledge went even further, however.

He

also took the opportunity of visiting a oonoentra.tion

camp together with Ministerial Director von

and stayed there about two hours.

Mr?ntenffel

According to his

testimony he had "not the slightest Impression of

atrocities,." (Tr. p. 23302) and allegedly nothing in
particular struck him.

'fet, his companion von

Mantenffel felt "that the head of the camp looked
like e. beast in the shape of a man." (witness Hayer,

Tr.p. 16790 ); This "beast in the shape of a man"
had the Inmates of the camp lined up to sing for

von KROSIG-K (Tr.,'p. 16790), but KROSIG-K did not feel
-81-
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shocked at this repugnant travesty-

He testified that

he "can only say that the installations, as far as
the outward order'and sanitary arrangements and so
forth are concerned, made a model impression". (Tr^p.
23301-23302).

Under cross examination KRGSIG-K admitted

that he Imew of Incidents in the concentration camps
as

early as 1938-

(Tr. p. 23811)

Whenever Himmler desired to enlarge a concentra
tion camp, he oonta.cted the Minister of •^inanoo

financial approval.

for

This Ms evidenced by the letter

of the Reichsfuehrer SS to von KROSIGK, dated 1 October

1941, requesting the budgetary approval for the pur
chase of a mill urgently needed for the enlargement

of the Auschwitz concentration camip and "in conformity
with the political tasks of the oamp„" (NG-5545, Exh.
3915, Bk. 212). Further evidence in this respect is
the letter of 7 November 1942 by SS Obergruppenfuehrer

Pohl to the Minister of Finance requesting authorization
for a further enlargement of the scjne concentration
camp.

The letter stated in partj

"The ta.sks allotted by the Reich Fuehrer

SS require an enlargement of fhe aa?ea of
the Concentration C^mp Auschwitz to the

limits which ho.ve already been marked on

the map. (total area about 4640 ha)....
the formation of such an estate district

presupposes,

that the total area is the

property of the Reich..

. This area, con

sists of the following estates: 1) agri
cultural and forestry estates belonging
to Poles and Jews
2) urban property
and several business enterprises oxvned

by Poles and Jews.... 3) landed property
which formerly belonged to the Polish state
4) Municipal Property...... 5) Eccle
siastical property.... 6) property of
persons of German blood„"
in a conference on this topic, held on 17 and IS

December 1942, "the representative of the 'Referat

Maedel' of the Reich Ministry of Finance, Reglorungsrat Keller, pointed out that there is no objection to
-82-

the cession of church property within the area ©f

the

Auschwitz concentration camp to the

fuehrer SS. "

Seichs-

, (1643-PS, Exh. 2422, Bk. 75, p,10- n ^

The document further shows that the concentration

camp was enlarged thereby.

^

On the other hand, when the finances of the

Party later on becamie strained the Party Tre0,surer

again got in touch with the ^Sinister of ^'inance sug
gesting tha.t the Reich should buy the <-orcRntration
cainp of Dachau, and adding;

"I should also v/elcome the sale of
the Dachau ce;np inasmuch as the

Party would benefit from it in
financial respects

e.nd because of

the fact that this real property is

now being used almost

exclusively

for the State, i.e. for the ^purposes
of the Waffen SS srd as a concentra

tion crjnp."

(KG-555d, Exh. G-98,

Bk. SIB)

In the sarao v/ay tho sale of the SS'Oadet School .

at Bad Toelz was offered to the Ministry of f'lnanco,
and von KROSIGK promptly came to the assistance of

the ^arty and bought the Gadot School and the conccntrs.tion cpmp of Dachau a.t 17 million marks as shown
in his letter of 15 May 1940.

Incidentally^ by

this letter he simultaneously allotted 289.6 million
marks "for the heeds of the KSDAP".

(NG-5550, Exh,

0-98, Bk. 212|.
I

KR0SIGK*8 sphere of influence and knov;ledge'

was not limited to the conoentrs.tion camps.

^

In 1941 the mass deportations of Jews to the

East commenced on a large scale.

KRCSXG-k's Ministry

of Finance had a considerable share in these'activi

ties.

By printed circular letter of 4 November 1941

the Minister of ^'inanoe informed all Oberfinanz-

praesldents of the impending deportation by the
-83-

'Gestapo sto.tlng "The property of the Jews to be
deported will be confiscated in favor of the

Reich".

✓

The letter then continues:

'/•

"The deportation has already begun
in the districts of the Fina.nce -

Presidents Berlin, Hamburg, \7eser-

Ems in Bremen, Kassel, Cologne,
Duesseldorf.
Shortly additional
8000 Jews ivill be deported from
the

Finance-District of Berlin.

^he administra^tion end
utilization

of the confiscated

property of the Jews is my task."

(NCt-4905, Exh. 2452, Bk. 75)
To accomplish this task detailed instructions

were given concerning all kinds of property.

Signi-

flca.nt for the domina.nt position of the Minister of

Pinfince with regard to utiliza.tion of the Jewish
property is the following directive contained in
the same letter:

" I request to exaraine, before
furniture is utilized otherwise,
which objects can be used for the

Rpich Finance-Administration. Into
consideration arc to bo token:

For

the outfit of offices (offices of
the chiefs and referents,

office

rooms):

i-.p

writing desks, bookcases, arm
chairs, carpets, picturos,'

typewriters ojid so' on.
For the outfit of recrdation homes

and schools of the Reich finance
Administration:

Bedrooms, beds, music instru
ments and especially bed linen,

table linen, towels, etc."

(2^'Gt-4905, Exh. 2452, Bk. 75)

This 'letter is sighed '-'by order" by Ministerial
Dirigent Schlueter.

The defendtnt von KROSIG-K, v/hen

questioned under direct examination as to whether

pf/s'v •

this letter of Schlueter had come to his knowledge,
stated;

m
my•:K

"A. No, I don^t think that I pre
viously knev; this circular letter,
but I

do kno'^' that as far as the

technical handling of the property
was concerned which deported Jev78
left behind them, this mcctter was

reported by

Schlueter." CTr.p.23&3i)
-84-
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It can be added that in this 'instpjice- it v;as appar
ently unnecessary to inform KROSIGK in advance, for

•

he had no objections to such a procedure*

Some months later, on 21 March 1942, the same

Ministerial Dirigent Sohlueter Issued, by order
of KROSIG-K, instructions to a.11 Oberfinanzpraesidents

(except Pra.gue) concerning the seizure of Jewish
literature and other cultural -and artistic works of

Jewish origin.

These works of literature and art

viere to be handed over to 'the operational staff of

Rosenberg, and the Oberfinanzpraesidents v/ere ordered
to inform

Rosenberg, if such material v/as available

from confiscc-ted or forfeited property.

(NG—5340,

/

•<

Exh. 3919, Bk. 212)

'

.

'

KROSICtK was fully awaxe of %hG meaning of the
mass deportations.

He attended the session of the

Reichstag on 30 January 1939,

at that time.Hitler

delivered a speech stating that.if
"Internationa.l Jewry in and outside
Europe should succeed in plunging
the people of the- world once again
into world war, then the result
v/ould be .

.

.

the annihilation of

the Jewish race in Europe." (2360 'A-RS
Exh. 3906, Bk, 211a).

Still more precise and definite was Hitler dur
ing the war.

In his speech of 30 January 1942, pub

lished in the official Nazi publication, the "Voel-

kischer

Beobachter", of 1 Februi-ry 1942, Hitler said;
"I have e.lready declined on 1 September
1939, in the German Reichstag, and I
am careful today not to make premature

predictions - when I say today that
this war will not turn out the way the

Jews think it will, that the European-

Aryan peoples will not be wiped out,

but that the result of this war will

be the annihilation of Jewry.
Exh. 3906, Bk. 211-0)
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(PS-2360B,

. t. ^ 1
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Time and again Hitler repeated thia threa.t
with unmistakable determination.

On 30 September

194S '.he once more delivered a speech reiterating
his prophecy that Jewry will be wiped out (FS--2560 G,
Exh. 3906, Bk. 211 C), and In his Proclama.tion of
24 February 1943 he said that
"this war will find i t s

end with

the annihilation of Jewry in Europe,"
(PS-2360 D, Exh. 3906, Bk. 211 C)
"j^he srane brutal and "most radioaJ. countermeasures" vrere announced by G-oebbels when he
I

ha r^angued a crowd in the Berlin Sportpa,last on
20 February 1943.

The speech was, of course, pub-

lished in, the papers and broadcasted over a l l G-erman

radio stations.

(PS-2360 E, Exh. fe906,' Bk, 2X1 G)

The Protestant

Bishop

V;urm was one of the

few Germans who was courageous enough to warningly
express his dismay about a situation which had be>

cone clear to everyonej namely,that the privileged
Mlschlings were

"in mortal d-i,nger, novf that the nonAryans have already been eliminated

•(

to a large extent, in the areas which
are under the power of Germany." "
I

This letter of the Bishop was addressed to Hitler

and the members of the Reich Cabinet under the date

of 16 July 1943.

(NG-5874 A, Exh.C-^41, Bk. 211 C).

..iv-

•
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Before 1941 German Jews were forced to emigrate

or succeeded in escarping from Germany.
not allowed to take along their property.

transfer was prohibited.

frozen.

-^'hey were
A legal

Their bank accounts were

A "legal" dgvice of confiscating their

property had not yet been enacted, hence confisca
tion took i^lace at random. -86-

''fi.'''j''

Arbitrary a.otions of

the G-ostapo were prevalent after the Jews wej^e

K'W.

deprived' of their citizenship",
WW.,
', -•
UA.^ *^. :i •
A

^et, in July 1941

Himmler ordered that safeguarded property of Jews

aga-inst whom a proceeding of de-naturalization was

'«

pending'should be sold by auction prior to the con

clusion of the proceedings.

Since considerable

quantities of such confiscated property was stored „
N

in custom houses, Himmler a.sked the Ministry of
Finance to Instruct the custom houses to hand over

the property under custom seal to the Sto-te Police.

The reaction of the Ministry of ^'inance to this re
quest, da.tcd 8 July 1941, read:
objections to this."

? ,

'.x:'

"There are no

(Nd-4906j, Exh. 2430, Bk. 75)

This letter is signed by Ministerial

Director

Wucher, head of Section II of the ministry.

There

can be no doybt tha.t he would not have given this
unusual and illegal instruction without consent of
his chief, the defendant KROSIOK.
ijv.:'.'

To render the theft of property of emigrated

Jews simpler, the 11th Decree to the. Reich Citizen
ship Law, dated 23 November 1941, was Issued,

It

provided that all Jews living abroad v7ould lose
their citizenship and hence their property*

decree Is co-signed by State Secretary

The

Rolnhardt

"as deputy of the Reich Minister of ^'inance," (Ng8499, Exh. 1536,

75, pp. 113-116)

On 7 July

1941 the Ministry of Interior had invited several
top officials., mong them the defendant von KROSIG-K,

to attend a meeting on the subject.

Tir; correspond-'

ing letter stated that

"According to information roceived from .

the Reich Chancellery, the

Fuehrer does •
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' v. -v/'.

not deem it necessary, the.t a, regula.tion
as comprehensive as previously provided
for should he made at this time. . The
Fuehrer rather considers i t as sufficient

to issue a regulation, which deprives
the Jews who live abroad of their c i t i

zenship and which declares their prop

erty as forfeited to the Reich." (NG—2499,
Exh. 1536, Bk. 75)
A draft of the decree to be discussed was attached
to that

letter.

After the

enactment

of the decree an ordinance

to it seemed necessary to fill certain gaps of the

regulations, and to-secure the ooopora.tion of the

Ministry of Finance and its subordina.te agencies for
oanrying out the confiscation.

Again the Ministry

of Finance received the corresponding draft, this

time by a letter of the Reich Security Main Office,

dated 27 November 1941.

(Na-5373, Exh. 3917, Bk, 212)

On S December 1941 a conference was held in the Min

istry of Finance where ' Krosigk was represented by
Dr. Maedel and Dr. Schwarzat.

The Gestapo representa

tives asked for a discussion of the draft, trans

mitted on 27 November 1941.

The document reveals;

"A general statement was ma.de to
the effect

that the Reioh Ministry

of Finance had no objections to the
draft."

The document

further sta.tes that individual ca.ses

were discussed with the following result;

"1) The Commissioner for enemy

property is to transfer to the Ober—
fInanzpraesident of Berlin all assets,
v/hich, on the basis of available docu
ments belong to Jews v/ho meet the
conditions of art* 1 nnd 10 of the
ordinance

4) Jews who arc residing in Palestine
have hitherto beon treated as foreign

Jews.

In future, it will no longer be

assumed that those Jews have enquired

Palestinian citizenship.
J-heir assets
will thus be transferred from the
-88-

Commissioner for Enemy Property to
the Oberfinanzpraesident of Berlin,
for his administration and utiliza-

tion»"

(NG-5373, Exh. 3917, Bk. 212)

I t must be stressed here that the Oberfina.n2praesi-dent Berlin as well as all other Oberfinanzpraesi-

dents v;ere subordinates of the Ministry of Finance

This has been confIrmed. by von KROSIG-K.

'Transcript

page 23905 reads;
•

Hi

"Q. Well, was th^' Oberfinanzpraesi
dent of Berlin a subordinate of yours?

:%

A. 1*0 3, he was."

<-•¥1

However

• •Ji'!

comprehensive the regulations for the

confiscation of property of emigrated Jev/s had bocome by that time, one particular phase was not

taken into considera t ion.

The, 11th Decree arid the

ordinance to it applied to^ a.11 Jews who resided
abroad on or after the day when the 11th'Decree cpjne

into effect,i.e. on 25 November 1941,

It, therefore,

didnH apply to those Jews who had committed suicide
or had died before that date.-

In

Their property conse

quently belonged to their heirs.

^Such oases are

very numerous" reported the' Oberfinanzpraesident of
Badenia to the Minister of Finance in a letter of
2 February 1942:

"The 11th Decree to the Reibh Gitiafcn-

shlp Law of 25 November 1941 does not
apoly to Jews who wore to be expelled
from Beden on 22 October 1940 but ¥ho

preferred suicide to deportation,"
Nevertheless, the Oborfinanzpraesident of Badenia
suggested the confiscation of the property of those,
dead Jews:

"....without consideration to the fact

whether they elected to commit suicide
thus avoiding deportation or whether
they ware no longer alive v/hen the 11th
Decree to the

Reich

came into force.

Citizenship Law

The simplest way

would be to carry out such confiscation

of the property of expelled Jews with
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retroactive effect from the da.te of

expulsion.

.

.

,

i

• V-,'

Such confiscation

retroactive to the date of expulsion
would prevent the possihility of -k
inheritance claims

on confiscated

"-'•1^ -.A#,
•n

assets which in menj^ cases have already

been utilized."

(NG—5371, Exli. 5918,

Bk. 212)

As a matter of fact, the Ministry of •'^'ina.nce
)

followed this shameless suggestion, G,nd informed the

Reich Main Security Office accordingly by letter of
16 May 1942 which reads in part;
"In order to avoid any claims by the

heirs to these properties, I should
like to ask you to announce confisca.tion with' retroactive effect as of
15 October 1940.
Please send the con

.'.'iiQ

fiscation orders directly to the
Ober
finanzprs,esident for Baden, in Ka.rlsruhel'

t;

.

Y

testified:

m

"A. Yes, the Oberfinanzpraesidcnt of

Ba.den was my subordin8,te. " (Tr.p. .^23906)
A similo.r letter of the same date was sent by

the Ministry of ^'inance to the

Reich Security Main

Offioe concerning the Jews who were scheduled for

expulsion from.Pomerania for 12 Februcjry 1940 but
Wi I
V«

''

had avoided deportation by suicide. (Na-5571, Exh.

•

3918, ^k. 212)i'he defendant von KROSIGK stated under re-direct

dxsjiiination thp.t he considers this letter "a very re

grettable document in its contents", and denied that

M,
fc.a

he knevj about it. (Tr. p. 24106).

"^et, it is most

unlikely that his competent Referent neither informed
him of the report by the Oburfinanzprsesidont of
Baden nor of the report of the Oberfinanzpraesidcnt

of Pomerania nor of the tv/o letters to the Reich Secur
ity Main Off ice.

It la all the more unlikely as
f
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V/hen questioned regarding this letter von ICROSIG-K

this was by no meeuis a routine matter but en excep

tional one, which could not be settled according to

prevailaing laws or instructions.

\

Assume KROSIC-K

had no knowledge of this natter, he nevertheless
cannot evade

responsibility for it,

That is to say^

there are only two possibilities, either von KROSIGK

had conferred general authority to give such instruc
tions to his competent

Referent, or he had neglected

to see to i t that matters of this Importance were

submitted to him.

He__o^nnot ^s_cape_r^sponsib_ilj.t_y;.
t

Referring once more to the 11th
Reich

Decree to the ,

Citizenship Law it may be pointed out that

an analogBus decree,, da.ted 2 Ncvember 1942, was
enforced in the Protectorate of

Bohemia and Moravia.

/

It declared all Jewish Bohemians and Moravians who
had established their domicile abroad devoid of citi-

zenship and property.

This decree was signed by the

defendants von KROSIC-K and Stuckart,

2453, Bk. 75).-

(M&-180, Exh.

In Korway the 11th Decree was already

Implemented by the/ Reich Commissioner in Spring
1942.

Before doing so the

informed the Minister of

Reich Commissioner had
finance of his plan., and

the latter's answer read;

"I ai:>prove your draft of an ordinance
fQj' the implementation of the 11th

Ordinance concerning the

Reich

CitizensliiJ) Law dated 25 November 1941."
(NG~4039, Erdi. 2455, Bk. 75, pp. 19a and
19b)

In 1939 KROSIG-K, together v/ith Rlbbentrop and

Frick, signed a decree of 3 October 1939 vfhich revoked
citizenship of persons who had committed actions In
foreign countries hostile to the Third Reich. It.authorized the Minister of Interior, the
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Foreign

Minister; and the Reloh Protector of Bohemia and

Moravia to revoke citizenship of wives and children

of such personsj and to confiscate their propertyc

'
•

(NG-3744, Exh. 638, Bk., .15 B) .

#

Gn 4 October 1959,

KROSIGK signed, together with Prick, a decree which

authorized the confiscation of property of persons
within the Protectorate who had committed actions

hostile to the
Bk. 15 B),

Third

Reich.

(NQ—3745, Exh. 635,

On 24 October 1942, KROSlGK^s State

Secretary Reinhardt, together with the defenda.nt

Stuckart, had Issued the "Dedree amending the decree
concerning the confiscation of property in the

Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia" a.ooording to
which the Reich Protector and the Minister of Interior

were to determine "what activities are considered
detrimental to the
Bk. 15 B).

Reich".

j

(NG—3794, Exh. 636,

These decrees were the forerunners of

the aforementironed decree of 2 November 1942, spedflcally aimed at Jews and implementing the llth

Decree to the Reich Citizenship Raw in the Protector

ate.

(HG-180, Exh, 2453, Bk. 75)
V/ith rege-hd to Belgium and Prance, a. conference

was held in the Ministry of

^inance on 11 and 12

December 1942, and "the subject under discussion

was the question of seizure, aajninistratlon and
utilization of present and future 'accrual of Jewish

property in the zones of command of the Military
Commanders" in those couritrics.

The basis of the

discussion was the Implementation of the llth Decree

on Jews who had emigrated to Belgium and

All particulars were discussed.

The miunites of the

meeting concludes
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j

"Concerning the suggestion made at
the conference of 1 June 1942

(0 5210 Fr, I VI) to the effect
that small assets up to 3000 RIyl

should be exeigpt from confiscation,
it was unanimously agreed that no

general minimum could be fixed."

Tng-5569, Exh. 3920, Bk, 212)

The application and execution of the 11th Decree
to the Reich Citizenship Law was of.

cern to the Ministry of. •'^'inance.

immediate con

Officials of the

Ministry of Finance were engaged in activities per
taining to the confiscation, liquidation and utilza«

tion of Jewish property.

They included, among others,

Ministerial Dirigent Mayer of Section I, Ministerial
Dirigent Wucher (head of Section II), Ministerial
it:v

Director Maass (head of Section IV), and Ministerial
Councillor Maedel of Section VI .

ii task which

Involved at least four out of seven sections of the

ministry was certainly not a sideline job.

The

following documents bear out this contention-

On 13 December 1941 the Ministry of ^inance
furnished various banking institutions still keeping
Jewish accounts with instructions to be followed

in the registration and sale of Jewish property.
These instructions were issued, as the note on the
copy shows,

"to cause no delay in the delivery of

securities (shares and raining shares) forfeited to
the Reich . . . on account of the decree of 25 Novem

ber 1941,'^

The securities were to b^ delivered to

the Prussipji State Bank,

" The Prussla.n State Bank

(Seehp,ndlung) will sell the securities for the
finanzpraesldent Berlin."

75).

Ober-

(No—5067, Exh. 2429, Bk.

It was the same procedure as already applied

in pursuance of the "Decree concerning the Fine of
Atonement of 12 November 1938,
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On 23 December 1941 a meeting \?as held in the

Ministry of

"''inance, under the chairmanship of

Mayer, to discuss the setting up of proper accounts

for the confiscated property.
notes of

The corresponding

Dr. Maedel on this

reveal thr.t

a new subdivision account v;a.s crea.ted, called Plan
XVIIj into which the proceeds from the sale of the

securities were to be deposited. {NG~5001,

Bch.

2431, Bh, 75).

On 27 February 1942 Maas issued new regulp.tlons
of competence concerning the administration and

utilization of confiscated property, putting the

District -^inance Presidents in charge of the adminis
tration and realization of conflsca.ted real esta.te,

(NG-4903, Exh. 2432, Bh. 75)
On 21 'ipril 1942 Ministerial Dirigent Bayrhoffcr

by order of the Minister of ""^inance sent a letter
to the Reichsbank and agreed that securities confis
cated from Jewish persons were to be deposited at

the Reichsbank "in order to simplify the administra

tion."

Simultaneously •'^^ayrhoffer suggested:
"To also deliver the

securities fallen

to the Reich as booty to a special

deposit of the Gorman Reichsbank after
they have b.een screened at the Reich
Main Cashier Office,

In this instance

foreign securities of more than

25

different countries are concerned.

.

.

(NG-5072, Exh. 2437, Bk. 75)
As to confiscated mortgage-bonds a.nd similar

bonds, deposited with mortgage banks, Bayrhoffer in
his letter to Locational Group Private Mortgage

Bank, dated 19 May 1942, gave his consent the.t those

bonds may be tra.nsferred to the banks at the current

rate (NG-5071, Exh, 2439,

75), and in his letter
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:

of 19 May 1942 declared his willingness to grant
the sane privilege to other banhs' upon individual

application. (NG--5062, Exh, 2440,

Bk. 75)

^he

same information was given to the . Bavarian State

Bank and to the Bank of Baden on 4 April 1942 and
16 May 1942o

(NO-5057, Exh. 2435, Bk. 75 and m-

5070, Exh. 2441, Bk. 75)

More definite distinctions with regard to
t:J:V'

securities were made in a letter which Patzer, by

order of the Ministry of finance, sent to the Obe3>-f

finanzpraesident of Cologne on 11 May 1942.

Accord

ing to this letter confiscated shares, mining shares
and colonial shares were to be delivered to the

Prussian State Bank, whereas all other securities,
i.e. bonds, etc., should go to the Reich Main
Pay Office.

(NG-5059, Exh. 2438, Bk. 75).

The

same Patzer stressed in his letter to the finance

Office Aachen of 14 September 1942 that only shares
confiscatied by virtue of the 11th Decree were to

be delivered to the Prussian State

Bank, but

securities "fallen to the Reich for other reasons"
to the

Reichabank. (HC-5000, Exh. 2446, Bk. 75).

In other words, the Ministry of '^inanoe in utilis
ing confiscated Jevrish property made use of its
subordinate Oberfinanzpraosidents, the Reich Main

Bay Office and the

^inance Offices as well as of

the Prussian State Bank, the Roichsbank, the Bavar

ian State Bank, the Bank of Baden, mortgage banks
and other financial institutes.

However, all

these agencies acted only as organs of the Ministry

of ^inanoe and upon its directives.
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It l8 a foregone conclusion that all proceeds
from the sale of confiscated securities had to

be handed over to the Reich Main Pay Office as the
instructions by Patzer and Bayrhoffer, dated S4
June 1942, 1 September 1942 eind 26 September 1942

indicate.

They also indicate to v/hich budgetary

account the proceeds were to be transferred.

4998, Exh, 2443, BE. 75;

75;

(Nq—

NG-5056, Exh. 2445, Bfe.

NG-4997, Exh. 2448, Bk. 75).

As the money was

delivered to the Reich Main Pay Office by order of

the Ministry of "^inanoe there can be no doubt that
it came under the jurisdiction of the Finance
Ministry.

The aforementioned directives applied also to
the Protectorate.

In its letters to the

Protector, dated 16 ^''•eTch

Rolchs

1942 and 8 July 1942,

the Finance Ministry agreed tha,t the

Protectorate

securities with fixed interest which v/ere

to be

forfeited to the Reich could be utilized by the

Reich Protector.

The letter of 8 July 1942 says:

''The proceeds from the sale of these
securities are to be transferred to
the Pay Department of the G-erman

Treasury. ''

(The latter office was

the Reichshaupthasse,

usually trans

lated ''Rclch LIs.in Pay Office") (NG—
5058, Exh. 2433, Bk. 75; NG-5060,

Exh. 2454, Bk. 75)

In this connection the case of the Warsaw ghetto
is relevant.

The Roichsfuehrer SS had applied to

the Finance Ministry for allocations of 150 and 40
million RIvf to be used for the demolition of the

ghetto.

In his answer of 15 June 1944, KROSIG-K

stated he could not yet me.ke a decision with regard

to the sums in question, "but I am willing to make
"-96-

now the necessary installinents upon request."

According to a note on the margin of the draft of
the letter the following paragraph was added;
"If the demolition should s t i l l be

necessary, I request that,in order
to cover the"cost, you first utilize

the values represented by goods

found in the ghetto or inform me
how the money end goods, available
in considerable : quaint itles are to
be utilized or in the meantime have
been utilized."

Incidentally, in this letter von KROSIG-K also
informed the

the

Keichsfuehrer

that he would supply

Waffen SS.in the future in accordance with the

i'uling arrived at in a conference of 28 March 1944
"which provides for an operating fund averaging

145 million RIvI per month for the fiscal year 1944.
To this letter the Reichsfuehrer

answered

on 25 August 1944 that the demolition of the ghetto
has been suspended for some time end stated?

"•^'he movable property in Jewish
hands -

Inasmuch as this was con

fiscated by the Waffen SS offices in
the course of the resettlement opera

tions - was realized and the proceeds

paid into the Reichshaupthasse^in
favor of the Reich •i'inance

Minister.

(i^G-5551, Exh. 3916, Bh. 212)
This is also confirmed by the secret memoran

dum by Ministerial Councillor Dr.

Patzcr, dtited 7 September 1944.
2451, Bk. 75).

G-ossel for

(NQ-—4094, Exh.

The memorandum, furthorgiore, gives

a hint that the proceeds were probably transferred
to the "Account Max Helliger."

Max Holliger was apparently a fictitious•name.
The Invention to be saluted by "Heil Hitler" was left

to the "Fuehrer", but no German carried the name
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"Heiliger" which means "Saint".

A memorandum by

Dr. Maedel, dated 16 November 1944, gives more
details on this "Account Max Heiliger".

It shows

that the sums transferred to that account were

handled by Section. Maedel of the Finajice Ministry,
and the amounts were "transferred to the account

of the single plan XVII, Chapter 7, Title 3, para
graph A".

(NG-4097, Exh. 2450, Bk, 75)

The letter

of the Chief of the SS Main Economic Administration

Office to the Minister of Finance, dated 24 July
1944, finally reveals that not only the proceeds
of goods captured in the Waj?saw ghetto, but also
cash amounts and the proceeds from the sale of

securities, bonds, foreign currency,

jewelery and

items of all kinds made of precious metals, confis
cated in the concentration camps "for the benefit

of the Reich" were paid to the "Account Max Heiliger."
The aforementioned letter states:
"It is impossible to enclose a list

because of the vast r^uantity involved.
The valuables accumulate in concentra

tion crmps.
fact

that

Reference is made to the

in this matter discussions

have already repeatedly taken place
with the Deputy of the Reich Minister

of Finance (RFM)">
and i t concludes;

"^he proceeds will be transferred to
the national Treasury cand be credited

to the Reich Minister of Finance,
special account 'Max Heiliger'."
(NG-4096, Exh. 2499, Bk, 75)
This account is also mentioned in the affidavit

of Relchsbank official Thorns. » dated 8 Hay 1946.
This statement describes the handling of valuables

delivered by the S3 to the Relchsbank.

Those

deliveries, coming from Jewish confiscations, were
.88-

r

made by an SS man by the name of Melmer.

^^The

question was discussed whether Melmer should appear

In uniform or civilian clothes, and (Brigadefuehrer)
Frank decided it was better that Melraer appeax.
of uniform."

out

Another part of the statement reads:

"^t was the tenth delivery in November 1942 that
dental gold appeared.

The quantity of the dental

gold became unusually great,"

Finally (paragraph

14 of the affidavit) states:
"Included in the first

statement sent

by the Reichsbank and signed by.mo,

to Melmer was a question concerning
the name of the account

to which the

proceeds should be credited.

In'answer

to that I was orally advised by Melmer
that the proceeds should be credited
to the account 'Max Heiliger'.
I
confirmed this on the telephone with

Rechnungsdlrektor Patzer of the
Ministry of Fine.nce, and in my second
statement to Melmer, dated 16 November
1942, I confirmed the oral conversa

tion,"

(3951-PS, Exh. 1909, Bk, 151)

The defendant KROSIC-K testified (Tr, p.. 23329) that

he never heard of the account "Max Hciligor" before
this trial took place.

The Tribunal sought to

clarify this matter.

"Q. (By Judge Maguire)^

Before we

take this up, what would be the
occasion of Melmer

or the affiant

Thorns calling up the

Finance Ministry

at all v;ith respect to this matter?
Was

i t because i t was an unusual

proposition that funds should be
Placed under the name of an indivi-

dua.l like Ma:x Helliger which were,
in fact, funds of the SS or funds

of some other agency - some other

Roich agency?
A. Your Honor, I donU know anything
about that.
I myself also have to
rely on conjectures. I can't rely
only on anything else, because I
don't knov; this account at all, and,

as a result of that, I wouldn't be

ohle to give you the reason vjhy
Thoma called up at all on that
occasion.

I t was not necessary,

but I assume that it was in view of
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this being an unusual account that

he called up in order to inquire

V7hether we perhaps might know sjiything about it; thatfs a conjecture
of mine.

Q. I'vell, wouldn't it be a rather

unuaual thing for a Reich agency to
make a deposit in the Reichsbank
under the name of an individual
rather than pay it into the bcank
or for the credit of the Reich Main

Pay Office? One gets the impression
from reading this document that it

was rather an unusua.1 way of handling

matters. We have what appears to be
a fictitious account, at least an
account by the name of a fictitious
person and not by the name of the
agency which was interested in the

matter.

I

am a little puzzled

about it, and I thought perhaps
that from the matter of your greater
knowledge you would be able to tell

us about why they had it that way or
why they would call up the Minister

of Finance."

(Tr. p. 23332-23333)

As a matter of fact, it is more than puzzling
that KROSIG-K professes such ignorance.
was not an account of minor importance.

It certainly
All proceeds

from the sale of confiscated goods tal^en from the
•VVarsav;

ghetto as v/ell as from the concentration

camps wore ps-id to that account,
the sale of movable property,

e.g. proceeds from

securities, bonds,

foreign currency, jewelry , not to spealc of the

dental gold (the quantity of which "became unusually
great.")

So largo were the sums that the encount

had to be "wound up from time to time"

(Exh. 2450,

supra) and transferred to single budget plan
established ad hoc.

The defendant Puhl, vice presi

dent of the Reichsbank, as well as Reichsbank council
lor Thorns knew about it.

Ministerial councillor

Dr. Gossel, Hechnungsdirektor Patzer (all KROSIG-K's
subordinates) luiov; about it.

in the dark?

Yet KROSIG-K remained

The puzzle here seems to be one of

convenience only.
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^he handling of property stolen from the Roth
schild family of Paris is significant,

Their jewels,

gold and paintings were seized after the invasion

of Prance.

According to the note of Ministerial

Councillor G-alleiske, dated 21 April 1941, two boxes

were destined for the Ministry of finance,

G-alleiske's

note, reproducing a telephone communicaption from the
Foreign Currency Protection Burea,u (Bevisonschutzkommando) in France, which had seized the property;
"•'he

contents of the two oases is not

yet known.

They"are said to contain -

.

gold and jewels. The Reich Marshal
(i-e. G-oering) has personally discussed
the ma.ttcr with the Minister of Finance."

(HG-4091, Exh. 2426, Bk. 75)
KROSIG-K tells us that he was not eager to receive
the jewels,

A momor.'ndum of Mayer' shows tha.t KROSIG-K

objected to G-oering's plan because he could not under

stand why the Ministry of

^Inance should be entrusted

with the disposal of the Rothschild valuables.

Ho^v-

cver, it sheds an interesting light on KROSIG-K's
activities.

Mayer in his memorf-ndum states that

G-ooring; with regard to KROSIGK's objections;
"retorted thrt, after all the RFM,
owing to his experience concerning
the disposal of money and jewelry

belonging to Jews, would know best
how to roelize those assets."

(Ng-4063, Exh. 2427, Bk. 75)

Notwithstanding his uneasiness about this theft

business, KROSIGK, when the valuables wore finally
realized, did not hesitate to accept the proceeds

"in the amount of 1,8 million marks" (Tr.p- 23318).
As explanation for his'act of concealing stolen

goods he offered, under direct examination, the
•following

excuse;
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, - First of all, it was actually not
possible for the Reich Main Pay Office

to refuse to taJte in this sum of money,
because it would have been a very simple
thing for Goering to issue

a directive
to taJie in
the reason

instructing the Pay Office

this money.
If I had been
for any refusal to take in the money,
then this money would have rema,ined

in the possession of people

who under

no circumstances were a.uthorizcd to

dispose of it.

That is the explana

tion for the settlement that was
finally reacted, In actual fact."

(Tr. p. 23319)

Thereupon the Tribunal inquired;

"Presiding Judge Maguire:

Before we

go to another subject, I would like

to ask the witness a question.

With

regard to these Rothschild jewels

and the proceeds from their disposition,
was there any question in your mind
at that time tha.t both the jov/els were
stolen and that the proceeds were
the result of the disposition of stolen
goods?

The witness;

Your Honor, in view of

the fact that I turned do¥/n the handling
of the utilization of these jev7els in vie^7 of tha,t i t can bo seen I

entertained the suspicion that these

jov^els ha.d not boon acquired on the
basis of a regular legal title.
Presiding Judge Maguire;
being the fact -

Well, that

I had assumed that

that v;as what your original position
vjas - then how would you justify
having the money paid into the Rolch
Main Pay Office from the hands of the
people who had obtained the stolon
goods?
•The v/itness;

Your Honor,

i t was a

difficult thing to leave those funds
in the hands of people who,

on their

part, had obtained those jewels, having
to entertain the suspicion a.s to the

illegality of their holdings. Much
rather, these people had ha.d these
jewels turned over to them from a

Reich agency, ond they wanted to ptay
for them in return." (Tr.pp.23320-23321)

This testimony reveals two things.

First KROSIGK

knew that the valuables were stolen from the Rothachilds.

The above mentioned note of Galloiske

explicitly states:

"Among the property seized

ojre paintings and six large cases." (KG—"1091, Exh.
-lo2-

2425, B3£. 75).

Second, knowing the valuables were

stolen KROSIG-K accepted the proceeds rrom their sale
in order not to leave them in the hands of the thieves.
Such a

defense is naive.

G-oering was right when he pointed to KROSiGj^'s
experience in disposing of money and goods belong

ing to Jews.

KROSIGK had gathered this experience

throughout the years in depriving the Jews of their
property.

As far back as 1938 he was not only con

cerned with exacting the

"Fine of Atonement" but

was also taken into consultation when the Ministry
of Interior elaborated its pla.ns for the so-called

Aryanization of trade and industry, i.e. the elimina
tion of all "non-Aryans" from German-owned or con

trolled enterprises.

On 14 July 1938 the Ministry

of Interior submitted to KROSIGK proposals "based

on the political demand tha,t the Jewish influence,

indeed any activities on the part of the Jews in
German industrial life should be elimlnp.ted as soon

as possible. " This goal was to be reached through
compulsory transfer of Jewish commercial enterprises

into "Aryan hands" in such a way "that tho compensa

tion actually paid to the Jev/s v;ill, as a rule,
constitute only a small fractloj^ of the actual value
/

of property."

This appears in a memorandum by one ^

of KROSIGK's subordinates commenting-on the plan

of the Ministry'of Interior. (NG-4031, Exh. 2423#
Bk. 75). The record is replete with such evidence, ,

KROSIGK*s alleged misgivings arc unconvincing. His.
guilt, has been established.
\

Von KROSIGK's farther activities with regard
to the confiscation of property of the Jews and their

deporthtion to the East v/111 be discussed later.
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special attention is made,once a^ain to the

"final solution" decree co-signed "by KHOSIG-K,

The

13th Decree to the Reich Citizenship Law, dated

1 July 1943, deprived, all Jews in Germany of judicial,

process and placed them at the mercy of Himmler^s
G-estapo.

It further provided for the confiscation

of property of persons of
Reich after their death,

75).

Jewish extraction by the
(1422—PS, Exh. 2456, Bk.

Practically all Jews were deprived of their

rights, and Himmler^s gang was free "to liquidate"
them prior to the enactment of this decree.

However,

they could not Tbe sentenced without judicia.l process.
The decree abolished all such legal prooc^dings.

It became open season on the Jews,

Questioned under direct examination whether he

had no misgivings about signing this decree, KHOSiaK.
came up with an astounding answer;
ti^

•

• '

•

^ , I v;as convinced that the

official promulgation would guarantee

•

greater protection under the law

than if the police as heretofore
handled the matter more or less

anonymously." (Tr, p- 23345)

The protection referred to here has been brought

home to the world, 'six million Jews were liquidated
by the Third Reich. For such unprecedented crime;
KROSI&K bears a major responsibility. His defense

of good character and reputation does n.ot refute
the facts.

Nothing can be said in mitigation.
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GERIS-Nia^TION

The defendarrb Sclurerin von KEDSIGK is charged in Count

V, paragraphs. 38 and 39, ^.-ith participation in the program
of the Germanization vihioh involved the deportation of civ

ilian populations from conquered territories, the confisca

tion of property, the persecution of the civilian populations
on racial, religious, and political grounds, forced German

XA

.

citizenship which resulted in non-Germans being made liable
to miiitary service, forced resettlement, kidnapping and oth
er inhumane acts. Prosecution Document Books 72-A. tlirough
72-H cover the participation of the defendants charged with
Germanization. Document Book lU6 covers the part played by
the BUT. Reference is'made to these document books relative

to the proof of ICROSIGIC's participation in the Gemanization
program. Further particulars of the'Germanization program
are discussed in the Prosecution briefs on the DUT, the HTO,
and the individual responsibility briefs on the defendants .

similarly charged. It is important to consider the German
ization sections of these briefs in order to fully understand
the complete program of Germanization,

The Germanization program was considered by the Inter
national Military Tribunal:

"

- .

In Poland and the Soviet Union these crimes

were'part of a plan to get rid of whole native
populations by expulsi.on and annihilation, in

order that their territory could be used for col
onization by Germans. Hitler had written in
'Mein lampf' on these lines, and the plan was

,clearly stated by Hhnmler in July, 19h2, when
he wrote:

•

yk
' *'•

<xt is not our task to'Germanize the
east in the old sense,
is to
teach the people there the

language and the German law, but to
see to it that only people of pure
ly Germanic blood live m the east.'

.;:V

./•

.M'

' '

.'.-i

-•n
" ' -!i
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• ,®In Poland the intelligentsia had been
marked dovm for'extermination as early as Sep

tember, 2.939} ^nd in r^iy, 19i;0, the defendant
Franlc wrote in his diary of Haking advantage
of the focussing of world interest on the west
ern front, by wholesale liquidation of thous
ands of Poles, first leading representatives

of the Polish intelligentsia i, ,
Judgment^ p, 237)

(II!T

The purpose of Germanization was stated most' succinctly
by Hiniraler who was appointed by Hitler as Reich Commissar for
the Strengthening of German Folkdom and charged with the over

all responsibility for the task*

The H'-iT quotes Himmler as

f ollovrs:

"Wl^t happens to a Russian, a Czech, does not
interest me in the slightest.

What the nations-

can offer in the Tray of good blood of our type,
we will take. If necessary, by kidnapping their
children and raising them here v/ith us. VAiether
nations live in prosperity or starve to death
interests me only in so far as we need them as
slaves for our Kultur, othenTise it is of no

interest to me,'"

(riT Judgment, p. 237)

Frank, the Governor of conquered Poland, recorded in liis
diary that:

"cheap labor must be removed from the General
Government by Imndreds of thousands.

This will

hamper the native biological propagation." (USD,
page 233)
The Iirr concluded with the following:

"So successfully did the Gennans carry out this

' policy in Poland that by the end of the vra-r onethird of the population -had been killed, and

the whole of the countrj'" devastated."
238)

(li.iT> p.

On 7 October 1939> a hitler decree v^as issued appointing

Himmler the Reichs Commissar for the Strengthening of the^ Ger
man potential.

This decree ;vas signed by Hitler, Goering,

Keitel, and the defendant Ldrnmers, It directed as folloifs:
"1*

to bring back those German citizens and-

racAal Germans abroad "who are eligible for
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.

; .

'

perm&nGnt return into the Reich* .
"2.

to eliminate the harmful influence of such

alien parts of the population as constitute a

danger to the Reich and the CToniian community*
"3«

to create nev/ German colonies by resettle

ment, and especially by the rosettloraent of
Gorman citizens and racial Germans coming back

from abroad* •
72-B)

(Rxh* 130^^ ^10-3075^ Bk.

In short, the program, of Gcnnanization called for the politxcal, economic, cultural, and social assimilation of the

conquered territoriesi former racial and religious character
istics, were tb be completely destroyed; dissident elements
were to bo exterminated; public and private property v,a.s to be

plundered; and the people and resources v/ero to be exploited.
I

In the implementation of the program, every crime, including

kidnapping and iiturder v/as committed.

The way in v/hich the

resettlement program v/as put into operation is described by
the Judgment of liilitary Tribunal Tie, I in the case against
SS-Obergruppenfuehrer Ulrich C-reifelt and his associates;
"Of all measures taken in the vast Germaniaa-

tion scheme, those connected T/ith the forced
deportation and evacuation of populations viere
perhaps the most far—reaching and in some re

«.'2r
J'i.

spects the most cru.el. These measures result
ed in death, misery, and destitution to thous
ands upon thousands of the citizens of con
quered nations. . .Poland, being one of the
first nations over-run by the Nazis, became
the first nation to be affected by this pro

gram; and it was within the incorporated ter
ritories of Poland that evacuations-and re

settlements Were carried oUt on the largest

and most ruthless scale. . .(page 60, 61).
The. enormity of the crimes coiranltted in the
evacuations and resettlement actions are

shown by reports made by high German offi
cials. . .(page 63).
existed a close
connGction between resettlement and evacua

tions. Almost all corres-pondence and decrees

concerning evacuations and resettlement actions

discussed both subjects, and detailed measures
to be taken in rbgard to both evacuation and
resettlement, . .{pi
C'reifelt, as deputy

to Himmler, was deeply involved in the plunder

and-confiscation of

property.

He issued

decrees, directing that confiscations be car
ried out; and after confiscations had taken

place, ha refused to return the property to

those from whom it had been confiscated. « .
-107-
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•

These conf is coitions were not carried out by

reason of inilitarj'* necessity, lout mainly Hvere
part of a preconceived plan to strip the Po
lish population of the Eastern territories of
all , their property and in turn to make the
property available to resettlers* • .None of
the land confiscated v-ras ever paid fore • •"

(P- 93)
¥ith reference to the confiscated JeiTish property, the Grei-.n

felt Judgment states:
"The Reichsfuehrer SS had signed a general di
rective Tfliereby the entire Jewish real estate

' is to be placed at the disposal of the Office

for Strengthening of Germanism."

(p. 9U)

In further elaboration of the aims of this large-scale plunder

of public and private property, this Judgnent states:

I -

• .The evidence unquestionably shows that
many confiscations were carried out for the
very purpose of using the confiscated prop

erty for the housing of resettlers. •

(p..

98)
Ttet these criminal actions against populations were not conA

fined to peoples of the East is evidenced by the IMT JudgiAenti
"In the West the population of Alsace were the
victims of a. German 'expulsion action'. Be

tween July and December 19^0, 10^^000 Alsa
tians were either deported from their homes

or prevented from returning to them, A cap
tured German report dated 7 August 19k^ with

regard to Alsace states that: 'The problem of

race will be given first consideration, and
this in such a manner thit persons of racial
value will be deported to Germany proper, and

racially inferior persons tc Erance.

(IIJT,

p. 238)

The particular plans for different countries varied as
to method. Poland v/as divi/ied into two areas: The occupied

Eastern Territories, riiich were to be incorporated into Gcivernmant General which t/as not intended for incorporation into
the Third Reich, v The difference in treatment y&.3 stated by

Goering in directives dated 19 October 1939 "to all Reich Min
isters and others.

Goering stated:
)
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.y.c : ' •

."The task for the economic treatment of the var*

ious administrative regions is different ^ de
pending on Yifhether the country is involved rdiich
Yd.ll be incorporated politically into the German
Reich, or v;hether i\e v/ill deal Tdth the Govornment-General, •\^ich in all probability Ydll not
be n&de a part of Gerrr^ny. In tho' first men
tioned territories, the reconstruction develop
ment and safegaarding of all their prodactive

facilities and supplies must be aimed at, as
vrell as a complete incorporation into the Greator German economic system, at the earliest pos
sible time. On the other hand, there must be re
moved from the territories -of the Govornment-

Goneral all rav.^ materials, scrap materials, machinos, etc., vrhich arc of use for the German
Y/ar econon^r. Unterprises v;hich are not abso
lutely nocessa]:y for tho merger maintenance of

the naked existence of the population must be
transferred to Germany, unless such transfer
would require an unreasonably long period of
time, and v/ould make it more practicable to ex
ploit these enterprises by giving them German
orders, to be executed at their present loca

tion."

(Exh. 1286, EC-ljlO, Bk. 72-A.)

At tho time of the issuance of those directives, the de

fendant KROSIGK Y/as a Reich Minister, hence, his knoivledgo of
tho program cannot bo refuted#

As Yd11 be shavm later, the

financing side of resettlement vi?as IvROSIGK's concern.
Further plans for the program are outlined in Exhibits

1287 (NG-I6U3) and 1283 (661-FS, Ek. 72-A).

It is significant

to note that at a socret meeting on 12 February 19^0, helcl
under tho chairmanship of Gocring, the defendants SchiTorin
von KROSIGIC and Ivoerner v/ere among those present as v:g11 as •

Backe, the defendant Darrens State Secretary,

It y/as at this

meeting that Goering stated tliat the strengthening of the T-var
potential of the Reich must be tho chief aim of all measures

to be taken in the East,

Goering further told them that the

greatest possible agricultural production must bo obtained

from tho hew Eastern Incorporated Territories disregarding

the question of ovvnership#

(Exh, 1289, EG-305, Bk# 72^) At

this same meeting, Himralor and tho Gauleiters reported the
evacuation of l4iiii,,000 Polos and Jovirs to make room for German
rosettlers.

.

;
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The defendant ICROSIGK received a

secret memorandam dated

18 November 19ltl^ of a meetin^y of the ?aar Year Plan, IJconomic Management Staff East, -v/liich set forth the principles for
the economic policy in the recontly occupied Eastern Terri

tories.

One principle T/as that the recently occupied Eastern

Territories v/ere to be economically G::ploited from colonial
vioT^Doints .and by colonial methods.

The only exception ^Tore

those parts ivhich "VToro designated for Germanization.

The mem

orandum also sot forth that only the Gerioans located or to be

settled there and the elements to be Germanized were to get
adequate treatment insofar as living standards vj-ere concerned,

Pogarding the Germanization in CzechoslovaVia, the Ij.IT
found:

"A somev/hat similar fate "v/as planned for Czecho
slovakia by the defendant von Nourath, in Aug
ust I9UO5 the intellipontsia wore to bo 'ex.pelled', but the rest of the population was to
bo Germanized rather than GxpeHed or extermi
nated, since there T/as a'shortage of Germans to

replace them. «

(l?^, p. 238)

In Czeohoslovakia the prograiu called for the assimilation of

approximately ono-half of the Czech people and the oxtermi-,
nation of the other half.
z

(Exh. 1293 , 3859-PS, Bk. 7^-A,

p. 59)

•'

In Russia it 7/as decided that the country would be tranS'
formed into a Gorman protectorate by Germanizing racially pos

sible elements, colonizing Gormnic elements and banishing

undesirable elements.

(Esdi* 1296, 1029-FS, Bk. 72-A, p« 66)

In Alsace-Lorraine and Luxembourg, racially valuable fam-,
I

ilies were to bo deported to the East and Germaany proper and
allt^asocial and criminal" persons wero to be expelled to Franc©.

(R-llU, Exh, 1298, Bk. 72-^) This document states further that

the first e^qxilsion aet in Alsace from July to DoccBmber 19^0
-llo-

I--'-

.

T/as carried oat and 10>,000 persons wore oither oxpellod or

provonted from roturning.

In a lottor dated 30 Septeiubor 19^0

from the defendant Laiinners to the defendant Scbverin von IQO-

SIGK concerning the budget of the Chiefs of Civilian Adminis
tration in Alsace-Lorraine itg find tliat:
' I'

•

.

-'i

•iki
•

• .In this activity they are not to be ham^
pered under ary circumstances nor limited fi-

''1

nancially, * .the Chiefs of Civil Administration are to be a31 ov/ed separate budgets T/ith

the Tddest""scope,

I herevdth infom you of

the Fuehrer*s decision and request you to take
this into account during the conferences'"-vjith
the above-mentionod Chiefs of Civil Administra

tion."

(NG-Ii.302, Exh. 1299, Bk. 72-A)

In the 7 October 1939 decree of Hitler, quoted supra, it
v/as established tlat the defendant ICROSXGK vj"ould provide the
\

financial moans necessary for putting the above measures into
operation in the various sectors.

The do'cree statess

"The "oich liinister of Finance v;ill provide
the Reich Fuchror-SS "./ith the financial means

necessary for putting the above measures into

' operation, , •"

(Exh. 1^05, HO-3075, Bk. 72-

B, p, 22)

The defe/idant' Lammers v/rote to KROSIGK on 23 September 1939
and statod:

"The Fuehrer has ordered the Reichsfuehrer SS

to carry out the resettlement of Reich and
Ethnic GGrmans (firstly the South Tyrolosd)
vrho are returning to the Reich from abroad,
and the establishing of agricultural settlers
in territory T:hich v;as hitherto Polish, • «

The Fuehrer requests you to place temporarily
10 million RII at the disposal of the Reichsfuohrer SS :for his" tasks as soon as possible

. ,

(Exla. 1306, NG-2900, Ek. 72-B,, p. 2J4)

On 8 October 1939, a decree signed by Hitler, Gooriiig,
Frick, Hoss, and the defendant Lammors incorporated'iTostorh
Prussia and I'osen and provideds
"(1)

Residents of Gorman blood or of racially

relatod blood shall become Gorman natj.onals

'''i'\

VI - ErvV ,

in accordAnco Trith furthar provisions to bo
issuciff

(2)

Rosidonts of Gorman origin in these ter-

ritories shall become German citizens in ac

cordance vlth the Reich Nationality Codec"
Section 10 provided:

"The Reich Minister of ?inancG shall arrange,
in agreement v;ith tEe Reich Minister of the
Interior, the questions arising from the re
organization in the sphere of the adjustment
of finances®"

Section 11 provided;

"(1) The Reich Ilinister of the Interior and
the Reich jlinistpr' of Finance or the agencies

determined by thorn shalT order the financial
adjustments required by the reorganization as
v/q11 as the measuros horeY/ith connected,

«

(Exh® U90, 3^60-FS, Bk. 72-B)
Without KROSIGK, the financing of the Gennanization pro

$

gram TTould havo boon jjipossibloc

program is ccmplete®

KROSIGK's knowledge of the

Ho received the instructions of Darrens
✓

ministry, dated 1? January 19U0, concerning the revival of

German peasant culture.

(NG-937, Exh© 1312, Bk, 72-B, p. k9)

Hitler, in a letter to the Foreign Office, charged the Vollcsdeutsche HittelstellG (YOK) -with Geimanization activities.

(NG-i;9U8, Exh, 1303, Bk. 72-B, p. 17) And, lOlOSlGK approved
the VOMI budget, for the Y/ork to be financed in the field of

Germanism.

(NG-li9U7, Exh. 1316, 3k. 72-C, p. 1)

In so doing,

KROSIGK' stated;

r

'

"I place at your'disposal funtis up to an amount of 31,700,670 PjI - in Tfords: thirty-

,

p.*

i.'-i

one million seven hundred thousand six hund
red and seventy RM - for the purposes of

vAV' '

' {^i^ k

' '

VDIO: for the period from 1 April 19hX until
31 Inarch 19^2."

• .>ii '

'

I

"After the end of the budget year I9I4I I ask

V -J ' . •.'••'

tep p

to submit an exact account of expenditure in

the usual form showing the expenditures div
ided up for:

a)

organization and work of the homeland

of the VOlCr

b) repatriation from the Balticum and es
tablishment of, camps, car© foi* immigrants.
i.V

•

U.'iv.-.v
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c) iTork on Gemanism^ especially in South

East Europe, separated for the single ter

ritories and as regards tne territories sep
arated according to current and single ex

penses."

(NG—Exli» 13173

72—C3

p- U)

The defendant's language speaks for itself. Can xt be sorxous-

ly contended that he merely supplied the money mthout ai^
knoT<-;ledge of the purpose for vfhich it v/as to. be expended? Ox

course, ho kne^v the purpose of the expenditures or he would
never have given.his approval. His successful financxng of
the Haai aggression is sufficient evidence of that.

Ylthin the sphere of Gcreaniaation, it was ICROSIGK who
determined under what circumstances the property confxscated
from Poles and Jews could bo used. Regarding the settlement
of Besarabian-German resettlers in Hoschatok and delnxk,
I

SS-GbcrgruppenfUGhrer Greifclt, Reich Goimnissar for the
Strengthening of Gennanization, vrrote to HROSIGH;
"According to your decision, the High Command
of the Ariry vrill receive free of charge farm
land from confiscated formei' Polish and Jew- ^

ish property for the ostablislimont of training
grounds. You decided the sarao regarding the
transfer of oxperimontal estates (Jersuchsgueter) to Roich-Univorsxty Posen. I therefore assume that disposal of real estate from

I

property of onemies of the state in favor of

the settlement of ro-sottlors mil, in the

present case, also bo done free of charge,✓

and nothing but contingont mortgages aro to
be taken over. I wculd appreciate a speedy

decision."

(NG-5012, Exh. 1335? Bk. 72-C,

p. 70)

These are key documents. EROSIGKts position of respon
sibility is made clear and unambiguous. Ho made supremo de
cisions and financed the operation. The clvirge of the in
dictment has been proven^
•

•

•iw.' •
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OUHT VI- H.-TOER AM) SPOLIATION

Undd*:;ount VI of the Indictment^ it is alleged that the

defendant 3GH1.D1LR1N von IGlOSIGK^ -with divers other persons^
during the period from Birch 1938 to

19i;^5 committed

war Crimes and Crimes against Ilimanity as defined in Article
XI of Control Council La^ No, 10,
"in that they participated in the plunder of
public and private property, exploitation, spo
liation, and other offenses against property
and the civilian economics of countries and

territories which came under the belligerent

occupation of Germany in the course of its invafeioi^ and aggressive Yrars"o
Especially with regard to SCP'^FIN von IffiOSIGK, the Indict-

ment (pc Si) charges:
"The German Foreign Office and the defendant,
SCP;JERIN von ICROSIGN, played a significant
role in establisliing and carrjljig aut programs
for economic exploitation in various occupied
countries, particularly in occupied territo
ries in the Westo"

•

•>

t'

/.' r

And furthermore:

"The defendants, SCHv"ffiRIN von ICROSIGK, IMRE,

KOERNEH, lAlIMERS, HSIGLR, STUCIART, and lEHRL,
among other defendants^ toolc part in numerous
I meetings at which exploitation policies "/^rere

discussed, and plans were s^de." (po 6i of the
Indictment)

Follcfwing is an extract from the HIT Judgment (po 239**
2ljO) which outlines the character' of this crime3
%

'« * aThe evidence in tliis case J^s established,
however., that the territories occupied by Ger

many were exploited for the German war effort in
the most rutliless way, 7ri.thcut considers t i.on of
the local econoiry, and in consequence, of a de
liberate design and policy^ There "vras in truth
a systematic ^plunder of public or private prop

erty', vrhich was criminal under Article 6 (b) of
the Charter.

"» ♦ gThe methods employed to exploit the resourc

es of the occupied territories to the full var
ied from country to countryo
-114^

In some of the
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.
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occupied countries in the ea-st and the -west,
this exploitation was carried c^t within the

framework of the existing economic struct^3r'e«
The local industries were put under German su-

"oervision, and the distribution of v^ar nsiterials was rigidly controlled* The industries
thought to be of value to the German -.var ef
fort were compelled to continue^ and most ef
the rest T-rere closed dovm altogether« Raw ma
terials and the finished products alike were
confiscated for the needs of the Gernxin indistry.

. .These resources were requisitioned in a
manner out of all proportion to the economic
resources of those countries, and resulted in

famine, inflation, and an active black mrket.

At first the German occupation authorities'at

tempted to suppress the black market, because
it .^s a channel of distribution keeping local

products'out of German hands. Tmen attempts
at suppression fai3.ed, a German purchasing agency was organised to make purchases for wer-

•W on the black market, thus carrying out the

assurance made by the defendant Gearing that it;
^vas tnecessary that all should kn^f that if ^
there is to be a famine anywhere, it shall in
no case be in Germary' •

"In iwny of t'ne occupied countries of the east

and the rvTest, the authorities maintained the
pretense.of paying for all the property which
they seized. This elaborate pretense of pay
ment merely disrjiised the fact that the goods
sent to Germany from these occupied countries

themselves, either by the device of excessive
occupation costs or by forced loans in rot^n
for a credit balance on a iclearing account'

•which vias an account merely in name. .

Evidence relating to the pertioipation of the defendant
ra.SlGK in the spoliation-of countries incorporated and oc
cupied by the German Reich is given as follows:
1. Spoliation in Poland

Shortly after the invasion of Poland, a decree, dated
' 12 October 1939, was issued by Hitler and co-signed by SGffiffiRIH von KROSIGK by which the Polish territory was put under ^
the control of Hans 'Franlc, sentenced to death by the B-IT.
' Pranlc was to sot up a budget approved by SCfflERIN von KROSI

IGK.

The decroo stated!

"Section X

f

Tbe territories occupied by German

troops-shall be subjoot to tho authority of tho
GoygrtjO^—Ooherai of tiio oooupiod PolisVi torrl**

torias, oxoopt ill SO fup as tliay apa iiiQOppspa'feeil
I

.

'

vfithin the German ^eich.

Section ^3- (1) The cost of admnistratlon shall
be borne by the, occupied territoryo

(2) The Governor-General shall draft a budget.
The budget shall require the approval of the
Reich ItLnister of Finance^" (2537-PSj Exh.
U91, Bk. 70-C, ^nd Blc. 3^)
It is' noted that in this "way^ von IGIOSXGK shared^ from the very

beginning^ the responsibility of all economic and financial
measures to be taken in Poland.

On 13 October 1939j the day

after the promulgation of the aforementioned decree^ Goering
furnished the Reich Mnisters vdth detailed directives for
the economic administration of the occupied territories.
Goering stated^ in part^ that
"the task for the economic treatment of the var

ious administrative regions is different, de~

pending on v/hether the country is involved v/hich

•will be incorporated politically into the Ger

man Reich, or v/hethsr we vdll deal v.ith the Gov
ernment-General v^hich in all probs-bility will

^ot be made a part,of Germany".

' -V

'vjf

regard to Poland, Goering continuedi

(
"On the other hand there imist be removed from the
territories of the Government-General all raw ^
n^terials-, scrap materials, macliines, etc.,
which are' of use for the .German v/ar econoray„ •

Enterprises which are not absolutely necessary
for the meager maintenance of the naked exist
ence of the population must be transferred to

Ge^S-" (SC^O, Exh. 1286, Bk. 72^)

By this, the fraraevfork for the exploitation and spoliation ws Qstablxshed. Aooording to the previous letter by
if&'rj-

Goering, a special agency, the ilain Trustee Office East
(Ifeupttreuhandstelle Ost - HTO), Was installed to handle
the seizure and adjninigtration of the Polish State and of

Polish and Jewish citizens. (EC-UlO, Exh. 1286, Bk, 72-^)
(See HTO brief of the Prosecution)_

Tn pwr§ufinQ@ hf th©

F0ed:veid froin Qoaring, th^

Minister of Finance it&de contact v/ith the OKH and OKI^ on 29

November 1939 in order to •vi^ork out the principles of the fi'nancial matters*

The agreement arrived at appears in a note

by ilinlsterial Dirigent Bayrhoffer, dated 18 January 19iiO;

(NG-5251j Exh* 3922, Bit* 212) and on the same day Bayrhoffer^
"by order" of the Minister of Finance, confirmed it in a let
ter to the High Command of the ViTehrmacht j

"With reference to the conference of 29 Novem

ber 1939) I hereby confirm that captured 'or
seized funds, etc,, irrespective ivhether the
equivalent of Polish notes or coins or other
currencies are concerned, i/ill first have' to

be paid into special deposit accounts"at the
Reich Treasury, (Note: "Reich Treasury" is us

ually translated "Reich Main Pay Office")

Cap

tured or seized securities I also beg to sur
render to the Reich Treasury v/hich v/ill take. .
these securities into deposit and — as far as
possible - ivill make available to the same de

posit account the proceeds from sale^"

(NG~

9251, Exh, 3922, Bk. 212)
I

On 12 February I9I4.O Cooring provided the high officials

vfho v/ere in charge of exploiting the Eastern territories with
further instructions.

He held a top secret meeting during

wfierein he stressed
"that the strengthening of the war potential
of the Reich must be the chief aim of all meas

ures to bo taken in the East",

and added:

"It v/ill be the task of the Reich to carry out

the reconstruction of the East with all its pov/er after the end of the war," (underscored in ^

the minute^ "Tec^05, EXh, 1239, Bk, 72-A) ,

The defendant von ICROSIGJC vjas present at this meeting.
Another meetiiig on the same topic, i*e,, the economic pol

icy and organization in the recGntly-oocupiod Eafetern •terri
tories, "was held by Goering on 8 November 19kl« The results
of this discussion were gathered in a memorandum of 18 No
vember I9I4I which v/as sent to the defendants, SGHi^RlN von
«117-

ICROSIGKj lAiHISRSj Dft-HRE, and miGER, among others,

Fo11ot7-

ing are some diroctivos quoted frora that memorandums
A

I

"For the duration of the v/ar the require
ments of the v;ar industry are the supreme
laii of all economic operation in the re
cently occupied territories,

A

II

"In the
cupied
ically
and by

A

HI

"The point of gravity for all economic v/ork

long-range vie;*;^ the recently oc
eastern territories v/ill be econom
exploited from colonial vigy/points
colonial methods.

lies in the production of food and ravr ma-

terialsp The highest possible production
surpluses for the supplying of the Reich
and the other European countries are to be
attained through cheap production and main
tenance of I0.7 living standards of the na
tive population,
B Ie2

"The urban population can receive only veiy
slight quantities of foodstuffs. For the

big cities (Mosco;-/, Leningrad, Kiev) noth
ing at all can bo done for the time being.
The consequences resulting therefrom are
liard, but unavoidable. Persons working di
rectly in the Gorman interest will bo fed
• • cin such a manner that their v/orking
strength vfill bo maintained to some extent,
0 la

"All agricultural and industrial installa
tions are tho property of the Soviot State,

This property has now been transferred to
the Reich,

D I 3 •

"I'ti is the clearly pronounced will of the
Fuehrer that the Reich^s burden of debt

arising from tho vrar must for the most part
be covered by roceipts that must be ex
tracted from the rocGntly-occupied terri,

D II 1

tcries.

"Budgets for the income and outgo of the
Roich^s Conmissariats will be dravm up by
the Reich JTinister for the Occupied East
ern Territories and approved by the Reich
Financo ITinister,

D II 2

"The Reich Finance Ilinistor will determine

what receipts in the occupied Eastern ter
ritories shall flow directly into the Roich
Treasuiy and v/hat rocoipts shall be left
at the disposal of the Reich Commissars
within the frame\Tork of their budget,"

(fTI-Ul+O, Exh. 1062, Bk, 122, p. 76, and
Bk, 70-C, p. 89)

Such Were tho ruthless aims and "colonial" methods of the
economic program for the Eastern territories.

Tho last three
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directives quoted above vfere especially destined for the de

fendant SCHliVERIIT von IGIOSIGK.

Tliey outline some of the ac

tivities assigned to him^ and evidence proves that he carried
them out«

HavT closely von ICROSIGK follovTed the line set by Goering
is evidenced by a secret letter signed by himself and dated

USeptember 1914-2, The letter concerns the exploitation of '
Poland;

"The Reich expects considerable economic and fi
nancial relief to come from the occupied East
ern territories.

These territories are to se

cure the food for the German pcoplce Oil^ coal_,
ore, and other raw materials are to be taken out

of the East for the purpose of German, nay the
European econon^r.

Another part of the letter (p„ 1) reads;
"The labor potential of the East is serving
our production^

Even greater use vdll have

to be made of the Eastern territories in the

present situation,

Tn this connection I may

refer to the statements of the Reichsmarshall

at the meeting of 6 August 19U2,"
Exh, 3921;, Bk, 212)

(NG-i;900,

.

It goes T/ithout saying that the confiscation policy,

with regard to property of Poles and Jg'vvs, was also applied
in the area of Danzig, According to notes of the Finance

Ministry, signed by Ministerial Director Maas, it was re
vealed daring a conference on 2? ISiy 19lD-, in which several

representatives of the Finance Ilinlstry participated, that

"3i;5 pieces of real estate having an assessable value of ap
proximately 7,161;,000 HM" were confiscated by virtue of the

"Decree governing the confiscation of Polish property in
Danzig, dated 1; Soptombor 1939", Similar measures were tak—
on in Zoppot.

The aforesaid notes state:

The real ©state property in question coming
ownership has an assessable value

of 1,262,082 Ri'l, that coming from Jewish own- /
ershlp an assessable value of 561,900 RJj; -119-

total 1^823,932 Kl',"

(NG-I669, Exh. 21+59, Bk.

88)

These figures appear insignificant, but they must be Judged
ivith a view to the size of Zoppot. Zoppot, near Danzig^ is a
tovm of 28^000 inhabitantso

A report of 10 October

concerning the "financial

achievement of the occupied areas up to 31 ITarch 19l4i"' shov/s

that the Government-General contributed about 1,200,000,000 Rii
as so-called "defense contribution"«

To be added are the fol-

Ica-zings

Retiurn of Zloty notes

290,000,000 Rli

Clearing debt and Reich

Treasuiy investment
Gent by laborers
Sent by FOW's

3,1^214.,000>000 Rli
71,000,000 RI.i
30,000,000 RH

TOTA.L OF TIE "REPJOH^ANC^ OF

THE GOVERNI'ENT CENERAL"

5,015,000,000 RM

(EC-86, Sxlio 2i|91, Bk. 88ll)
This tremondous contribution ext-racted from Poland consti

tutes only the amount officially evidenced by a Genmin report.
No report discloses the amount of private property taken away
from Polish citizens.

It is common kncywledge though that the

Poles were robbed of lock, stock, and barrel.

Hovfever, the

official figure ox tlie Financial achievement of the Government

General gives a sufficient idea of the spoliation as porpetratcd in Poland with the help of the defendant ICPOSIGK.

2, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg.

As far as Belgium, the Notharlc.nds, and Luxembourg are

concornod® the report, dated 21 '.lay I9I1.O, of the Commandor in
Chief

of the Army to, among others the hiinister of Finance,

(attentions State Secretary Reinhardt), gives a survey on the
oconomic situation in those countries, stating that tho supn-

plies of raw materials V7ill be investigated and that a decree
120-

on confiscation has been worked out "to create a basis for a

regular management of strategical rav; materials, half-fin

ished goods, etc«".

(NC—3911, Rjch. 2[;62, Bk, 88l)

On 10

July I9U0, the iiilitaiy Commander in Belgium and Northern
France published a "Public Notice of the Establisliment of a

Clearing System betv/een Belgium and the German Reich" by which

the rate of the PJJ v/as fixed at 2,5 Belga,
2ii6It, Blc« 881)

(3608-PS, Exh,

It must be recalled that the RII had practi

cally no value outside of Germary before the outbreak of the
7^ara

Germans v/ho came to foreign countries v-rith RH could sell

them only on the black market at a fraction of their nominal
value.

The official rate of the W applied only to a fev/

transactions approved by the Devisenstolle (Agency for For
eign ExclTange), and this approval could only be granted within

the close ccmpass of foreign money v/'hich v/as at the disposal
of the Reichsbanktf

By this ordinance, Germrn businessmen

v/ere empowered to buy goods, patents, etc. from Belgians and
to pay processing costs at the very favorable rate.
Let us assume that this clearing system v/as not worked

out in agreement with the ilinister of Finance, it cannot be
contended that he was not informed of it.

Belgium like all other invaded countries had not only to
pay ocoupe.tion, but also non-occupation costs to cover the
needs of German troops outside of Belgium.

This was in di

rect violation to the "Hague Regulations on Land "farfare" of
18 October 1907.

von iflOSIGK kncfv/ about these non-occupation

costs. A letter by the Chief Military Goiimiander to the Reich

Finance Minister, dated 2k April 19ii2, informed him to tliat
effect.

The letter indicated that

"a total of RI\{ 28,209,066.6ij. were made in I^rch
from Belgian occupation costs, which served
-121-
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from the beginning to cover

the needs of the

Armed Forces outside of Belgium (non-occupa

tion costs)".

(SCR-lOiij Exh.^ 2l|67, Bkr.. 88l)

To Y/hat ejrbent those "non-occupation costs" ivera used is shown

by a letter of the Commissar at the National Bank of Belgium,

dated 1 I^-y 19ii2, to several high military and civil agencies,
among them the Main Administration West of the Reichskredit-

•kassen, an institute v;hich furnished the German army in oc
cupied territories v/ith a special kind of money, namely Reichs-

kreditkasseiir-notoso

The document proves that even "payments

for political purposes, i^G. SS, Propaganda, Hitler Youth,
etco , .are to be paid out of tho occupation costs of Bel

gium".

(EGR-106, Exiio, 2668, Bk. 83l)

These Roichskreditkassen-notes had no backing at all,

tho only backing of this "money" v-jas based on "the hopo of
victory". (Tr. P. 23913)

Despite the fact that von KROSIGK

objected to the acceptance of these notes as occupation costs

from Belgium;- (EGR-lii2, Exh. 2ii71, Bk. 88l) he did, ho^Tover,
approve the use of RllC-notes for black-market purchasos in

FrancQo

(Tr« Coni'nission I, p. ISBWl)

a) The Bolgian Gold.

Special attention Y/as paid to the

Belgian gold because it -was desperately needed as the Gomian
reserves of gold and foreign exchange had decreased consid

erably.

This Yvas stressed in a letter of the Delegate for tho

Four Yoar Plan to tho High Goiiimand of the Armed Forces, dated

8 July 19l|2«

The letter states i

"Also the taking ovor of tho gold supply of the
Dutch Bank, Ydiich has moarr.fhilG bec-n put into
effect and vrhich has taken place in montlily in
stallments under the title ^Gontribution to the

battle against Bolshevism^ cannot replace the
reserves to tho absolutely necessary extent.

The already often-discussed taking over of Bel
gium Gold, all of Y.'hich has moamThile arrived

in Berlin at the equivalent value of 5U5 million
RI.J and has been taken into custody by the Reichs-

bank as a regular deposit for tho Belgium National
-12S-

Bank^ can, therefore, not be postponed any

longers"

(EC-UOl, Exh. 2li69, 3k, 88l)

The only question vra-s the method of confiscation.

The Dele

gate for the Four Year ELan feared that the directors of

the National Bank and the Chief Secretaries would resign if
th(3y Tfere forced to sell the gold to the Reichsbank or to de

liver it under the title of occupation costs. As their re
signation was "not desired", he suggested to siiaply "requi
sition" the gold, for "in the case of a requisition on the

basis of article 52 of the Hague Regulations concerning land

v/ar, the Chief Secretaries would not have to cooperate", and
the Delegate "was of the opinion that their resignation would
presumably bo avoided in this v/ay.
ivas sent to the Minister of Finance,

Copy of this proposal
(EC-UOl, Exh, 2U69, Bk,

88l)
Incidentally, the trdcky suggestion to requisition the

gold apparently originated ^^ith the Foreign Office as sho^'m

in its letter of 18 Jane 19ii-2 (foregoing document).

The con

fiscation of the gold finally took place on 1? September 19^2,
according to the report of the Commissar at the National Bank

of Belgium of 5 June 19ij.3.

(ECR-1U9, Exh, 2U72, Bk. 88l)

Details in connection vfith the occupation costs against

Belgitu-a are given in the report, dated 15 August 19144-, for
the month of July 19144- by tho Commissar of the National Banlc

of Belgium.

Tho report states that "the occupation cost

payments of Belgium amounted at the end of July 19l4l- to 65,

498,000,000 Belgian francs". The enoimiity of this aanount
may be judged from the fact that Belgium has a popalation of

about 8 million Inhabitants. A copy of the report of l5 Au^
ust 19l4l-was sent to the Finance Minister,

2473, Bk. 8811)
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(ECR-173, Exh,

As a matter of course^ the indicated amount concerns only

cash payments o

The financial report of the Chief of iiilitary

Adininistration" in'"Belgi\iin and Northern France proves that

Belgiuaa^ in addition^ supplied over h billion RM in goods to
Germany and received only a little over one billion in re-

burn.

(ECH-lp Exh, 2hlk, Bk, 8811)
Another report, dated 1 Deceabor 19i;2, of the Commissar

of the National Bank of Belgiuia for the period from 30 July
to 29 October 19U2 revealed the unfavorable effect that the

occupation costs, clearing advances, and exchange of RIQC

(Rcichskreditkasson) certificates had upon the Belgium econonyc.

In part, this report stateds

"The total deficit of the Belgian budget a-

mounted to 5^5-72,300,000 mi 11ion bfrs in the
months August to October 19i|2. » oOn the oth
er hand, the Belgian clearing credits increased

in even greater tempo by 5^1 billion bfrso 0 •
The increase has been caused to an increasing
extent by the financing of the black market

purchases of German agencies,"
2ii?0, Bkc 881)

(ECR'-132, Exh*

A similar "strictly confidential" report is that of 5

June 19^3, covering the period from I^y 19U2 to IJay 19l|3, and
once more showing the occupation costs assessed against Bel

gium, the black market purchases, the acquisition of the Bel
gium-French gold, o.nd the clearing agreement entered into with

Belgiuiu by "v/hich oxcessivo debits against Germany u'ero cleared
up.

The follOT/ing significant sentences are quoted:

"In the year of this report alone, according to
the above, the payraents made by Belgium for

Gorman requireiuents'amounted to about til bil
lion bfrSc, that is, more than doable the na
tional Belgian expenditures or more than
thirds of the estimated Belgian national in
come of 50 to 60 billion bfrs^"

a cTho greatest danger for the Belgian cur

rency and the econoiy vjas the black market,
Vifhich has received a considerable iiTipetus from

the purchases by German organizations and ser

vices, -vThich in the past year vfere made in
-1S4-

ever-increasing amounts. Apart from the fact
that these purchases endangered the German '
reputation in Belgium, the Belgian General
Secretaries and the management of the Note
Bank have repeatedly declared their inabili

ty on moral grounds to provide more money
means for disposal for black market purposes."
(ECR-1U9, E:di. 2i;72, Bk. 88l)

The "Distribution" of the report shows a copy of it v/as
sent to the Ministry of Finance*

Evidence for the active participation of the defendant

KROSXGK in issuing or approving the directives for the spoli

ation of Belgium is given by a latter of the Delegate for the
Four Year Plan to the Military Commander and the OKH, dated
11 June Ipijlo

This letter dealt v/ith the collection of

occupation costs in Belgium, and the addressees Y^ere re
quested to apply the directives vforked out "in agreement
Tfith the Minister of Finance, the Reich Minister for Eco

nomics, as Yfell as the OM".

One of these directives read

as folloiTsj

"Belgium must provide under the title 'Internal

occupation costs' those sums v/hich are gotten
out of the country to finance the needs of the
German military formations uocated in the coun

try*

Goods which are purchased in Belgium for

the noods of the Armed Forces in other terri

tories are not to be paid from occupation costs
but through the clearing. Goods Yirhich are ac
quired by means of requisitioning are to be paid
out of the occupation costs, YJiiether they are in
tended for the use of the Armed Forces inside the

country or in other areas."

(ECR-32, Exh, 2ij.63_,

Bk. 88l)

Significant in this respect is also the letter of the

Special ELenipotentiary Fest of the Central Administration

of the RKIC to the Central Administration of the RKK.

letter states in parts
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This

"In addition, the Military Gommander
in Belgium and iMorthern France has

made

cation ^o_the_Reich__Minister

of Finance, Berlin, that- there "be put"
at his disposal those payments which
have up until now "been spent "by the
Wehrmacht for the purchase of goods

used outside the country (Belgium).
Purchases of this sort, of good to
be used by the Wehrmacht in other

areas, are likewise to be paid not
out of occupation costs as previously,
but through the clearing. At least
• 20 million Rl^i a

involved,"

month are said to be

(ECR-.35, Exh.2465, Bk.

88 I)
The fact that the collection of occupation costs was

carried out "in agreement with the Minister of Finance"
and that applicatOns of this sort had to be submitted
to him,

needs no elaboration.

The l e t t e r of the Reichskreditkasse of >imsterdam

to their Central -administration at Brussels, dated

18 May 1941, indicates the amounts exacted from the
Netherlands. The occupation costs for the month of

March 1941 amounted to 70 million hfl, and the non-

occupation costs to 23.8 million hfl.

The letter

discloses that the Military Commander in the Nether
lands received from the Dutch Finance Minister a
"credit" of "100 million hfll'

It states further;

"On the German side it has been attempted
not to exceed this credit. As is shown

in our report of 19,3, this_has not been

possible in the past year x.u this present
year, however, the requirements, mainly
for non-bccupation costs, have increased

greatly,"

(EOK-175, Fxh.2461, bk.88 i,

p.76)

Before continuing to the spoliation of France,
the smaller countries, stripped with the help of the
defendant von feROSIGK, must be mentioned.
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3.

Yugoslavian-' Territories

As to the former

037ie_s of

Lower Styria and Garniola the Chief Command of the
and the

Armed Forces informed the finance Ministry/Ministry of

Interior on 10 July 1941 that"the legal basis for

the incorporation of property on former military

real estate, etc., taken over by German armed forces,
has to be established".

On 23 August 1941 the

Ministry of Interior (Section I South—East, Stuckart'g
Division) advised the High Command of the Armed
Forces that such confiscation should follow the

Pc.ttern taken in the former Czechoslovakian State
in the territories incorpora.ted into the Sudetenland.

Copy of this advice v/as sent to the finance Ministry
which promptly reacted on 17 September 1941 by
replying:

"There are no objections to the regu

U

la.tion suggested by the Reich Minister

y

of the Interior and the Reich Minister

of Justice."

(NG—4767, Exh. 1176, Bk.

70-C)

Typically and cynically enough, the confisca

tion of property belonging to natione,l6 and Juristic
persons of Lower Styria, Corinthia, and Carniola took
place by virtue of the "Decree of the Fuehrer and
Reich Chancellor on the Utilization of Confiscated

Property of Enemies of the Reich, dated 29 Ma.y 19*^1 »

signed by Hitler and the defendant Lammers. (NG-5037,
Exh. 2248, Bk. 80). The Plenipotentiary for the
Four Year Plan advised the Ministry of Interior to
this effect and the defendant Stuckert informed the
Finance Minister accordingly. (NG—4769, Exh. 117 ,

Bk. 88 I) The only dou>t that arose in this respect
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concerned the question of v/hether the confiscation

should be made In favor of the entire G-ermem Reich
or in favor of the local areas.

The local areas

finally got the priority, as sot forth in Stuchart's
letter dated 24 October 1941 which we,s sent to

SCHl'ffiRIN-ICRGSICrK and others, and, in part, steited;
'H/hen, -in future, confiscations in
favor of the Reich ,^take place, the

Reich Minister of ^ins.nce v;ill, in
a.drainistrating and utilizing the confisce.ted property left with the Reich,
avail himself of the general a.clniinistratlon on an intermediary level, which
for Styria, accordingly, v/ould be the

Reich G-overnor. " (NG—4769 B, Exh. 1177,
Bk. 70 C)
This reference by Stuckart to the Minister of

Finance was in conformity with the above-ijientioned
Fuehrer decree of 29 May 1941 v/hich iraplica.ted the
assignment of KROSIG-K to

administering a,nd utilizing

the confiscated property left to the Reich".

ViThen

the property of the Yugoslav Banat end of the roya.1
house was confiscated in favor of the G-a,u, the

Finance Ministry protested vji+^h the Ministry of

Interior by letter of 9 April 1942 and demanded that
the confiscation must be on behalf of the Reich, i.e.,

administered and utilized by the Finance Ministry,

Cng-4766, Exh, 1179, Bk. 70 C)

The same holds true

v/lth regard to the seized estate of Ronowitsch as evi
denced by a memorcjidum of an official of the Ministry

of J^inance, dated 30 July 1942.

(NO-4919, Exh. 0-77,

Bk. 212)

As the territories of Lower Styria, Corinthia,
and Garniola were to be Incorporated into the German

Reich, the

Finance Ministry concluded, in a memorarv-

dum of 29 September 1941, that the Yugoslavian railways
-128-

of those countries v/ould become ipso jure pa.rt of
Gorman railways property and declared that the Reich

Railway Law "can be introduced without any restric
tions or reservations in the liberated territories

by 1 November 1941".

(NG-4768, Exh. 1178, Bk. 70 C)

The case of the "Relchs Gau Lower Styria" v;here

the

Chief of the Civil Administration seized property

on behalf of his Gau gave the Reich i'larshal of the

Greater Germany a further apportunity for setting
forth the principles applied in Poland v/ith regard
to the confiscation of e.ssots.

"By order" of Goerlng

the defendant Koerner wrote to the defendant Lammers
on 17 June 1941:
"The basic idea of all mea.suros for
the economic re-incorporft.tion of the
Eastern Territories was, that, since

these territories have been conquered

by the sv;ord in the Polish Campaign

in 1939 by the whole of our people,
the fruits of this victory should be
enjoyed by the whole of the Gorman

nation.

Thus, I immediately ordered

at the time that all Polish assets

situated in the incorporated Eastern
territories should be administered in
the interest of the Reich."

Moreover the letter stated;
"If, hov/evor, one wore to agree with
the Reich Minister 'of E'inanoe that
the above mentioned settlement is the

only possible solution from a political
and economic point of view, then i t

would seem desirable that the principles
concerning the treatment of Polish assets
should be extended to other assets
captured by the Gorman V/bhrmacht and that
these assets should benefit the whole

of the German people which carries

the burdens of vmr, but not individual
parts of the country."
39S3, Bk. 212)

(MG-4912, Exh.

ihis letter thus shows that von KROSIGK was in full

agheomont with Koerner and Goerlng.
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4. Bohemia and Moravia

With regard to the Protectorate of Bohemia

and Moravia, the letter of the ^^inance Ministry^
dated 30 November 1944, to the State Minister and

SS Oborgrupponfuehrer iCarl Hermann Frrnk, proves

the burden impossed on these tivo territories by the
defendant Von KROSIGE. He explained to Frenk tha.t the
military development of the war in 1944 had led to a
serious fina.ncial overload of the R.eich and to a

considerable deterioration of the budget.

On the

9

other hand, the tax rates in the Protectora.te were

allegedly lower than in the Reich.

Von KROSIOK "knew

that this did not moan anything, for ho v;roto:
"I do not x-jcjnt to draw conclusions

from this comparison. . . because
in such compe.risons a,lso other
essential fi.ctors

ha,v.e to be taken

into account,"

Nevertheless, he was of the opinion that,

"in the

interest of the common financing of the v/ar", the

Protectorate could be charged v'ith d;ill greater
achievements than those up to that date.

Therefore,

he stated:

"I intend to fix the proportionate
contribution at 1,25 billibn RM for
1944 end to start for 1945 from a

proportionate contribution of 1,5
billion." (Ng-4060, Exh. 1174, Bk.
70 C)

This letter is personally signed b;y the defendant
Von KROSIGK.

5.

France

The Eonplest opportunities for exploitation were

in Prance, by far the richest of all inva.ded countries
The Nazis ma.de the most extensive and thorough use of
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of this opportunity and stripped Fr^Jice to the bone.
J-he defendant KHOSIG-K had fjti essential share in this
act of spoliation also.

Shortly after the armistice, the Delegate of

the Four Year Plan sent a letter, dated 4 July 1940,
to, among various Ministries, the Ministry of Finance,
a.ttempting to give legal Justificc?,tion for economic
measures against Prc.noe.

The letter especially

referred to Art. 3 of the Armistice Treaty which
gave Germany "all rights of the occupation power",
and stated*

"On these rights of the occupation
pov/er Germany can base all measures

which arc, according to her own
judgment, necessary for the continua

tion of the wrr against l^ngland.

Accordingly, the rights of Art„ 3
are more extensive than the rights

of the occupation power in the Hague
Regulat'i ons for the V/ar on Land. "
Reference in that letter was also made to Art.

17 which "gives Germany the right of securing the
economic values and stocks In the occupied territories."

The appendix of the letter set forth fhe following;
"Economic property is the general

term for everything v/hich determines
the economic life of the individual

and the community.

Naturally, a.

complete list of all those values

cannot be given.

In order to explain

the contents of the terra to the
French Government and to facilitate

its use, I give the folloiving list
of examples of economic values of

the most Important economic fields.
"Foodstuffs and feed of all

kind as well as raw materials,
installations for its produc
tion, raw materials, semi
finished and finished products
of all kinds as well as in
stallations and structures

Tor Its production including
mineral wealth and forests,

foreign exchange currency,
etc." (Ec-lis; Exh. 2475,
Bk. 88 II)
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The document :./'4.T.-rS: -'^xh, 2476,
88 II, gives
the background ox the French occupation costs. The
Pile mainly contains correspondence beti^^een the
Chairman of the German-P):.ench Economic Commission-

Ambassador Hemmen, and the Chairman of the French

Delegation, General Huntzirger,

On 7 August 1940

the German Foreign Office had fixed the amount of
occupation costs at 20 million mi; to "be paid in
French francs or RKK-. The conversion of French

francs xvas fixed on a currency ratio of 1:20;'
1 m would equal 20 fr-So In his note of 8 August
1940, General Huntzinger objected to.the daily
amount, as well as the exchange rate^

Details

on this protest have been given by witness Hemraen

when he testified that General Huntzing.--,
V^maintained that with a contribu

tion of 20 million BIf per day in

^^®.Pplnion it would be possible

to maintain an army cf 18 million

menc^and that Germ-any with these

20 millioii Fil would be in a. posi

tion to .buy all of France^- (Trop.
3950, Session of 23 llax-'oh .1948)0
General Huntzinger-s protest i«ras of no avail»
and a second protest by the French Delegation of

24 October 1940, signed by "yves de Boisange.r, was

likewise unsuccessful,

in his letter to Hemraen,

dated 4 November 1943, Boisanger objected once more

to the "burdens imposed on France, explaining in
detail that it would lead to a catastrophe.
It is not necessary to set forth here the de

tails of the occupation costs.

It is sufficient to

say tfe t the amount changed later on but that, never

theless, the Payment averaged about 20 million RM a
day until the liberation of Frmce^ KROSIGK partici
pated in the decisions in Question made by the German
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Government or the T-reign Officeo

In this respect the

secret telegram^ dated 19 February 1942, of Wiehl (For
eign Office) to Hemraen Is indlcatlvec

Wiehl instructed

Hemmen to emphatically warn Boisanger against the

planned discontinuation of the payments for occupation
costs by France as i t "would create a serious situation

and result in corresponding German counter measures"o

Wiehl^s telegram goes on to says
"The Reich TJIlnister of Finance has on

17,February declared that he approves
these steps
Bko 88 11)^

""

.' (1741.-)?S,- Sxhc 2476,

In addition, the witness Hemmen has described to

the Tribunal the position and the function of the HPA

(Handelspolltischer Ausschuss), 'which was created as
a special committee of the Reich Cabinet^

The follow

ing excerpt is quoted from Hemmen-s testimony;
"Qo

What composition did HPA have as

far as membership^

"A,

Represented in the HPA were OKW,

Four Year Plan, Reich Finance Hini-

stry, Minister of Economics, Minister

of Agriculture; and the Roj.chsbank,
and when the occasion arose other

ministers like Minister of Transport

or Minister of Munitions were called
in."

"Q.

The chairmanship of this committee

A,

The chairmanship was held by, as I

was held by whom^
said before,

the Director of the Eco

nomic Department of the Foreign Office,
Mr. Wlehlc

And would you briefly describe the
functions of HP A?

"A

The HPA handled all economic and

financial questions between Germany

and foreign countries; also the eco
nomic and financial relations between
the German Government and the Vichv

Government, after an armistice had
^en concluded were handled by this
M l, 1948).
March

3946, Session of 23

This testimony shows that the Finance Minister,

also by way of the HPA, was not only kept informod
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of "all economic q.isstlons^ "between Germany and tYB
Vichy Government, but r.hat, as a meiaber of the com

mittee, he also cooperated in "handling" these ques
tions.

A memorandum dated 9 November 1943 is about

one of the meetings of the PTPA and is presented by

document NCU4198 (Hlxh, S482, Bk. 88 II),

The meet

ing took place on 7 November 1943 under the cha-r-

manship of Wiehl and dealt especially with occupa

tion costs in France.

The following is an excerpt

from this memorandums

'4ii[inisterial Director Wiehl pointed
out that before any further deci«

sions are made the Reich Foreign

Minister wants to knov.?, the reasons

for the high expenses occurring on
the account for occuoation costs,,

According to the attached statement
handed in by the '^ehrraacht we would

have enough with -a daily pa^rment of
15 million Reich Mark for occupation
costs if the expenses were limited

to the occupation costs proper®

Up

to now 700 million Reich M.-^rk have

been used for illegal purchases,,."

To understand this quotation, it must be recalled

that, during 1943, France paid daily installments
of 25 million RM®

Reference is now made to the aforementioned

exchange rate of Is 20 as established for the Germ-an-

French clearingc

As already mentioned, before the

outbreak of World War I, German money was exchanged
on the black market of foreign countries far bolow

Its official rate.

Notwithstanding the ratio set

up in France after the armistice, and valid for

unlimited business, was even better than the last

official rate. Hence, General Huntzinger objected
"to this rate on very good grounds. Piloreover, Hemmen
himself admitted in his report of 15 January 1941
thats
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"It was onl.T with difficulty that the
French s;:•-.'\tu^a to the agreement
couP-d 'be jbtaiiied inasmuch as this
clearing agreement involves a uni

lateral German advantage in the
following points^

"The agreement is based on an exchange
ratio of Is20 as requested by Germanyc

"Capital transfer is permissible only
from Frnnce to Germany and not vice
versac

"The Germ,an creditors for merchandise
and c?pital ^^ill receive payment of
their pre-war claims at a rate of

100 frs. equal to

pi, while the

German deh*«-t.s's have to pay their pre

war, liabilities only at the new rate

of 100 frs. equal to 5 Mo"

(1986.-PS;

Exho 2489. Bko 88 II).

The imposition of the occupation costs ha_d a ruinous

effect on France.

In his letter to Heramen^ dated 4

November 1941; de Boisanger pointed out that "the ex.-

penses of the French Treasury resulting from the oc
cupation alone are as high as the expenses of the '
State Itself'h

However, perhaps still -more devastating than this

tremendous burden were the blach-marhet purchases ef
fected by the Germans in France and paid out of the
occupation costs«,

If the Nazi Government had only

taken the money, however terrific the amounts, French
economy might have remained intact inasmuch as the

greater part of her real values would have been saved^

^®t; the abundance of money which France had to make
available for the payment of occupation costs lod to
a disastrous change of the ratio between circulation
of money and goods, and resulted in Inflation and in
t=he selling out of France,
Reference ig made to a letter, dated 9 September

19iO, from the Finance Ministry to the Foreign Office,
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signed by Minister^

. Birectof- Berger, head of Section

V of the Finance Ministry and copies of which were
sent to Goerlng and various mlnistersr

It st?ted;

Apparently there Is no agreement

with the French as to what Is to he
regarded as occupation costs® Even
If It is clear among ourselves that

we have to avoid at the present

moment an (endless) discussion with

the French for practical reasons,

there should not bo any doubt left

on the other hand that we have the

right to Interpret the term ^sui>port^ in the broadest sense (at
least as broad as.cur vnemies them
selves did In the world w.c,r). and

that we can claim also the expendi
tures originating outside of France,
that is, mainly in Germany, for the
occupying troops in Fe-^nce'besides
the costs that originate in France

proper (equipment, home salaries,
ptc^) It should be clear that

herefor the stipulated. 20 million
M, daily are nci: suff iciento . e

(EO-201; Sxho 24V8, Bkc 88 II),

f'.q
t

K-

•^

•

•'r
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,

There can be :\6 doubt that such an Important

letter of th--;

"lanlstry^ signed only "by a

Section Chiefj was In conformity with the opinion
of the Minister^

There was apparently a stea<3.y correspondenee

between the Finance Mnlstry and other high officials
about the sajne toplCj l„.eo, the occupation costs of
France.

On 9 October 1940 the Minister for Economics

answered another letter cf •.b-r ^anance Ministry and
stated:

"... ^^"Ith regard to the assumption

n

in the last paragraph of your letter

of 26 September that, aftev the coming
into effect of the clearing arrangement

with France, payments can only be made
by way of clearing, I beg to say that
although lin2orts may be_paid for in this
^I'he,acquisition of _bond_s anci partjolpa^ions

ovners cannot b*e

arranged "dth the help of this account,
as the French Government will probably
ralse^objections against the use of
the clearing arrttn^n^nt for such acquisi-

4. '

tions. .

(WG 4013; Fxh, 2479, Bk. 88 II)

Figures regarding raw materials taken from France

and put at the disposal of the Germaj, war Sconomy,

since the signing of the Armistice up to July 1942j are
contained in the report of the Military Coraaiander on

"The development and position of Fr^nch^Indust^ry in
the area of the Military Commander., France in the year

1941,11 Following are figu-nes from this most signi
ficant dooumentc

225,000 tons of copper (80,. of the existing
French copper supplies)

49,000 tons of lead
9,000 tons of tin

(60,, of the lead supply)
(85,, of the tin supply)

5,700 tons of nlchel (86>i of the nickel supply)
"Itlon, 55/i of the French aluminum production was

gradually being delivered to Germany as well as 80/,

of the magnesium production. As to textiles, 71,000
tones of wool, 64,000 ton

of cotton, 70,000 tons of
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A^.

rar^B

further qusr.tities of linen goodsj cellular

wool and arvj-flo.*" -

jjllk -freve delivered to the Relchj

and France retalneci only 30^ of her normal production
of the woolen industry;, 16;^ of the cotton# and 13,^ of

the linen production for her o^vn use.

Finally,- French

agriculture produced for Germany during 1941 over a

million tons of wheat and oats, 11 million tone of hay
and straw, 160,000 tons of meat and large amounts of
fruit, vegetables, wine and pickled fish, as well as
53,000 tons of edible oilc

(FC-267, Fxh. 2^0, 3k.

88 IX).

This deprivation fr-om F:r-anoe of raw materials,
which is without precedent, resulted in the economic
ruin of the country.

It must be stressed that the

official figures of goods taken away by German orggtnlzations did not include purchases of German soldierso
These purchases came up in a conference held under the

chairmanship of Goering on lo October 1940, with the
defendant von KHOSIGK as a participants According to
the minutes of the conference, Goering declared 'n;hat
he considers the scruples as negllg-.>ie which were
raised by various sources, fearj.ng a threatening
depletory selling out of the oocuxjled countries" and
"that it does not matter If the selling out takes

place sooner or later",

Goering, moreover, complained

that the soldiers were demanded at the Reich frontiers

•to pay custom duties on their purchases, and gave

directives to facilitate such purchases. KROSIGK,
on his part, immediately agreed, stating "that the
Finance administration takes not the slightest
interest in levying a custom duty on goods, carried
by soldiers, etc." (1^-180, ^xh, 2477, Bk. 88 II).
.~l38-»

The purchaser, en the blach market could he paid
with French irancs;. which came from payments of occu
pation costs, or with HKK notes furnished to the

German soldiers by their respective agencies. (1741-

PS, ixh, 2476, Bk, 88 II, Note of B August 1940).

The RKK notes received by France in this way were
credited to her account of occupation costs,"' Later

on the RKK certificates were discontinued, as already
mentioned before, and further purchases were paid with
francs (Tr, Commission I, p, 38344)^
It has already been stressed that it was the
who

defendant KKOSIGK/apxDropriated all funds required for
the black market activities. The action was initiated

by Goering when he ordered a Colonel Veltgens to take
the appropriate steps to carry it out.

This fact as

well as the scope of the planned spoliation of France
/•

has been outlined by the witness von Knorre, lanisterlal Dlrigent of the Ministry of Finance:
Were these black market purchases

made only on behalf of thO' occupation
povrer, that is the troops in France,
or were they also made on behalf of'
the population in Germany?
A, Later on, according to Goering's
Instructions they were also made on

behalf of the German population, that

is, how the spending of the amounts

for price reduct-ions became necessary.
Xou say on Goering's instructions:

how do you know that?

A, Because Colonel Veltgens had ex
tensive 03?ders "hen he came to the

Ministry, .
p. 18347)

(Tr. Commission I,
'

Peering wanted everything in France, whether it
was nailed down or not. This 'Jpollcy" was x^ursued not
only on behalf of the Third Reich, Goering had an
'••'J

additional ^ioalv a'": d.lsolosed "by the defendant KHOSIGK
under direct examination:

"If;for instance; it was a matter of

inflation in any country; then Goering
would take the standpoint that we need
not bother about it, that^ on the contrary, we should be pleased if such a
state of affairs arose in any countrv,

(Tro p. 23552)

Von KROSIGK has maintained that he was opposed
to this inflationary tendency^ and that the sums

allocated by him had only to serve for price x-eductlon of the purchased goods^ that means to render

them saleable at a lower price within Germany- whereas
the money for the purchases vrere procured by the OKW
(Trc 23552)„

This does not alter the fact that

KROSIGK made possible the black-market activities

and hence the spoliation of France.

The size of these

sums were revealed by Gross-examination of the witness
von Knorre?

"Qtf

How big were the amounts furnished

by the Finance Ministry for black market
purposes or,

as you say,

for

this reduc

tion action?

"Ao

You have the Individual applications

in your document books,

but: altogether

i t amounted to about 1,250,000,OOOo- to
1;300;0O0;00Go- the value of goods would
be five or eight times the value of their
amounts

Q.

"A.

1-250,000,000 to 1;300,000,000?

Approximately, the equivalent value

in goods was only fifth or eighth part
of this sum, because they were bought
so expensively^
In this letter of 11 November 1942

"the Minister of Finance mentioned that
"the amount made available for black mar

ket purchases was nearlng the billion

mark and instead of the applied for ad

ditional 300 millions, for black market
purch^^ses, he only releases 150,000,000

through.this letter.

"A.

Yes»

* lEls Is document NG-4286, Fxh. 2458, Bk, 881,p.31,
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"1

Do you know that the Minister of

Finance^ exactly two weeks later, that
is on 25 novem'Der 1942, released an

additiona.1 500,00g^for the same purpose?
"A.

That is possible.
Possible.

May I show you the letter

of 25.November?

(Document shown to wit

ness. )

"A.

It is probably that larger imoorts

were made.

"A.

500,000,000 is that right?
Mes, only with the reservation

"Q,. Not with the reservation, but with
reference to his fundamental position.
A. Yes, at the end it says, *With this
reservation, I put this amount at your
disposal'.

"Qj

This is a copy,

is that letter

signed by Graf SCH^.7SRIN von KROSIGK?
A." Yes, that is his signature,"

(Tr.pp. 18349-18351).

The reference letter of 25 Nove^ntoer 1942 Is document

NG-4237. Sxh. 2488, Bk. 88 II, p. 216. To continue
the qucteutlon from the Transcript:
To resume, those wer^^ an additlomT

500,000,000 two weeks later.

Don't vou

remember that shortly afterwards

a onn

for the

"

another 300,000,000, but
Whether they were used suDsequently,
would have found out only at the final
accounting,

'

•feamount
fSjuS;
srjsss/ss'hssSiSK
•
of 400,000,000 was made available,
"hofl
possible.
All occupation
these purchsqpp
had to ^0
oe paid
for with
francs,
"Q. Let us take these araounts.
The subsidies price reduetinr. -p

..u

l^^S'l'OOofoooTooo t'o1e''o°xaJt"'
tloAal 500°mn^o°

400,000)0^?

'•

tlon^for^fh^^"'^'

400.

°f

Honor, may i oen^Sur^ °f

nient NG-4286. Exhibit 4258. In Book 68.
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....

•f

r

That l3 a letter signed by Her-r von
Manteuf felc

iQo

(Continued;

800^000,-000 pjus

500-000;000, plus 400,000-000 these-

amounts run" to around 1;-700;0001000
that is to say almost 2-000,000^000c

Then, Herr von Knorre. it is not cor
rect and you must be mistaken^e. when
you say that altogether 125,000,000
were allotted for this purpose^

I was thinking of the transfers^

to Account B and these amounts had to

accurmlatfev at the end of this actlonj
because more for the drop import cf
goods purchased at high prices ps-y-ments had to be made, to the Hogeso*'

(Treppo
18351-18352)y
}
•
/

•

'

.

It may be added that the Roges was the Roioh-osned

corporation which executed the black market purohaseso
(Tro p«. 18349 )c
The- figure of 1.?.700-000,000 .Is not yet completOo
The letter of the OK'vV to the ijii-niater of ILcononiics:,
the Minister of Finance and others.^ dated 20 November

1942;: was not taken into consideration during the

r

cross-examlnationo

This lettex^ proves that an addi

tional amount of 244,600,000 H'i was appx-opriated from

occupation costs ,"in order' to avoid a scandstiA c:a
the black marketpi^
,-r

(NG-4I99, Exh. 2437, Bko 88 IT-,

Finally? by letter of 26 Februar-y 1944 the Ministry

h.:- ,. •••>

of Finance placed IB^OOOjOOO Rid at i'he-disposal cf
the Four Year Han ^as additional funds

ju cover eic-

change discrspancies In the procurement of bla-k
market foreign currency by means of French occupation

coat francs'h

(NG-.42325 ^x.ho 2433, Bk,. 83 II).

• In other wordsy the funds allocf'tea up the de
fendant KROSIOK for t>lack raarke'- purchase^, i .i France
amounted to approximately two billi"-.. -vrtrars-i

i

it may be true that KB0SIG3C disagreed to a cer
tain extent with the black market actx.vitiee, but
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.

A

" r:"'

this "fundamental position" which he reserved in the

letter of 25 November 1942 (NG-dSS?^ Exh<, 2488^ Bko
88 II, pa 216) did not stop him from appropriating
the required funds»

The meaning of his "reservation^

can be seen from his letter of 11 November 1942 (NG-.

4286- Exho 2458j Bk® 88 I^ po 31) in which he wrote.;
"<ocIn this connection it is no Innger

possible in Firance_to find these sums

within the margin of present paymentS

for costs of occupation^ the proposi
tion therefore having been made to

charge them, as a total or partiallyy
to the German-French Clearing,

IOCS

"

and continued to suggests
"Under these conditions it is of vital
interest In carrying out Blach Marhet
deals at least not to purchase indis
criminately all and everything avail

':''4

able to the buyers; but to consider
the collective interest of the Reich
in their buying programme^

"In this connection the following points
are of importancec

,J
•

••

1) Apart from single, so-called Christ,
mas-purchaseS; investing in such goods.
only as are necessary for the require
ments of vital exigencies in the Reich,^

According to my information, this has
not been the leading principle in past
proceduree The term vital requirements
cannot be applied to the purpose of tools

and implements unsuitable for use in Ger
many on account of their raeasur ements-:

nor to the importance of expensive under
wear for ladies and similar articlesv-."

(N&-4286, Exho 2458, Bk„ 88 I, p„ 32)0
KHOSIGK agreed with buying goods required for vital

exigencies in the Reich but objected to the baying
Pf useless implements, e„g, luxi-.ry underwear for

ladies and the like. His position is clear„'

Aa to the proceeds from resale cf'gooSs bought
on the black market In France, they were.
occto be paid to the National Treasury
be entered as profits in con

nection with the recoj^ts of Separate

Plan XVII a ^art^KlII of the extra- ordinary (war) budget, in'a special

sub-sector with the designation "Pro—of_goods__from
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occu£ied_terrljtori£s^" (NGu-4286, Sxh.
S458, "Bk. 88 I, p, 33, Underscoring in
original).

Thereby the proceeds cajne under the Jurisdiction
of Ki^OSIGKo

The words "National Treasury" are another

translation for Heichs Main Pay Office (Reichshauptkasse)
an^i it mugt be stressed that the repeatedly quoted let

ter of 11 November 1942 (NG-42a6, Sxh. 2458/ Bl, 88 I)
is signed by the defendant KROSIGK.'

It is noted that

^ the Minister of Finance, though adverse to "bu/ing use
less and superfluous things, favored "the securing of
art treasures in the Government General and the occu-

\

pied Western territories"- for which purpose he au
thorized expense money up to m 252,000, as shown in
his letter to the Reich Main Pay Office, dated 15 July
1942, (NG-4286, Fxh^ 2458, Bko 88 I, po 28),

^

• /.,

The black—market purchases not only concerned raw

'
r

materials, foodstuffs, etCo, but also gold, foreign
currency, and securities.

Reference is made to the'

meeting of the HPA on 24 September 1940 where the
preparations for taking over the French and Polish

gold were discussed.

As to the Polish gold, on which

France had laid certain claims on account of advances
made to Poland, it was decided that these claims were
•unfounded

because "the fugitive Polish Government was

no longer competent to dispose of the gold".

At this

meeting, the defendant Stuckart was represented by
X

deputy, Shrenaberger, and the defendant SCHvTERIN-

KROSIGK by two of his section chiefs, Berger and
Wucher, which, again, shows how important KROSIGK
considered these meetings of the HPA,

(NG-3629, Exh,

2490, Bk, 87).

The report of the German Armistice Relegation for

Economy (Hemmen), dated 15 December 1944, covering the
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r
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period from 1 July 1943 to 17 August 1944, statesS

•^During the four years of the occupa-

i" . v^.".

K,tv'. .•'- ';.

tion of France tho Armistice Delega

•

tion transferred approximately 121
million BM ivorth of

investments

from

French into G-erman possession, among
them shares of war vital entei'prises
in third countries, in France and in
Germanyc
About half of these transfers

••

•; • J •.

• v-vi

have 'been paid for 'by Germany with
e-conomlc compensations "by deljv<sry
of Foreign bonds., which v?ere aoqtiired
in Holland and Belgium, whereas th-j
balance was paid tlirou^n Clearing
and from occupation costco^
(1991-.PS.,
Fxhc 2484, Bho 88 11).

As the purchases of foreign currency on the "black
%

market apparently did hot suffice^ the Flenipotsntiary

of the Four Year plan commissioned one' of the i'.arge

German banks, the Ber].ine3:" Handels Ge3elj-,gohaft, to
purchase foreign currency en the frec^ market,^

.For

this purpose, the defendant KP.Ci-jluK appropriated, byletter of 30 July 1943j the amount of 35,;700,000 Tillo
On 25 February 1944 the Plenipotentiary for the .Four

Year Plan applied for an .additional suru of 18p000,000
RM needed for the rest of. the financinl ye.aro

(NG -4283^
I

Exh, G466, JJk.

'

.

'

3:1)^

The aforesaid Berliner Handels Ge-sellschaft sup-,

plied KROSIGK with continuous reports aboeit th^ir p.'rp— '
cu.rements of foreign coin.and notese

One of these re.-

ports, dated 27 October 1943, is shown in document NG—

4287, Exh. 2485; Ek^ 88 II,.

That ^repo.vt oravlos a

green pencilmark by KKOSIGKo

Reference is made to an earlier part of this Brief

where the "Account Max Heilige.r" is dl3cue.sed...v (ppc
97 )o Further reference, is made to I^in?. sp>rial Dirigent
Bayrhoffer's letter to the Relchabank; oatcd 2u April,
1942, suggesting "to also deliver the securities fallen

to the Reich ;3:S_boo;ty to a special deposit of the Geri2an Roichsbank after they have been soreenod at the
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•0'^ A
'•

'J'-'

• :j'.

Reich Main Cashier Office"*

(NG-5072, Sxh. 2437,

Ht. 75) ;•

The already mentioned notes of the Ministry of Fi

nance and its corresponding letter to the 0Kv7, dated 18
Janua.ry 1940, set forth the principles concerning the

utilization of money,

securities,,etc*, taken as hootys

"Captureji or seized securities, saving
banks books, shares etc* will"be handed

over bjr the. V/ehrmaoht
Cashier^s Office
to the Reich Treasury for safekeeping or
utilization*"
(NGv-5251, Sxh. 3922, Bk.
212).

KHOSIGK^s testimony to this followsS.
BY JUDOS PO'VBRS:

''Qf^

'Witness, , you speak of -savings bank

booksThe document says ^savings bank
books"*
Did you interpret it to refer
to the bank of the individual depositor
or

to

"Aj»

the

books

of

the bank?

No,,Your Honor, I was thinking of

the savings bank books of the indivi

dual savers which are deposited with
a public pay office in the-form of •
deposits, as I said, or as a result
of having been confiscated*" (Tr*p.
24108).

Questioned further by the Tribunal, KROSIG-K stated:
"JUDG3 MAGUIRS:

Well, witness, you

spoke of war booty*

5'ust how eould

a savings bank book become a part of
War booty?

"TH3 witness:

You say a savings bank

book, Your Honor?

"JUDG3 MAGUIRS:

Yes, where people put

in small sums in saving accounts.
would that become war booty?

"TH3 '.VITNRSS:

How

I can't imagine any such
su

case right now. Your Honor,

"JUDG3 MAGUIRH]:

off hand

Well, how would secur

ities become war booty?

"TH3 \VITNSSS:

Yes, securities without

any further ado, Your Honor, I believe,

and^I am sure that this applies" to the

Various cashier offices of the Wehrmacht

because they also handled securities.

"^DGE MAGUIRE:

well, I mean, but how,

under what theory of international law

would securities belonging to private
J}*ii^iduals become war booty, under

What circumstances?

"TRcj WIti^IFsS:

Your Honor, first of all

we are not discussing securities of
.

--

o

o

o

O

^

W. J

^

-I. V./

WJ.

private persons. We are discussing
securities that were located in banks
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bt the enemy power and that does happen,

"klDG-S MAGUIRE;
BY m,

All rightj go ahead^,

HARBYS

"Q^
ties

\

You maintain that all those securi
confiscated in these "banks in the

occapied territories were securities of

the government which you were occupying;
is that your position?

•••.-.If

I donH know it, counselc,

.1'r

VTell., then you cannot affirm i.ct deny
it

"At-

- IP'

After all I wasn't responsible for

capturing bootyo

Wj

This was Vfehrmacht

.Jurisdiction^ •' (TropPc 25916.-23917]^

t'

This "boldly indicates that KRO.SIGK Indiccrim.-naL'ely
accepted savings bank t-ooks and securities of a"!.^ kinds
V V- V.
•v /

as booty, whatever may have "beer, thei;/ source^

•

As to the utilization of the pXiindtred property
taken over "by the Ministry of Finance through the Raich

Main Pay Office, KB.031GK gave orders as to its liquida—

tion and reallzatloni,

In January-li'941 when'he-.knew,

that Germany was doomed, KP.OSIGK issued auch orders,-.
This is evidenced by a file note of the Ministry of

Finance, dated 17 Oanua.ry 1944, which atatos thaij.
"On the occasion of his visit to

Sigruarihgen on 15 January

"bh-

Herr Minister ordered that the articles
I'#

of booty which are located in the .?.eic.h-3-.
hauptkasse (Reich Treasui-y) are to be

utilized,.^

..' p.' 'ii

(NG-5o5B, E.xhn 5925, Hky 2.12'«

Sigmaringen is a town to w,hlch some soctionri of tiio Mini^

stry of Finance were transferred at that time„

The "booty business was so vjell established by the
Ministry of Finance chat It had organized a rvecial.
"War Booty Office" within the Reich U.?.ir. T-ay

.t.ce..

On 19 December 1944 the defendan'c KRpSXGK gave orders

to this office with regard to the realization of booty?
"I i'equest to let the Municlpa.1 Pawn
Institute utilize also the objects
-147-
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.

b. L. K.

•I.'. d.

...wVi

^

made from precious metals, precious

stones and pearls, which are stored

with you«

"Objects made from platinum and gold

(bracelets, rings without stones and

pearls), old and working silver, sil
ver shavings and silver in rolls, are
immediately to be.transferred to fhe
Heich Office for Precious Metals in

Berlino"

(NG-5248, Sxho 3926, 3k<,

The letter is signed by JCROSIGK,

The last available report about '^the financial achieve,

ments of the occupied areas'- covers the period up to 31

March 1944«

The report, dated IQ October 1944, was

drawn up by the Forschungsstelle FVer Wehrwlrtschaft

(Research Office for Military Sconoray) and gives an
ins-^ructive summary of the plunder in the different in

vaded countries.

Attention is called to the following

particulars^

The Frotectorate^ considered a kind of federal State,
contributed a "proportionate payment" (Matrikularbeitrag)
of 2c.3 billion Rid-

However, . the Protectorate "furnished

much more than this sum of 2-3 billion HI.(E during the
ye-..rs it had belonged to the Reich^

We need only think

of thu weapons of rail kinds that were taken over by the
Vi^ehrmacht, the manpower represented by the armament
workers assigned to the Reich, the continual deliveries,
etc,,"

The amount of these deliveries was not evaluated^
Government_G_en£ral contributed as so-called "de

fense contribution" and vl^ olenring activities, etc.;
5,015,000,000 RIvI.

France_paid for 1940 to the first quarter of 1943

' .Itogt. ther 265 791„ 000, 000 Rlil on occupation costs, and
Germany spent 126,7 billion frs^, equaling 6,335 bil

lion Ri.., on the black market, but the report explains
that this sum does not cover all purchases and coraee
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to the following conclusion:

"The total demonstrable French contribution

is^in the vicinity, then^ of 35 billion Bll.

This sum does not include all of the French
contributions, e«go, captured raw materials

valued at about 255 million M, war bootyj

cr the billetingo"

(SG-86, Fxh, 2491. Bk'

OQ ) o

Belgium'^ total contribution amounted to about.
9,300,000,000 H/i, not including her gold deliveries.
M^lh£rland_s paid for internal and external oc

cupation costs amounting to 7,767,000,000 BM.

_b£nmark^ which was "ndt considered as occupied terri:o3:y and, therefore, did not pay occupation costs,
h-d rj cwithsT:andlng to make contributions which amounted
to about

530,000,000 mc.

Norway had "borne an especially heavy burden of

occupation demand^J^ The report figured out that this
country
r, financial contribution of over 6 billion
RI.1, and added r

'^This sum of over 5 billion Bfi is indeed
-y'lt'ge ^(amount tailing into consider'^.tlon
^n--^ s Gate of Norwegian economy, "

9/101
317oo\
bxho 2491,
Hi.
88),

(BC-SB.
^

•'

0_C£up_-L£d_3as_tern_Areas v/ere mainly charged with
agricultural contributions. The report.gives a total

figurr; _ "admittedly incomplete^' - of 4.,5 billion Rli,
stressing that Franco furnished about 7 times as much

and Bclgiuia twice as much.
Th.

(FG-.66, -^xh. 2491, Bk. 88).

are the facts pertaining to the spoliation

of the Furop^an

countries invaded by the Nazis..

The

•-nts submitted in evidence bear out the charges that
£-fendant KHOSIGK pa.rticipated in establishing and
r^ing out of the programs for the oconomic exploitation

the occupied te.rritorie8, partlcul-irly in the West,
-149^-
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V.

THE D3FEKTSE AFFIAi^ZTS

KHOSIGK strived on the witness stand to give the
imoression that he was a Minister without influence.

Simultaneously, and in contradiction to this, he rereatedly maintained that he did not resip;n in order

to remain in a position to influence the leaders of

the Kasi regime ''by building in some brakes-', ('Tr,p.

22918) ''to ward off the bad and to do the good" (Tr.p,
2?G22) and to have "the opportunity of seeing to
.iustice an5 right"(TroP« 22925),The fact remains that
he never resisted in any important matter, but proved

an obedient; henchman of Hitler, whom he held "in
steadfast loyalty'- from the beginning to the end.

A oignifioant example for the manner in which
he has uried to palliate his activities is his con
tention that his ministry employed the smallest

•.Trfoer

of Farty members^ However, under cross-exarai-

nation he has admitted that his State Secretary, Hcaiaherdt;

his T:inist-jrinl "hircct^'Ps •Klu£;,e (Sdction I), V/ucher

(Section II), Hedding ;Section III). Wever (Section IV).
his Ministerial Dirigents Bonder (Section I). Nasse,

Schwandt (Section
•T'

Braahtz (oectj.cn Y±) and

Bayrhoffer were Party members, KlugO; Wucher, Hedo.ing,

Wever, Braahtz were chiefs of the individual sections,
the others were deputies of their section chiefs.

Other important Referents like Rademacher, Breyhan,

Scholl, Sokardt were Party members also (Trpp.238o925890).,The list is not complete. The Prosecution

ciiecked the Party status of 15 of "^on KROSIGK's
affiants and it turned out that 13 of them belonged

to the Party, for the most part since 1933.Tim© did
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not permit further investigation.
All these affiants were close collahorators of

KFlOSIG-K and it is not inconoslvahle that they desire

to exonerate their former chief, since they partici
pated in his activities, and the stigma of his guilt
will rest on them to a greater extent if he is con

victed. Further affidavits submitted by the Defense
are from affiants who knew KS03IG-K's activities only

prior to Hitler*s seizure of power. For instance,

the affiant Schaeffer, former State Sbcretary of the

Ministry of Finance under the Weimar Republic, whose
affidavits cover 21 pages (Doc,No,301, Exh.160,

Defense Suppl.Bk.II and Defense DocNo.SqB, Exh.161,
Def. Suppl.Bk.II) saw KROSIGK in March 1933 for the
last time (Doc,No, 302, Def.Exh, 161, Dcf. SupplBk.
II, p.21).In any event for reasons of expediency the
Prosecution did not venture to call these affiants
for cross examination. It is left to the Tribunal
to place whatever weight they deem these affida-^-'

vits to be worthy of, in the light of the circum
stances;
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VI.

PH0P0S3D FINDINGS OF FACT CONCERNING THE

INDIVIDUAL RESPONSIBILITY OF THE DEFENDANT
SGHWERIN VON KHOSIGK

The evidence has established beyond a reasonable
doubt the guilt of the defendant KHOSIGK with

respect to the charges of the Indictment contained

in Counts, I, II, V, and VI,

The guilt of the

defendant iCROSIGK' under each of these counts is

predicated upon the following facts, which have
been established by the proof:
h

COUI^T I

1. KHOSIGK participated in the initiation of

invasions of other countries and wars of a.ggression

in vlol.ation of international laws and treaties,
and was connected with plans and preparation for
aggression in that he knowingly;

a) Occupied a responsiole position in the

Reich Government and committed Crimes against

Peace in th.at he vjas a principal in, accessory
to, ordered, abetted, took a consenting part
in, and was connected with lolans and enterprises
involving said crimes.

b) participated in the planning for Hltler^s
seizure of power,

in that he

1.) attended the meeting of Liinisters of

15 liiarch 1933 to discuss the Enabling Act,
2.) signed the Enabling Act under which
every provision of the German constitution
could

be

side-tracked.

c) participated in the coi solidntion of power
in

that he

1.) signed the law of 7 April 1933 as to
-152-
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control of the Civil Service, which
provided th^^.t officials v;ho were of non-

Aryan descent should he retired; that

officials who because of their previous

political activity did not offer security

:

befitting the Nazi plan; and that strict

regulations concerning the financial aspects
of civil service administration be invoked,

2.) sighed various other laws and regula
tions to the

sane effect,

3.) sighed the German Public Officirals

Law of ^7 January 1937 which effected the
complete subjugation of all State officials,

4.) signed the law of 14 July 1933, a

A

further blow against the Je\"rs, an accretion

-Of some financial support to the Reich, and
an in terjoj_em_ removal of opponents to the
Nazi regime.
\

+

5.) signed the law of 1 August 1934 which
consolidated all power in Hitler.

6-) participated in the deetruotion-of the
trade unions.

V.) participated in the persecution of Jews
and the churches.

c) initiated, prepared, '^nd financed the
rearmament program in its early stages with a

view to waging wars of aggression.

d) participated in devising the secret trnnsaction of the iiXFO bills, which ?ras the heart

of the secret armament budget of the Reich.
e) refused to meet the MSFO bills when they came
<iue in order to continue re armament.
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t) established a secret reaT^mament budget
for the Wehrmacht, Including the three parts
of the Wehrmacht and the Waffen SS^

g) continued to be active in the economic
field of rearmament after the Hazi plans

to wage aggressive war had "been clearly
defined.

h) demanded, in August 1938, a review of all
projects with a view to postponing any projects
which were not for the defense of the R^ich.-

i) knew of the plan to smasih Czechoslovakia and
made the necessary financial preparations.

j) became, subject only to Hitler,

the sole

financial power in the Reich by the law of

15 June 1939 which put the Reichsbank in a

position fully subordinate to the Finance
Ministry..

k) was a key figure in planning the aggression
against Poland..

1} supplied the money,, by taxes, long-term

loans, short-term loans, proceeds of confisca

tion, and the like, to fin.anco Hitler's aggres
sive

Wears.

m) participated further in government, politi
cal, and diplomatic activities consistent with
%

the aggressive policy of the Reich,
n) committed War Crimes and Crimes against

Humanity which were an integral part of Crimes
against Peace in violation of lntern.atlon-^1.
law, treaties,, agreements, and .assuranc^is, and
of Article II of Control CounoH ^aw Wo. 10.,
_
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COUNT I I

The fot'egoing p.ctivitles were knowingly engaged
in by the defendant KHOSIGK in collaboration vrith
the defendants charged in this case and divers
other persons of the SS, as a part of a common

plan or conspiracy to further the Nazi policy of
aggrandizement, and thereby to deprive German

nationals and peoples of other countries of their
personal freedom, their property, and their lives
by use of force.

COUNT V

The defendant KROSIGK knowingly participated
in plans and enterprises involving the commission
of atrocities and offenses including the murder
and extermination of human beings in that

1) he was a principal in, accessory to,
ordered, abetted, took a consenting part in,
was connected -ath plans and enterprises

involving the persecution of the Jews, to wit
a.) he approved the imposition of the
"•''ine of Atonement" in the amount of
1 billion marks on the Jews, and in
pursuance thereof issued an ordinance,

dated 21 November 1938, levying an

assessment of 20^ on the property of Jews,
to be paid in four installments, in order
to collect the "fine".

b.) he issued on 19 October 1939 a further

decree increasing the assessment to 25;^
and on lo December 1939 signed detailed

instructions as to how to exact payment.
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. c».) he was the competent authority to
realize property received from Jews "by the
Reich regardless of the method^'

•d^.) he financed the concentration camps
with full knowledge as to the conditions
therein.-

e.) his i/Iinistry of ^''inance played a consider.able pa,rt in the mass deporta-tions of
Jews to the East in 1941,

f.) he ordered that the property of the
^

Jews being deported would be confiscated
in favor of the Reich.

>

g.-) he realized for the R^ich the property
80 received from the deported Jews,-

h.) he and his Ministry of Finance were
co-responsible for the 11th Decree to the

\

Reich Citizenship Law, d-ated 23 Movoinber

1941, which provided that all Jews living
abroad'would lose their citizenship and

"V

hence their property,
'

'

) be and his Ministry of Finance were
CO-responsible

for further legislation

applying the above methods to the occupied
territories.

J.) he made available the funds necessary

to accomplish the demolition of the V/arsaw
ghetto resulting, in unprecedented slaughter
and destruction.

k.) his Ministry of ^Inance realized the
property confiscated from the Jews of the

Warsaw ghetto,: including dental gold, under
the "Account Max Heiliger",, for the benefit
of the Reich.
^156-

1») he accepted the proceeds realized
from the property stolen from the Rothschild
family of Paris for the benefit of the Reich,

m,) he co-signed the "final solution" decree,
entitled the 13th Decree to the Raich Citizen

ship Law, dated 1 July 1943, '"hich deprived

all Jews of judicial process and placed them
at the mercy of Hinmler^s Gestapo.

2.) he was a principal in, accessor^y to, ordered,

abetted, took a consenting part in, was connected
with plans and enterprises involving the Germanization program, to wit

a,) he provided the financial means necessary
for putting the Gerraanizatlon progr.am into
operation with complete knowledge, of the
intent and purpose of the progr.am,

b,.) he approved the VOHI budget for work in'
the field of Germanization,

c,) he determined, within the sphere of

Germanization, under what circumstances the
property confiscated from Polos and Jews
could be used.

\

COUl^T

VI

The defendant KROSIGK knowingly participated in

plans and enterprises involving the plunder and

spoliation of public and private property in that
1.) he was co-responsible for all economic
and financial measures resulting in the ruthless
exploitation of Poland,.
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2») he issued and a^jproved the directives for
the exploitation of Belgium, the Netherlands,:
and Luxembourg,.

) he shares responsibility for the stripping
of the Yugoslavian Territories, and Bohemiaand Moravia#-

4#) he xjlayed a leading role in the measures
resulting in the most extensive acts of
plunder and spoliation in Franco,

to v'it

a#) he took part in numerous meetings at
which exploita.tion policies were discussed
ana plans were made#

b.) he and his Ministry of ^in,ance bear
responsibility for the imposition of occupa
tion costs which had a ruinous effect on
France#

c.) he approved black market purchases
effected by the Germans in Finance, and
paid out of the occupation costs.

d.) he approTpriatod funds required to
negotiate the black market .activities
amounting to approximately two billion
marks#

* e#) he received the proceeds from resale of
goods bought on the black market in France,
for the benefit of the Reich

f#) he received, for the benefit of the Reich,
the booty taken in Franco without regard to
i t s source#.,

g.) he Issued orders as to the liquidation
and realization of the plundered property

taken over by his ministry through the
Reich Main Pay Office#
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h,) he established for these purx^oses a
special "War Booty Office" within the
Reich M.aln Pay Office.,

5.) he occupied the position of Minister of
Finance and conunitted these crimes in th^t

he was a principal in, accessory to, ordered,
abetted, took a consenting part in, .a.nd was
connected with plans and enterprises involving
the commission of said crimes..
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